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LENIN AND THE CONCEPT OF EPOCH IN WORLD HISTORY

Academician Evgeny Zhukov

As is common knowledge, the doctrine of the progressive succession of socio-economic formations is the theoretical foundation of the Marxist division of history into periods. A comprehensive scientific definition of the essence of socio-economic formations was provided by Marx and Lenin, so that the necessary clarity exists in this question.

The attention of historians and sociologists has been logically focused on concrete problems of the analysis of the various forms and specific features of the transition from one socio-economic formation to another; on problems of the struggle and temporary coexistence of various formations; on the important problem of the possibility, in certain conditions, of avoiding a rigorous succession in the transition from one formation to another, i.e., of the possibility of reaching a higher stage of social development, by-passing what stands intermediately.

Wherever the need arises to establish a division of the historical process into periods, we make use of the word epoch. The question naturally arises of whether there exists an objective criterion for the use of this concept.

It should be noted that Lenin often made use of the concept of epoch and even gave special importance to the problem of epoch while dealing with highly complex theoretical and political tasks. In his article "The Russian

Züdekums" (1915) he criticised Plekhanov for his defense-of-the-Fatherland stand in respect of the imperialist world war. Lenin characterised Plekhanov's booklet On War as a substitution of sophistry for dialectics. In Lenin's words: "He [Plekhanov] sophistically confuses the period of imperialism (i.e., one in which, as all Marxists hold, the objective conditions are ripe for the collapse of capitalism, and there are masses of socialist proletarians), and the period of bourgeois-democratic national movements; in other words, he confuses a period in which the destruction of bourgeois fatherlands by an international revolution of the proletariat is imminent, and the period of their inception and consolidation."[1]

Lenin was perfectly right when he accused Plekhanov of the failure to understand the profound social changes of fundamental importance, occurring during the transition from pre-monopoly to monopoly capitalism. What is inherent in the epoch of imperialism is distinct from the typical features of the preceding epoch. In both cases, the capitalist socio-economic formation exists and even holds a predominant position in the world. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish between the highest and final stage of capitalism, a special historical epoch in which objective conditions have arisen for its downfall and the epoch of industrial capitalism, in which the internal contradictions inherent in that system had not yet reached a degree of acuity sufficient for a consideration of the question of its future and its overthrow in all its details.

It was in greater relief that Lenin's concept of historical epoch found expression in his article entitled "Under a False Flag." Here is what he wrote: "We are undoubtedly living at the juncture of two epochs, and the historic events that are unfolding before our eyes can be understood only if we analyse, in the first place, the objective conditions of the transition from one epoch to the other. Here we

[1] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow, Vol.21, p.118.

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have important historical epochs; in each of them there are and will always be individual and partial movements, now forward now backward; there are and will always be various deviations from the average type and mean tempo of the movement. We cannot know how rapidly and how successfully the various historical movements in a given epoch will develop, but we can and do know which class stands at the hub of one epoch or another, determining its main content, the main direction of its development, the main characteristics of the historical situation in that epoch, etc. Only on that basis, i.e., by taking into account, in the first place, the fundamental distinctive features of the various 'epochs' (and not single episodes in the history of individual countries), can we correctly evolve our tactics; only a knowledge of the basic features of a given epoch can serve as the foundation for an understanding of the specific features of one country or another."[2]

Thus Lenin clearly showed that the concept of the historical epoch should be based on an objective class approach, which should not depend on particular modifications of the general historical process in individual countries. The boundaries of epochs are established within an international framework; an epoch expresses the typical social processes in which a social class operates as a leading and definitive force. In the same article, Lenin deals in detail with the most important question of the objective appraisal of historical facts and the establishment of the role of definite classes and social groups, a role which wholly depends on the overall historical situation, the character of the epoch in question. Lenin criticised the metaphysical approach to history, the absolutisation of appraisals and characterisations taken in the abstract in respect of the epoch in question, and any failing to take into account the class that is guiding the historical process in concrete conditions.

Drawing on the division of the historical process, accepted in Marxist literature, into epochs within the frame-

[2] Ibid., p.145.

work of a single social formation, in this case the capitalist formation, Lenin emphasised the following: "Here, of course, as everywhere in Nature and society, the lines of division are conventional and variable, relative, not absolute."[3] "We take," he emphasised, "the most outstanding and striking historical events only approximately, as milestones in important historical movements. The first epoch from the Great French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian war is one of the rise of the bourgeoisie, of its triumph, of the bourgeoisie on the upgrade, and epoch of bourgeois-democratic movements in general and of bourgeois-national movements in particular, an epoch of the rapid breakdown of the obsolete feudal-absolutist institutions. The second epoch is that of the full domination and decline of the bourgeoisie, one of transition from its progressive character towards reactionary and even ultra-reactionary finance capital. This is an epoch in which a new class--present-day democracy--is preparing and gradually mustering its forces [the reference is to the period between 1871 and 1914 --E.Zh.]. The third epoch, which has just set in, places the bourgeoisie in the same 'position' as that in which the feudal lords found themselves during the first epoch. This is the epoch of imperialism and imperialist upheavals, as well as of upheavals stemming from the nature of imperialism."[4] [The reference is to the period of 1914. We shall note that these lines were written in 1915--E.Zh.].

Lenin's remark on the conventionality of the concrete boundaries between one historical epoch and another is of substantial significance. It is aimed against the thoughtless and mechanical striving (dogmatic in its core) to divide the historical process into periods almost according to days and hours, the attempt to absolutise the significance of concrete historical dates, this ultimately leading to a grossly over-simplifed idea of history. Incidentally,

[3] Ibid., p.146.
[4] Ibid.

a number of Lenin's writings provide varying concrete boundaries for the definition of major historical epochs, in particular the epoch of imperialism. It is common knowledge that Lenin usually qualified the end of the 19th and the onset of the 20th century as the beginning of a new epoch.

"The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist epoch", Lenin wrote in "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism"[5]. Further, speaking of the transition to imperialism, Lenin pointed out in his article "Statistics and Sociology", that this latter epoch "...in America was especially sharply etched out by the Spanish-American imperialist war of 1898 (i.e., a war between two robbers over the division of the booty)"[6]. The same proposition on the end of the 19th century as the historically initial boundary of the epoch of imperialism[7] is also contained in a number of his other writings. In his article "Under a False Flag", Lenin defined as the initial date of that epoch the year 1914, i.e., the year in which the First World War began.

Can any serious contradiction be discerned in this? Probably not, inasmuch as the First World War was a kind of culmination of the typical processes inherent in imperialism, processes which Lenin described as "imperialist upheavals". That is why it is most important, in a definition of an historical epoch, to take due account of the main trend in social development. Consequently, the role of concrete historical events is of considerable but not primary importance. Lenin never absolutised concrete historical dates. Thus, in a letter to M.P. Pavlovich (May 1921) Lenin proposed taking 1876 conventionally "as the culminating point of pre-monopoly capitalism".[8]

[5] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.23, p.115.
[6] Ibid., p.276.
[7] In his "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", Lenin wrote the following: "Neither Marx nor Engels lived to see the imperialist epoch of world capitalism, which began not earlier than 1898-1900." (Ibid., p.111).
[8] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.35, p.501.

The dialectical approach to the historical process runs through literally all of Lenin's writings dealing, in one measure or another, with problems of the division of history into periods. While frequently speaking of "historical epochs" and providing the concept with absolutely definite content, and in establishing the main trend in social development inherent in a given epoch, Lenin also constantly cautioned against oversimplification, a stereotype approach towards a characterisation of an epoch. Thus, Lenin explained, in his polemic with Pyatakov (P. Kievsky), that besides phenomena typical of a given epoch, the latter cannot but contain other phenomena as well. Any other approach to history is grossly erroneous, since it would mean misuse of the concept of epoch. Lenin cites examples of such misuse on the part of Pyatakov, who denied the possibility of non-imperialist national-liberation wars, with capitalism going over to the new, imperialist epoch. Pyatakov saw the entire content of the imperialist epoch as being nothing but imperialism. Only imperialist contradictions existed in Pyatakov's field of vision. He ignored the fact that problems solved long ago in respect of the advanced capitalist countries (Germany, France and Britain) had not been solved in other countries. Consequently, side by side with the imperialist wars of plunder typical of the imperialist epoch, there could not but exist national-liberation, progressive wars untypical of Western Europe.

"An epoch," Lenin wrote, "is called an epoch precisely because it encompasses the sum total of variegated phenomena and wars, typical and untypical, big and small, some peculiar to advanced countries, others to backward countries. To brush aside these concrete questions by resorting to general phrases about the 'epoch', as Kievsky does, is to abuse the very concept of 'epoch'".[9]

[9] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.23, pp.36-37. In a letter to G. Zinoviev (August 1916), Lenin wrote that "an epoch is a sum of varied phenomena, in which in addition to the typical there is always something else" (Ibid., Vol.35, p.229).

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In his articles "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" and "On the Slogan of 'Disarmament'" Lenin returned to the same subject. The war of 1914-1918 was "the continuation of the imperialist policies of two groups of Great Powers, and these policies were engendered and fostered by the sum total of the relationships of the imperialist epoch. But this very epoch must also necessarily engender and foster policies of struggle against national oppression and of proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and, consequently, also the possibility and inevitability, first, of revolutionary national rebellions and wars; second, of proletarian wars and rebellions against the bourgeoisie; and, third, of a combination of both kinds of revolutionary war, etc."[10]

Thus, Lenin's understanding of an historical epoch contains the definition of the main trend in social development, and of the class force standing in the centre of the historical process and guiding its movement. At the same time, the entire historical process is considered, not in the abstract but in the totality of the concomitant concrete circumstances, in the entire variety of social phenomena.

The concept of epoch is of primary importance in establishing the periods of world history. That is so, first and foremost, because the category of the socio-economic formation--in view of the uneven historical development--reveals, as a rule, the essence of the historical process, not in all countries but only in a particular country or a group of countries. The forms and features of the revolutionary transition from one socio-economic formation to another are varied, the transition itself taking place at different times. Consequently, the division of world history into periods cannot be wholly reduced to a succession of socio-economic formations. One can hardly discern in world history

[10] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.23, p.80.

periods that can be reduced only to a characteristic of some particular formation.

As a science, history studies concrete manifestations of general law-governed patterns of social development in the historical process. That is why the division of history into periods cannot but take account of the variety in that process, and should objectively reflect the concrete modifications in the overall advance of the mankind.

Of course, it would be highly "convenient" were it possible, for instance, to completely eschew the traditional and highly conventional division of world history into the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary periods and to provide strictly scientific definitions, in keeping with each period, according to socio-economic formations. That, however, would lead to an impermissible simplification of the world historical process. If we take ancient history, it contains at least two socio-economic formations intertwined in a very complex way: the primitive communal system, and slave-owning society (with numerous particular modifications). Some Marxist historians consider it possible also to speak of the existence of a feudal formation in antiquity. It is only in the fundamentals that medieval history coincides with the period of the domination of the feudal formation. Other social forms also existed and developed parallel to that formation in various parts of the world. In the Western Hemisphere, Australia, a considerable part of Africa and in many areas of Asia, pre-class clan relations and class slave-owning relations were predominant for over a thousand years. In a number of cases, there was to be seen something of a blend of pre-feudal and feudal forms of society. In exactly the same way, it is impossible to reduce modern history to the existence of a single capitalist socio-economic formation. Feudalism and various pre-feudal social relations not only "coexisted" with capitalism and fought against it, but actually dominated over vast territories. Finally, modern contemporary history should also be characterised, not only as a single socio-economic formation--

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socialism, but also as a process of rivalry and struggle between two systems, one taking place in a situation of a considerable variegation of social forms existing in various parts of the world.

The establishment of periods in world history on a scientific basis cannot be restricted to an indication of the succession of socio-economic formations. It is in this area that the concept of the historical epoch will prove highly rewarding. We have already seen that Lenin, besides using this term, gave it a scientific definition as well. Of course, it would be totally erroneous to contrapose the fundamental principle of the Marxist division of the world-historical process into periods--the doctrine of the succession of socio-economic formations--to that relatively more particular and concrete division of history into periods, which makes use of the category of the historical epoch. One obviously cannot speak of any historical epoch in the abstract, away from the social socio-historical formations that existed at the time.

An historical epoch is a period in world history which is marked by a sufficiently stable trend of social development, a trend determined by the relation and interaction of the existing socio-economic formations. Thus, the natural borderlines in an historical epoch are determined by revolutionary changes in the alignment of forces in contiguous socio-economic formations that come into collision.

When we speak of the epoch of pre-monopoly capitalism, we take as our point of departure the victorious bourgeois revolutions in Europe and America at the end of the 18th century (in the first place, the Great French Bourgeois Revolution) which dealt a decisive blow at feudalism and ushered in a period of the self-assertion of capitalism, the formation of national states, democratic movements (but simultaneously also of colonial wars, the brutal suppression of action by the proletariat, which for the first time advanced its class demands, and the like). The gist of that

epoch was the completion of progressive capitalism's struggle against feudalism, the embodiment of the ideals of bourgeois society, and the triumph of liberalism. However, the protagonist of the epoch--the bourgeoisie--very soon cast off its revolutionary armour and revealed its rapacious nature. The length of this epoch did not exceed a century, its ultimate borderline--1871--being linked with the first attempt made by the Paris proletariat to assume power.

As already pointed out, any system of dates, including the year 1871, is conventional. Strictly speaking, the onset of a new epoch, that of imperialism, should refer to the conjunction of the 19th and the 20th century. It might seem that, if we take 1871 as the conclusion of the preceding epoch, then that would be an error in the establishment of periods of world history and mean disregard for an eventful period of 25 to 30 years. However, following in the footsteps of Lenin, Marxist historians do not consider this erroneous.

If we remember that the class approach is the basic criterion in a definition of an historical epoch, it will be obvious that, after the Paris Commune of 1871, the bourgeoisie (we are, of course, referring to capitalist countries) could no longer lay claim to the role of a progressive social force, or determine the advance of society. The thirty years between 1871 and the turn of the century, and, in particular, down to the first purely imperialist Spanish-American war of 1898, showed that though capitalism had not yet entered the monopoly stage, the bourgeoisie had already become an indisputably reactionary force, which had yielded to the proletariat (then only amassing its forces but already aware of its historic mission) the role of the leading factor in society's progressive development. The period bracketing the events between 1871 and the end of the 19th century, i.e., until the onset of the imperialist epoch, was marked by vividly expressed transitional processes and phenomena.

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The basic content of the new, imperialist epoch that set in with the beginning of the 20th century was as follows: the exacerbation of all the contradictions of the capitalist system; the turning of capitalism into an undisguised hindrance to social progress; the ever greater pressure of social and national colonial oppression of all kinds; the upsurge of the revolutionary activity of the working class and other democratic forces; the beginning of the process of the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the emancipation of the oppressed masses. The epoch of imperialism is an epoch of wars and revolutions, with the international working class finally and irrevocably becoming the guiding force in social development.

We have already seen that, at first, in 1915, Lenin regarded the period between 1874 and 1914 as an independent historical epoch; he called that period the epoch of the preparation and the gradual amassing of forces by the new class of present-day democracy. He considered 1914 as the beginning of the imperialist epoch. However, later appraisals made by Lenin give greater precision to the division of the world-historical process into periods in keeping with the actual course of social development. The First World War, which was engendered by the imperialist contradictions, did not usher in a new historical epoch, but marked its completion. The historical period of the bourgeoisie's unbridled supremacy was now reduced: in October 1917 the socialist revolution took place in Russia, radically changing the alignment of forces between the revolutionary working class and the reactionary bourgeoisie, and marking the beginning of a new historical epoch--that of the transition from capitalism to socialism.

In his "Reply to an Open Letter by a Bourgeois Specialist" (1919), Lenin spoke of the October Revolution as "the beginning of a world-wide change of two epochs in world history--the epoch of the bourgeoisie and the epoch of socialism."[11]

[11] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.29, p.230.

A year later, Lenin worded this proposition even more extensively: "The abolition of capitalism and its vestiges, and the establishment of the fundamentals of the communist order comprise the content of the new epoch of world history that has set in."[12]

The split of the world that was initiated by the October Revolution brought about--of course, not immediately--the establishment of a new and progressive socio-economic formation, socialism as opposed to capitalism. Almost another two decades were needed for the completion, in the main, of the process of the evolution of the social relations of socialism. World development as a whole has been determined in ever greater measure by the consequences of the October Revolution, which made an indelible imprint on the entire nature of the epoch.

Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, the Party Programme gives a comprehensive definition of the present historical epoch, based on Lenin's propositions and enriched by the vast historical experience mankind has acquired in nearly 50 years.

The guiding role of the socialist system, which is an embodiment of working-class hegemony on a world-wide scale, is the leading feature of the present historical epoch. However, the transition from capitalism to socialism is taking place in such conditions of history, in which, side by side with the two antagonistic systems, the two basic socio-economic formations--socialism and capitalism--there exists a vast "peripheral" area represented by a variety of survivals of pre-capitalist relations, mostly operating in combination with bourgeois forms. Consequently, the very process of the transition to socialism cannot but be marked by a wide variety of concrete roads, that depending on the level of development achieved by individual countries, and on the existence of objective and subjective factors accelerating or holding up the course of history.

[12] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.31, p.392.

The period of time that has elapsed since the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution is not so long, but during these years over a thousand million people--one third of mankind--have irrevocably taken to the road of socialism. Another third--a thousand million people--are represented by the developing countries, which have in greater or lesser degree achieved political independence and are rejecting capitalism as a prospect of further development.

The internal contradictions inherent in the capitalist system are steadily growing more exacerbated. The objective course of history confirms that the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism on a world-wide scale is the main content of the present historical epoch, which was ushered in by the October Revolution.

SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND THEIR MODIFICATIONS

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There are structures in different spheres of natural life and society and in the corresponding sciences which study them. Thus, a triangle, a hyperboloid are structures. A theorem, an equation, an algorhythm, an integral are also structures. Engels wrote this about mathematics: "Pure mathematics deals with the space forms and quantity relations of the real world."[1] Quantity relations and spatial forms--these, too, are structures. The atom or the galaxy are structures, moreover complex ones. The cell and the organism are structures as well. Linguistics operates widely with the structures of words--their phonemes, syllabemes, morphemes--and investigates the grammatical structure of existing languages, and so on.

No doubt, both the socio-economic system of society and every socio-economic formation in general is a structure. A social system and the structure of every given society are interconnected with the entire system of societies and states in a given historical epoch. It is possible to discern the internal structure of a given society and the system of societies external to it with the structures that are inherent in these societies.

[1] F.Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1969, p.51.

It is impossible to study a society without abstracting from this or that side of its existence. The study of this or that society makes it possible to study it in various aspects.

One should pay attention to a remark by Marx about economics which is important for many sciences, especially for the humanities. Marx wrote: "When we investigate the politico-economic relations of a given country we begin with its population, its class divisions, the distribution of the population between town and country and the sea fishing and hunting and also among various branches of production, as well as with exports and imports, annual production and consumption, commodity prices and so forth.

Thus, it seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with real premises, for example, in political economy, with the population, which is the basis and the subject of the entire social process of production. Nevertheless, upon the closest scrutiny this appears to be wrong. The population is an abstraction if we leave aside, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes, however, are again an empty word if one does not know the foundations upon which they rest, for example, hired labour, capital and so on Capital, for example, is nothing without hired labour, without value, money, prices and so on."[2]

Here Marx emphasises that without abstracting some general concepts such as, for example, value or surplus value, corresponding to the basic structural phenomena of capitalist society, and without isolating capital--the structural foundation of this society as a whole--a simple description of phenomena just turns into an empty abstraction.

The task to resolve problems of social life by applying mathematics is pressing in concrete investigations, e.g. in

[2] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.12, p.726 (in Russian).

statistical enquiries of population, in determining the directions of commodity flow, in ascertaining public opinion on various questions, etc. The processes of social life such as commodity circulation (money-commodity-money) and the correlation of variable and constant capital can be expressed in the language of mathematics. The phenomena of social life, however, cannot be studied by this method in all cases. The problems of ideology, art, of the mechanism of the correlation between the individual and the collective, of the psychological life of individuals and the collective and many others cannot be covered by means of quantitative measurements alone.

It would be wrong to draw a simplified parallel between some social structure of society with its specific, basic structural relation (for example, between capital and labour value) and any structure in mathematics (for example, the correlation between an integral and a differential). The social sciences deal with complex phenomena and many unknowns which are not always found with the aid of mathematical equations.

Since new tasks confront the social sciences there have arisen new practical and theoretical problems, in particular that of the content of sociology. The term "sociology" is usually used to mean the general theory of social development, while the term "Marxist sociology" implies historical materialism.

Further, there are particular social disciplines which study in greater or lesser degree the past, the present and the future. These disciplines are less general in scope, each of them having a specific content. For example, there are particular historical disciplines such as world history, the history of the USSR, political economy, ethnography, demography, archaeology and others. It is possible, therefore, to make use of the terms "general sociology" and "particular social sciences" having (as has been said earlier) a greater or lesser scope in terms of content and certain methodological peculiarities.

The theory of historical materialism is the methodology of special or particular sociological disciplines. But the methods applied in these disciplines have much to differ. For example, in political economy, a deductive method is used on a wide scale. In history, the method of description and ascertainment is used. The historian must face the stream of both general theoretical substantiations and facts under study, and must go from the description and analysis of isolated facts and particular laws to their generalisation. Thus, the historian cannot use the deductive method to the same extent that the political economist does.

While the historian cannot experiment (for example, he is unable to reproduce the French Revolution of 1789), people engaged in concrete social investigations make wide use of experiments, mathematical methods, computers and so forth. Ethnographers have to make direct observations of the life of peoples and to use other methods of research.

The question arises: how to classify structures existing in society? Given the variety and complexity of social structures, there cannot be a single systems approach to their classification.

It is possible to proceed from the size and content of structures to consider them as general, particular, or solitary. One may discern among them the really existing, the possible, the necessary. Structures can be antagonistic and non-antagonistic.

In terms of size, content and significance in the life of society, primary importance attaches to the socio-economic formations, upon which other structures of society depend to some degree. It is necessary to distinguish between the socio-economic basis as a fundamental social structure and the superstructure that arises on it, such as, for example, law, state, political parties and so forth.

There are also many other structures such as race, ethnicity, culture, metropolitan countries and colonies, neo-metropolitan countries and neo-colonies, the church,

religion and others. Further, there are international as well as regional and local organisations and associations of people.

The question may arise: Is man himself a structure? Naturally, in biological terms, his organism is an anatomical, physiological and physical structure. But can "social man", a social creature, be a structure? Yes, man is the bearer of social relations. But to consider man an independent social structure is to make an error. One man is not a structure; rather he is part of this or that or even many structures. Man is connected with his family, he communicates with the people among whom he lives and works, he is a son or daughter of his own class, of his own country and not only of his own country. People used to say about Chopin that he was a Warsawite by birth, a Pole in his heart, and a citizen of the world in his talent. The Frenchman La Fayette and the Pole Kościuszko fought for the freedom of the American colonies. Anacharsis Cloots considered himself "an orator of the human race". Byron s field of activity was Greece, for the liberation of which he gave his life. With money collected by Russian young people, Pirogov went to Italy to operate upon Garibaldi, whose life he thus saved.

In the most difficult conditions of his life, Karl Marx expended all his strength in the work on Capital in the name of liberating all humanity and directed the international workers movement. Lenin became immortal in the eyes of the working people throughout the world as the founder of the world's first socialist state and as a brilliant strategist of the world communist movement.

We can turn to still another example that testifies to the significance of the international aspect in the scientific analysis of historical phenomena. An understanding of the significance of international ties helps one to grasp the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of a series of phenomena. There is one state in the system of international law which can be considered a religious-church institution and which

possesses certain state functions. It exists, as it were, on the basis of ideology, and not on the basis of productive forces. In this state, as it were, there are no productive forces and no production worthy of the name. The inhabitants of this state are engaged only in consumption. In this case we have in mind not the population of Pitcairn Island whose needs are satisfied by nature. Our example is the Citta del Vaticano, a state which has been in existence since 1929 on the basis of the Lateran Treaty with Italy. This state, situated in the centre of Rome, has an area of 44 hectares and a population of around two thousands.

The Pontiff exercises temporal power over the clergy that make up the Vatican population. But he and his government have great influence over hundreds of thousands of the Roman Catholic Church servants and their flock. This is to say that this state exists on the basis of the ideological needs of the capitalist world, on the basis of the existing capitalist s.cieties and also, to a certain extent, of the peoples who have a pre-capitalist system, but are subjugated to capitalism. In the world today the structure of this state, seen in isolation on the banks of the Tiber on just one Vatican hill, outside the international structure of capitalism and the Roman Catholic Church, remains a mystery; but there is a Marxist explanation for it in terms of the external relations established by the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church throughout the world.

In Soviet literature one can come across the opinion that the development of social research is linked chiefly with the great complexity of modern life. We believe that still more important is the growing need for, and the possibility of the management of social processes and the forecasting of the future.

In classifying the social sciences according to their methodology and content it is necessary to point out the bordering spheres of life and science. Thus, pedagogy as a social science deals with the biological growth of the in-

fant and the adolescent, with their psychophysiology and psychology. Among other things ethnography studies anthropological categories. Anthropogenesis relies on the data from geography, linguistics and other sciences. In studying productive forces, the economist turns to natural resources, to the development of technology, to engineering psychology and so on.

The Marxist-Leninist study of structures is a task of great significance and promise, and it is connected with the struggle against bourgeois structuralism in the field of social sciences. In the present article we shall dwell upon the general features of this contradictory trend in bourgeois sociology.

First of all, let us look at the disputes among the structuralists. Thus, C. Lévi-Strauss, for example, engages in a polemic with the English ethnographer-functionalist B.K.Malinowski. Lévi-Strauss reproaches Malinowski for denying historical development and acknowledging only the interaction of structures and the influence of some upon others. According to Malinowski, these structures change but do not develop through contacts. Like biological organisms, social structures strive to renew the equilibrium that for one reason or another has been upset. In contrast to Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss is an ardent supporter of historicism. How does he understand it? He denies that peoples and countries develop according to a general regularity. Each people, in his opinion, seeks and finds its own, unique, way of development. In other words, Lévi-Strauss adheres to outspoken relativism.

The leader of the American structuralists, T.Parsons, also has an idealistic understanding of the structure. He considers values, norms and roles to be the basic structural components of a social system.

The prominent American structuralist R.K. Merton asserts that functional analysis is not intrinsically linked with any definite ideology, although, like every other form of

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sociological analysis, it can be identified with any ideological value.

T. Parsons, however, refutes this position, declaring that the main task is to describe the mechanism of social regulation, the mechanism directed towards the preservation of a system in a fixed, "normal" condition. Proceeding from a biological understanding of equilibrium in the organism's system, Parsons has in view the sustaining of the "normal" status of capitalist society.

As he presents the problem in his most recent works, Malinowski considers function as an institution inextricably linked with a given society and as something brought into being by the task of satisfying socially-necessary requirements. The disturbing of any function, even an obsolete and irrational one, can lead to disorder in the life of society. Malinowski's conception, which proceeds from biological and psychological factors, is full of contradictions. He denies that societies develop recognising only changes in them that result from synchronised horizontal contacts. But at the same time he admits that disfunction can cause the demise of a society, acknowledging, in this way, that society regresses and undergoes destruction.

The idealistic intepretation of structures, metaphysical anti-historicism, the formalisation of these structures as functional systems outside history and the same in all societies, approaching social structures as biological regularities (Parsons, Malinowski), or attempts to build a model of society on the basis of mathematical equations and the laws of physics (the Swiss sociologist V. Pareto)--all these are not accidental phenomena. One of our critics has observed that bourgeois structuralism is valuable for its idealistic dialectics. But it seems to us much more correct to evaluate structuralism as metaphysics. The tendency of the bourgeois structuralists to deny the inevitable collapse of capitalism is perfectly obvious, as is their attempt to perpetuate the existing capitalist system. This gives rise to anti-historicism and the formalisation of structures.

In his classic work, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx made a number of brilliant discoveries. He gave a scientific, materialist explanation to the laws of the historical process and discovered the socio-economic formation as a law of social development.

One of Marx's greatest scientific discoveries, in his conception of productive forces and production relations, was that these categories are shown in development, in their modification, in their qualitative change and interaction, are shown as the development of contradictions between productive forces and production relations, which leads to a social explosion and a socialist revolution.

Marx's prediction of the downfall of capitalism is of special importance. It is based on the law, which he discovered, of the inevitable collapse of capitalism in the course of a proletarian, socialist revolution, the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Beginning with 1844 and throughout their life Marx and Engels considered that the socialist revolution would take place simultaneously in a series of countries where capitalism was well advanced.

In the conception of the social or socialist revolution (the two being synonymous in this case) there is another extremely important side. This conception, advanced by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, emphasises the international character of capitalism. In this work they showed that the capitalist structure of a country is part of the capitalist structure of the system of states in the corresponding epoch.

The conviction of Marx and Engels that the socialist revolution would embrace many countries has been borne out, although not in the form which the founders of scientific communism visualised. It is well known that the social revolution did not begin immediately in all the advanced countries, but there is no doubt that the world socialist revolution began in October of 1917. The stages of the general crisis of capitalism are at the same time the stages of the

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complex, difficult development of the socialist revolution, of whose universal character Lenin wrote in his time.

One of Marx's most important discoveries was the establishment of the phases in world history; this was bound up with his refutation of the Hegelian conception of the world-historical process. In his Philosophy of History Hegel put forth the thesis that world history, which began in the East, in Asia, ended with the French Revolution of 1789. Marx, however, considered this entire period as only part of the pre-history of human society, and he gave a different concrete scheme of the universal history of humanity as a progressive succession of socio-economic formations. Marx held that the bourgeois formation was the last antagonistic formation, and that it would consummate not the history but the pre-history of mankind. Consequently, the socialist revolution launches true history, the history of unantagonistic human society.

In the foreword to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx, who possessed the enormous power of abstraction, formulated the fundamental materialist regularity of social development which applies to the historical development of all humanity and which characterises the basic stages of all human history. At the same time the regularity Marx discovered stands as a fundamental law of the development of separate countries. From this, however, it does not follow that Marx postulated a similar sequence of stages of development in every society and in every country. In their historical development various countries influence each other. It is natural, therefore, that the general regularity of human development operates in separate countries with modifications due to the historical conditions and peculiarities of their development, both in relation to their internal structures and to their position in the system of societies and states. Mongolia, for example, which had not a developed industry and a proletariat, took the socialist path of development as a result of the aid rendered first by the USSR and later by other socialist countries. Some peopl-

es took to socialism by a path that was not only non-capitalist but even non-feudal, by-passing feudalism. This group includes such peoples of the Soviet North as the Chukchi and the Eskimos.

Proceeding from new historical experience, and developing the Marxist conception of the socialist revolution, Lenin introduced an extremely important theoretical proposition about the dependence of revolution on the level of the country's economic development. Thus, Lenin ascertained that the collapse of the world capitalist system had begun in the countries that were, in terms of the level of their development, only about half-way up the ladder. "Without a certain level of capitalism," he wrote, "we would not have succeeded."[3]

Lenin proved the fact that there is no automatic conformity between the level of capitalism in a separate country and the possibility of the victory in it of a proletarian revolution, and he also showed why the correlation between the degree of capitalist development and the possibility of a proletarian revolution in this or that country could change. In particular Lenin pinpointed the influence of the more advanced countries upon the more backward, in other words, the influence of some countries on the possibility of a revolution in other countries. Victorious proletarian revolutions do not start in the countries most developed economically. Lenin proved that a socialist revolution can take place in one country taken singly, moreover in a country with an average level of capitalist development, as was the case in Russia.

Now let us take an example from the history of capitalist states. The USA, the leading capitalist country in terms of its economic development, possesses, for all its powerful productive forces, no high intellectual culture. The labour movement in this country is relatively weaker than in some other countries. The structural development of

[3] The Lenin Miscellany II, Moscow, 1929, pp.397, 399 (in Russian).

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its society, the complex of elements that make up the capitalist formation in the United States, are influenced, among other things, by the wide expansion of American monopoly capital and the American bourgeoisie's extraction of enormous profits from the capital invested in other countries.

The facts cited above could be supplemented with examples from the history of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In this case it is important that the dialectical development of human history from pre-class societies to class societies, and then to the higher stage of non-antagonistic socialist societies, shows that the general perspective of human history outlined by Marx has been borne out of practice. Another law discovered by Marx has been also confirmed, namely, that social being determines social consciousness, in other words, the materialist conception of the development of society has been confirmed. As far the stages of development and their sequence are concerned, the mutual influence of countries and even regions determines the peculiar ways of their ultimate movement towards socialism and communism.

Now we turn to one of the instances of the modification of capitalism in breadth. The study of the "American" path of capitalist development, including the difficulties in the formation of the army of hired labour when there were free lands where labour could be applied, was first undertaken by Marx in his Capital (Chapter 25 of the first volume).

Lenin's theory of the two ways of capitalist development in agriculture, the American and the Prussian, is of great significance. Lenin demonstrated that there were several variants in the development from feudalism to capitalism in Prussia and in some other countries, on the one hand, and in the USA, a country which never knew feudalism, on the other. He drew comprehensive conclusions about the general and particular traits of these two ways and about their significance for proletarian revolution. Lenin pointed to the dialectical modification of capitalism in its development "in breadth"--first the temporary weakening of the contradic-

tions of capitalism and then its inevitable downfall through revolutionary explosion.

The development of capitalism in the USA proceeded along the "American", or farmer path. However, towards the last decade of the 19th century, the reserve of state lands in the West available for cultivation without the preliminary expenditure of significant effort and money, was largely exhausted. In this manner, further migration to the West was impeded, although not halted altogether. In the last two decades of the 19th century, the western farmers could not stand the competition with large, mechanised agricultural enterprises and became ruined en masse. As the American historian Shannon noted that the ratio between those who in the 1880s and 1890s migrated from cities to rural areas and those who migrated from rural areas to cities was 1 to 20.

Although echoes of the agrarian egalitarianism of the 1820s and 1830s could still be found in the ideology of the American workers of that period, these were merely survivals of the past in their consciousness. The dreams of some workers to escape from the power of the monopolies and live, not in the city but on their own farms, became unrealisable. The rapid concentration of capital and the earlier development of monopolies in the United States was conducive to the rise of a wide movement against these monopolies. The 1880s and especially the 1890s witnessed a powerful rise of the labour movement in the USA. Strikes in Homestead and Pullman, a hunger march on Washington, new stages in the formation of a national front of the labour movement and, in opposition to it, of a national front of the industrialists--all this bespeaks of new traits in the American labour movement. However, the question arises, why, at the end of the 1890s, did the farmer movement decline so rapidly, and why, in the first decade of the 20th century, do we not see a significant rise not only in the farmer but also in the labour movement? It seems to us that the period from the 1870s to the end of the 1890s was not only a period of the efflorescence of the farmer way of capitalist development in agriculture,

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but also it was a period of the considerable stratification of the farmer class, of the ruination of many small landed proprietors. The exhaustion of the western lands available for exploitation put an end to the hopes of the small farmers for a happy present and future.

At the beginning of the 20th century the pattern of capitalist development in the USA "in breadth" underwent a modification. Until the end of the 19th century this development had taken place basically at the expense of Indian and neighbouring lands (Texas, Mexico, and also Alaska), but since the beginning of the 20th century the US ruling monopolies pursued a broad colonialist policy involving the export of capital on a significant scale. This policy was already prepared in the 1880s and 1890s through the building of the navy, and also through the propaganda of the idea of foreign expansion in politics, in history and literature. It is usually argued that the exhaustion of the reserves of the western lands put an end to the development of American capitalism "in breadth". We believe that this process continued into the 20th century, but it took another form, the form of the expansion of capital abroad and this, together with new internal features of the capitalist development in the USA, provides the key to the understanding of the subsequent economic and political destiny of the USA.

The abstraction of the essence of social relations helps solve other problems in the history of colonies. For example, what is the difference between the colonies in the ancient times, in the Middle Ages and those which took shape in the 17th century?

The significance of the structure of society and its elements was shown by Marx, for example, in his analysis of the nature of colonies. In our epoch in which the growth of the general crisis of capitalism and the progressive movement of the world socialist revolution are becoming all the more patent, the ideologists and politicians of the obsolete

world try to falsify Marxism-Leninism, especially its theory about colonies. They assert that colonies have not matured sufficiently for independence or proclaim the racist proposition that some peoples are incapable of an independent life and need guardianship.

Moreover, Marx s prevision of the collapse of capitalism is being realised, and colonialism is being liquidated, the latter process being part of the general process of the socialist revolution. The liquidation of colonies, however, is not yet complete. The class, party and scientific struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism, and against their indispensable attribute, racism, continues.

Soviet scientists study the new characteristics of the contemporary capitalist system, for example, the development of the former metropolitan countries which at present do not have colonies, such as the FRG and Japan.

The colony is not a self-sufficient phenomenon and category of social life. Colonies belong to the international sphere. They imply the existence of metropolitan countries exactly as the metropolitan countries cease to be such when they no longer have colonies in this or that form. The study of the different types of colonies does not exclude, but rather presupposes, the study of that which is common for them, that which comprises their nature.

First of all, let us dwell upon the difference which Marx made between the colonies of antiquity and the Middle Ages and those colonies which he called contemporary. In a polemic with Proudhon, Marx wrote in 1846: "Yet must not the division of labour in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when there were still no colonies, when America did not as yet exist for Europe, and Eastern Asia only existed for her through the medium of Constantinople, have been fundamentally different from what it was in the seventeenth century when colonies were already developed."[4]

[4] K.Marx and F.Engels, Selected Works, Vol.I, Moscow, 1969, p.520.

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Thus, Marx stated that the process of forming colonies ran between the 15th and the 17th centuries when there appeared, as he wrote, "already developed" colonies, by which, obviously, he understood settlers' colonies which joined in the division of labour among countries through the world market.

What then is the fundamental difference between the colonies of antiquity, the Middle Ages and modern times? Were the colonies of the ancient world and the Middle Ages mere settlements which had weak economic ties with their metropolis? In fact, the colonies of antiquity were above all military villages, outposts, as for example the Roman colonies in Gaul and Britain. But colonies of this type are encountered also in modern times. We recall the military significance of the colonial settlements in New England and New France, of the Spanish citadels in Latin America, of the free Cossacks in feudal Russia. It is impossible to say that in the pre-capitalist period, for example in antiquity, colonies had no production significance. Thus, Marx wrote that in Corinth and other Greek cities in Europe and Asia Minor the development of trade was accompanied by highly developed industries.[5]

In ancient Rome, in the late Republican period, when a high development of capital [merchant capital--A.Y.] had been attained, this did not summon forth, in the words of Marx, any kind of progress in industry.[6]

Marx wrote of the colonies of antiquity: "In the ancient states of Greece and Rome, emigration was forced, and this took the form of the periodic formation of colonies, thus creating a constant link in the social structure In order to preserve their civilisation, their citizens had to remain few in numbers. Otherwise they were threatened with subjugation to the yoke of that exhausting physical labour that turned a free citizen into a slave. The inade-

[5] See Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.III, Moscow, 1971, p.332.
[6] Ibidem.

quate development of productive forces put the citizens' rights in dependence upon a definite quantitative correlation which was impossible to upset. The only salvation was forced emigration."[7]

What was the colonial system which arose in the 15th-17th centuries? According to Marx, it was "'the strange God' who perched himself on the altar cheek by jowl with the old Gods of Europe, and one fine day with a snove and a kick chucked them all of a heap. It proclaimed surplus-value making as the sole end and aim of humanity".[8]

Who was this strange God? Why did the colonial system become a God that destroyed the foundations of feudal society?

As Marx found out, exchange at an earlier stage of social development, in a tribal system, took place not within clans but between them and tribes. In modern times the rapid growth of trade and exchange began not within the feudal countries but rather between them, in particular between these countries and the colonies. As is well known, originally trade dominated production and determined its development inside countries. The era of geographical discoveries launched the prolonged process of forming a world market. This gave rise to an exchange of commodities between countries which was non-equivalent for the colonies. In this period, value and surplus value became the goal and the dominant factor of production either directly or indirectly. In this manner, the "strange God", conditionally personified in the form of colonies, revealed itself as capital, which at first developed together with the world market under the impact of trade, and later took possession of production itself. As Marx showed, originally trade with the colonies was not so much trade as outright pillage. The exchange of commodities took place not according to value but rather on the basis of accidental value correlations.

[7] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.8, pp.567-568 (in Russian).
[8] Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.I, Moscow, p.706.

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"The quantitative ratio," Marx wrote, "in which products are exchanged is at first quite arbitrary. They assume the form of commodities inasmuch as they are exchangeables, i.e., expressions of one and the same third. Continued exchange and more regular reproduction for exchange reduces this arbitrariness more and more."[9]

In Anti-Dühring Engels wrote that the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century saw the inception of world trade. He emphasised: "The capitalist mode of production, aimed at the creation of surplus-value, necessarily became more and more exclusively the prevailing mode."[10]

Thus, the differences between the colonies of antiquity and those of modern times lay not in certain features, and their similarities lay not in certain phenomena. The first essential conclusion to be drawn is that Marx linked the rise of modern colonies with the pre-history and rise of capitalism (production of commodities which hinges on the production of value and surplus value) directly or by means of the subordination of the survivals of pre-capitalist forms to capitalism: the case in point is plantation slavery and its development on a capitalist basis. Here we see the fundamental difference between modern colonies and those of antiquity and the Middle Ages, where there was no capitalism and where colonies could not participate in its inception, where there existed exchange value alone, at the basis of which, as we have already said, lay accidental value correlations. It is precisely these abstract economic categories, and not the similarities or differences of separate features, that provide a key to the understanding of the difference between the pre-capitalist colonies and the colonies of the capitalist era.

Developing Marx's teaching, Lenin introduced much that was new into the theoretical study of the essence of colo-

[9] Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.III, Moscow, pp.329-330.
[10] F.Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1969, p.245.

nies and colonial policy. We shall turn here to only one aspect of his works on this problem. Comparing the Roman colonies with those of the imperialist era, Lenin first of all pointed to their dependence upon the respective socio-economic formations. He wrote: "But 'general' disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: 'Greater Rome and Greater Britain'." Directly linking the problem of the essence of 20th century colonies with capitalist monopolies, Lenin noted that "even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital". Monopoly replaces free capitalist competition. This is the period "in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun"[11] along with the redivision of colonies. Thus, Lenin conceived the structural feature--the socio-economic formation and the stage of its development--as the main point of departure for a characterisation of colonies.

We are not going to make a special analysis of the problem of slavery in the ancient world. It is a big and complicated problem. We shall only take account of the main direction by which, it seems to us, one may come to an understanding of the essence of the slave-holding formation and its varieties. First of all, one has to reject, in our view, the statistical-quantitative approach to the problem. The most important thing is not the quantity of slaves, not their share in the general mass of the population, but rather the fact that the labour of slaves is more productive than that of primitive men. There arose an enormously wider cooperation of labour than that under the clan system. Big towns, which did not exist in the first stage of human development, made their appearance. A higher culture, built on slave labour, arose. However, the obtaining of slaves from other countries was one of the requisite conditions for the maintenance of the slave-holding economy. Slaves were chiefly obtained from neighbouring tribes who stood at a lower level of development. International relations tended to grow and geographical information was extended.

[11] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.22, pp.260, 267.

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Side by side with the slaves there were peasant commune members whose situation differed little from slavery. As the clan system disintegrated, and as private property developed within it, the labour of the peasant commune members became more productive than that of the slaves. The heavy plough, for example, which was not in significant use in slave-holding latifundia, began to be used in peasant farming.

In its last stage, the primitive-communal system produced dolmens that to this day startle us. The slave-holding world left pyramids both in Egypt and among the ancient Maya and Incas. The sphinxes of Egypt and the anthropomorphic statues of ancient America and Easter Island evoke speculation about contacts on a geographic scale that would be unthinkable for primitive communes.

And what is slavery of the capitalist epoch which structurally is not a direct continuation of the slavery of antiquity? In order to demonstrate the complexity and originality of the modifications of ethnicity and of the class structure of slavery, we shall turn to slavery in the epoch of capitalism. What is American plantation slavery from the standpoint of the theory of socio-economic formations and ethnic structures? Slaves brought to America (first to European colonies and later to the USA) from Africa belonged to different African tribes and peoples that were at different stages of social development. The majority of the peoples and tribes south of the Sahara were still at the stage of the clan and tribal system. Others to this or that degree had already reached the initial stages of feudal or, perhaps, slave-holding relations of the ancient Eastern,

North African type. The African Negroes spoke different languages and dialects, had their own cultural and social characteristics. However, finding themselves in America, on the plantations, they preserved some ethnic peculiarities but nevertheless became a part of one of the classes of American bourgeois society—the slave class. Roughly the same situation was created in other American countries, for example, in Spanish Mexico and Cuba, Portuguese Brazil, French Haiti, English Trinidad, and elsewhere.

In the USA the Negro population, parcelled out among the plantations, took shape not only as an oppressed class of slaves with common class tasks but also as a Negro nationality. They had their common anthropolotical type, the common English language with American dialects, their own cultural accomplishments (here we speak not only of music, but of the wider Negro participation in the development of American culture). The US Negroes also shared in common the Christian religion, with considerable syncretic elements, and so forth.

The Black population of the USA (as in other American countries, especially in Mexico, Brazil and on Haiti) took an ever greater part in the class struggle. The process of the formation of the class of Negro slaves was broken in the course of the Civil War as a result of the collapse of slavery and the personal emancipation of the slaves. After the Civil War of 1861-1865, the Negro nationality, originally consisting of farmers, agricultural and industrial workers, became all the more homogeneous. Today they consist for the most part of industrial workers. The American Negroes struggle not for national independence, but for the assimilation with the American nation as its natural part, free from racial oppression and discrimination.

All these facts testify that in the process of seizing Negroes in Africa by slave traders who turned them into slaves, their class position changed. They gradually changed over from a classless position or from a layer in the early-

class society into a class of slaves in capitalist society. At the same time their ethnic community changed its character: the slaves belonging to separate tribes and the peoples with different languages and cultures, gradually made up a Negro nationality.

Before going on to our final conclusions on the significance of the dialectical-materialist approach to social structures, we must dwell upon the correlation of biological and social structures. This is a complicated theme which embraces many problems. We shall cite one example alone that goes to demonstrate links between biological and social structures, the problem of modification being not without some value.

There can be no argument about the fact that, if we turn to the biological side of the category of race, we shall find fewer differences between races than between individuals of races. These differences do not imply the greater or lesser ability of races for development. Since people of all races belong to the genus homo sapiens, where must we look for the causes of the unequal position of races, of racial oppression, and racial conflicts? If it be denied that in certain historical conditions the race acquires a social quality and becomes not only a biological but also a social category, then it must be admitted that the unequal position of races can be explained by their biological inequality, i.e., one must take the position of racist anthropologists.

Some people say that racism already existed in the ancient world and cite Aristotle's remark about "natural slavery" in support of their opinion. A study of the works of Aristotle and Plato leads to the conclusion that they bluntly expressed the idea of the rule of an élite over the "worse" elements of society, that, in the opinion of these thinkers, some people are called upon by nature to perform intellectual labour, others to do physical labour, and that,

in this way, the latter must be the "natural slaves" of the former.

It is true that the ideas of Plato and Aristotle about the élite were later widely used by racists. But above all racism is bound up with colonial conquests and with the pillaging of the colonies in the 15th-16th centuries, in the period of the so-called primitive accumulation, and with the subsequent development of capitalism, the colonial conquests and colonial policy.

In non-antagonistic societies, that is, under socialism, the relations between different races become amicable.

The problem of structures and structuralism has assumed a prominent place in England, the USA, France, in socialist Poland and other countries, and it is attracting ever greater attention in the USSR. Some Soviet scholars, in connection with the creative elaboration of some problems of social structures, begin to approve the formalisation of structures or to see in them purely idealistic constructions of our time. It seems to us that Soviet humanists, not only philosophers but also historians, should devote more attention to this problem. Here it is important not only to bring to light and characterise structures in a static condition but also to investigate their various modifications.

The word "modification" implies changes that in this or that measure are linked with the transformation of the essence of phenomena. Changes can be partial or even negate the essence of a structure, which develops in accordance with the laws of dialectics. For example, the overall picture of the history of mankind implies the dialectical negation of the pre-class structure of society, the development of societies with antagonistic classes and, finally, in the course of the socialist revolution, the liquidation of the antagonistic character of societies and the beginning of a true history of mankind.

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Modifications can take place along a genetic line, so to speak, along a vertical line of development, in the course of the progressive replacement of some formations by others. However, the causes of modifications may include the contacts between societies, the influences, so to speak, along a horizontal line, the synchronised ties between them, the results of the influence of the entire system of societies or of its parts upon a given society. At the same time, there can take place interactions of various structures within society.

A number of features of the contemporary history of the developing countries is an example of the synchronised influence of societies brought to bear upon the development of these countries by a genetic line and directing it along this or that path. Let us show another example of the variation of structural modifications. Thus, a colony can become an independent state, as happened with the English colonies in America. However, economically they continued for almost a century to be the colonies of the advanced European countries. Then the former American colonies themselves began to seize colonies or to bring, to a greater or lesser degree, independent countries under their sway. Take another instance: a colony receives equal rights with the former metropolitan country and also makes use of its support and aid. An example of this is the former colonies of tsarist, bourgeois Russia after the Great October Revolution.

Anthropogenesis also serves as an example of modification, as does the acquisition by the biological category of race of social characteristics in definite historical circumstances, that is, the simultaneous transformation of a race into a biological and a social structure.

In one of his articles, Academician B. Kedrov aptly described the approach of Soviet scholars to social phenomena with due account for contemporary scientific achievements. "All the more persistently," he wrote, "we feel the necessity for rejecting the traditional and in many ways

already outmoded approach to social phenomena which holds that only this or that humanistic science, isolated from other humanistic sciences, can and must study those phenomena." Developing the concept of the unity of life, nature and society, he writes further: "The humanities should in a given situation learn from the natural sciences.... Some representatives of the humanistic sciences, from among the number of sciences that were formed long ago, prefer, to a significant degree, to study phenomena in the old way. It is not a matter of the mechanistic 'reduction' of the social sciences to the methods of natural science and mathematics, but in essence it is applying a matter of Marx's scientific method more fully to the humanities. Such a unity of the sciences reveals itself just in the very process of the all-round study of complex social phenomena."[12]

But how to realise this unity in the study of nature and society? It seems to us that the most fruitful thing here is not bourgeois structuralism but the study of class relations, the study of social structures from a Marxist-Leninist stand. In this connection, let us cite two interesting opinions.

The first opinion concerns structuralism, and it belongs to the American sociologist Professor George Homans. In his work entitled Return to Man, he said about the functionalist theory that it was not a theory at all. Having described various trends in American sociology, notably the functionalism of N.Smelser, he proposed that everything that is said about theory should be brought into conformity with that which is really done in order to put an end to intellectual hypocrisy.

The second opinion concerns not structuralism, but the study of structures. The French Marxist Noël Mouloud, having in view the fundamental prospects before contemporary philosophy, came to the conclusion that "the introduction of

[12] B.M.Kedrov, "Marx and the Unity of Natural and Humanistic Sciences", Voprosy filosofii, No.5, 1967, pp.7, 9.

structural methods into research that concerns man is one of the remarkable results of modern science. The knowledge of structures, the attempt to understand human knowledge, does not imply the construction of abstract or ideal self-sufficient types, does not mean the subordination of real history to symbolic essences. This is the exposition of dialectics, logic and practice, all of which link the stages of history."[13]

We do not believe that the study of structures is a scientific discovery. Structures are successfully studied in the natural sciences. Marx, Engels and Lenin made great discoveries in the field of social structures. A systems approach to the study of structures in the life of society and nature is not only the question of terminology. Already Aristotle held that the name must correspond to the thing, and the thing to the name (we would say not "thing and name" but "phenomenon and concept"). As for the problem, the systems study of structures on the basis of Marxism-Leninism can be useful in the following respects: it creates better conditions for bringing to light and comparing common and differing phenomena and regularities in the field of the natural sciences, and also in the processes of social life and the sciences that bear upon it. This is also important for the study of border-line phenomena between society and nature, and for the solution of problems that arise, so to speak, at the "crossroads of the sciences".

Given the resemblance of some spheres, for example, the economic basis of society and the nation, the study of this phenomenon is facilitated by a comparison between socio-economic formations and communities as structures. Further, the study of the genetic line of dialectical development and of the modification of structures in a diachronic aspect should be combined with the elucidation of the role of the contacts

[13] N.Mouloud, "Structural Methods and the Philosophy of Science", Voprosy filosofii, No.2, 1969, pp.75, 85.

between various cultures, and with the analysis of the interaction of the internal functions of structures and the external contacts between the structures and the functions inherent in them. This is important for the study of the dialectic of the development of any society in connection with its interaction with the entire system of societies. Finally, the introduction of the concept of a structure can help extend the spheres of social research on the whole, especially with the explanation of the allround, complex phenomena of social life.

THE SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF HISTORY AND MODERN IDEALISM

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The problem of interpreting historical fact is closely bound up with the emergence of the philosophy of history, that is, the urge to comprehend history as a whole and, consequently, to comprehend its beginnings, its present and its ultimate result in this or that form. But the irony of history is such that it tends to assimilate these attempts to provide a final answer and makes them its own, a product of time. On the other hand, apparently despite the relativity of history the movement of thought penetrates into its foundation step by step, laying bare its true principles. This blend of the relative and the absolute, as a most complex dialectic of cognition, produces a scientific comprehension of history as a law-governed process of the development of human society, a product of the vital activity and social practice of men. Marx and Engels wrote: "As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts, as it is with the empiricists (they themselves stil abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists."[1]

The materialist view of history has helped to show the dialectical connection between the objective basis of social life and men's subjective activity as recorded in the vital

[1] K.Marx and F.Engels, The German Ideology, Moscow, p.38.

facts of history. No scientific theory of history can now develop outside this view of the dialectics of social life, constituting the "primary basis" of history, which "eliminates" naturally and dialectically the contradiction between "historical facts" and their interpretation. At the same time, the attempts to subordinate the empirical reality of history to philosophical systems rising over and above it, and the attempts to discard the theory of history so as to declare it to be an empirical substance, on the other, turn out to be metaphysically one-sided.

The attempts to ignore the real dialectics of history, as historical experience has shown, do not help to "clarify" it but to produce a succession of interpretations of the "historical substance" claiming absolute knowledge and turning out to be relative at root.

In the 20th century, for all the diversity of trends and schools claiming to have produced new interpretations of history in idealistic philosophy, the latter clearly reveals dominant tendencies taking shape under the impact of the most profound social changes. A succession of idealist philosophers attacking the materialist view of history has travelled the way from subjectivist speculation on dialectics and historical solipsism to reactionary interpretations of the meaning and content of history. The idealist philosophy of history has tried to "reconstruct" the epistemological basis of the philosophy of history, seeking to find theoretical arguments so as to present the "desired" trends in social development as a "call" of historical fate.

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Back in the 19th century, the idealist philosophy of history posed the problem of a historical reason which differed from natural-science, physico-mathematical reason, a problem actively tackled by W.Dilthey and the neo-Kantians, who exerted a serious influence on the shaping of idealistic social thinking in the 20th century.

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Ortega y Gasset specifically stresses the importance of so-called real dialectics, the dialectics of historical, instead of logical, reason, bringing out the role of Dilthey and his ideas of life, and declaring him to be an outstanding thinker in the latter half of the 19th century.

Ortega believes that the problem of man's being is a very important one. He holds that the past is such not because it is related to other men, but because it shapes a part of our present. In other words, life as reality exists in the present: we cannot say that something exists, unless it is present here and now. Consequently, if the past exists it must in some way be present and active at the present moment. This fundamentally idealistic thesis has served as a premise for a number of conclusions which are of fundamental importance in the interpretation of history. According to Ortega, when we try to determine the composition of our present, as a chemist does, through an analysis of the object into its component elements, we discover that the life of the present is determined by what we have been. Consequently, the only element of man's being or nature is what he has been. This, you might say, is man's immutable, eleatic being. At the same time, if man's eleatic being is what he has been, his authentic, actual being is distinct from the past and is his uneleatic being: man is not simply is, he continues to be (however, according to Ortega, the notion of "continues to be" is absurd and is ultimately irrational. That is why it is more correct to say "man lives").

Man invents for himself programmes of life, a static form of being, providing the answers to questions posed before him by his circumstances. He is imbued with the spirit of his programme, believing it to be an expression of his real being. He is full of illusions, but commences his experiment in all seriousness. His failures make him formulate a new programme in the light of his first experience, and then of his second, third, etc. Man lives through "being"

and "non-being", accumulating his past. In this way he builds up his being himself through a dialectical series of experiments. That, according to Ortega, is the real dialectics, the dialectics of historical reason. That is no slip of the tongue. He believes that the dialectics of the history of the individual and the dialectics of human history are essentially identical. The analysis of the series of experiments, their stages and the connections between the preceding and the subsequent stages is called history. This analysis transforms history into historical reason.

Ortega says that man has no nature; the only thing he has is history. For its part, history, man's past, is inseparable from himself and man is always bound up with history like the snail which carries its shell on its back. This history comprises collective beliefs that had been meaningful in different ages. Man always has these "behind him", adding to them something new--which constitutes progress. Society is "collective man", and history is a system, a system of human experiments linked together in a single concatenation.

Thus, in the philosophy of history the problem of historical reason develops into an attempt to determine the unique specifics of society as a universal phenomenon. Because abstract society is considered as a sum-total of abstract individuals, it is naturally assumed that the chief specifics of the individual may be referred to society as a whole. This specific is taken to be the formulation of life programmes, their criticism, the formulation of new ones, etc. For man, this process is limited by his life-span. For society it is boundless, that is, it goes on so long as society exists. The face of any social structure is determined by its programme, purposes and values to which the given society aspires. This explains the emphasis made by the idealistic philosophy of history on society's spiritual life. The prevailing religious, philosophical and other notions turn out to be pivotal to historical analysis, because they

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are a concentration of the life programme of the given society, this kind of philosophy claims.

The idealistic philosophy of history inevitably includes an irrational element, because it makes no effort to understand the objective logic of history and, in effect, rejects it in principle. Its assumption is, rather, that, like the individual, who freely (arbitrarily, to be more precise) formulates his life programmes, society also spontaneously adopts various values which are subsequently negated by the new values of a new civilisation.

Insistence on the problem of historical reason by the idealist philosophers of history in the second half of the 19th and the 20th century implies a negation of the logic of history as formulated by Hegel, who believed the logic of history to be essentially ontological, that is, the basis, or pivot, of actual history. Nowadays, historical reason so conceived is being rejected ever more vigorously, being supplanted by narrowly egoistical, pragmatical reasonings of the historian, an approach that results in a peculiar dichotomy of the whole fabric of history into a "chaotic", irrational substratum and a value stratum as recorded in the spiritual formations that are regarded as the original motive of historical action.

In this context, special importance attaches to the interpretation of "historical facts", which are regarded as the original building-blocks of history itself.

It was H.Becker (1873-1945), who could be called the John Berkley of the philosophy of history and a theorist of historical solipsism, who first produced a full-scale idealistic interpretation of historical fact. He strove to dispel the notion of historical fact as being something sound and substantial, like physical matter. In this connection he raised three questions: 1) What is historical fact? 2) Where is historical fact ? and 3) When does historical fact occur?

Replying to the first question, Becker suggested the following analysis of the simplest historical fact: "In B.C. 49, Caesar crossed the Rubicon." But, Becker asked, is that historical fact all that simple? It turns out to be very complicated, because together with Caesar the Rubicon was also crossed by a whole army, and this involved various acts, words and thoughts in the minds of many men, so that it would take hundreds of pages of text to describe this simple fact. But that is not all. The crossing of the Rubicon by Caesar is a fact that has no meaning for us in itself unless it is considered in the context of a complex of circumstances, such as those connecting Caesar and Pompey, the Roman Senate and the Republic. Consequently, fact is a symbol of a whole series of facts bearing on the intangible, immaterial reality, namely, the connection between Caesar and millions of men in the Roman world. Becker believes that other historical facts are not more than generalisations of thousands of facts and human acts. Moreover, history operates with facts like the "German mark" or the "Russian mir", which are even more indefinable. That is why it is impossible to define an illusory and intangible thing like historical fact. All we can deal with directly is the assertion concerning an event, but not with the event itself. It is the assertion concerning an event that constitutes for us what we call historical fact. Of course, Becker does not make any discovery when stressing that "in B.C. 49, Caesar crossed the Rubicon" contains within itself much historical meaning. But Becker breaks the rules by trying to deny the fact of the event and to convert it into a mere symbol, a mere assertion, on the plea that it is a complex event. What he does merely shows that our judgements of historical facts are to some extent limited, but that does not destroy the historical fact itself. But reduction of the historical fact to a symbol enables Becker to draw the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything about such a fact or to assert whether it is true or false. In other words, the problem of objective truth in history is eliminated, because

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it is less risky to say that a symbol is more or less relevant.

The answer to the second question--"Where is historical fact?"--is illustrated by the analysis of another example: "Abraham Lincoln was killed at Ford's Theatre in Washington on April 14, 1865". That was an actual historical event. But, says Becker, we say it is now a historical fact. But if Lincoln's assassination is a historical fact, where is it now? Indeed, the event has passed, and cannot be experienced by any living person. This means, says Becker, that historical facts are no more than dim reflections, and that they exist only in the historian's head or someone else's head, or nowhere at all.

Characteristically, Becker's theoretical constructions still stem from his judgement of actual historical events. The assertion that Lincoln's assassination is a historical fact does not at all imply the conclusion that it needs to be of permanent duration from the moment when it occurred. When we say that an event is a historical fact we merely assert that it did take place. The question of where it is now is meaningless, because it implies a negation of the nature of time. Becker is also wrong in claiming that historical facts can exist only in the historian's head. What exists in the historian's head is a reflection of the historical facts, which occurred in the past.

Becker then goes on to analyse the question of when historical fact occurs. If historical fact exists in a man's mind at the present moment this means that it is a part of the present. But the present is an indefinite moment in time which passes before man manages to think about it. Moreover, images or ideas of the past are frequently or always inseparable from the future, considering that they are retained for the purpose of taking some action for some purpose. That is why, according to Becker, it is impossible to say precisely whether these images and ideas belong to the past, present or future. Quite possibly, he remarks, they move at the speed of light and are extratemporal.

In this way Becker reaches the conclusion that the world of history is a mysterious world, which is intangible, which is recreated by the imagination and which is present in our mind.

This approach illustrates the changing methodology of the philosophy of history depending on the changing historical position of the existing social structure. Hegel proceeded from the assumption that reason was inherent in the movement of history: everything real was reasonable, and everything reasonable--real. This idea of Hegel's expressed the confidence of the bourgeois class that the social system it was creating ushered in the age of reason.

The discovery of the antagonisms inherent in bourgeois society results in a "shift" in the methodology of the philosophy of history. First, we find a trend justifying the existence of all historical facts, regardless of whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. Then comes Becker and objects to the idea that all the facts need to be presented and allowed to speak for themselves. He holds that is an unfeasible task. Every historian selects definite assertions concerning an event and rejects other. It is not the fact but the historian himself who speaks, attaching to facts definite meaning in accordance with the purpose which is in his mind (incidentally, Becker asserts that it is not only the historian but also the natural scientist who similarly creates his theoretical constructions). Personal inclinations are necessarily present in history. Every generation re-writes the whole of history. Although we say, Becker stresses, that the past determines the present, we can well say that the present determines the past.

In a sense one could say that Becker tries to doctor the theory and methodology of the philosophy of history to fit the actual state of affairs in bourgeois historical science, in which there is a diversity of standpoints, and discord in the assessment of events and historical periods. But characteristically Becker does not seek to overcome the

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subjectivist chaos but to provide theoretical justification for it and to legalise it.

Thus, the philosophy of history has made an attempt to destroy historians' notion that they are dealing with history. In the process, the philosopher of history appears to rise over and above the historian, who is guided in his activity by the "preconception" that history is objective. The philosophy of history sets itself the task of overcoming this "preconception" and also the established practice in the work of the historians, who had assumed that they were studying the reality of history.

The idealistic philosophy of history, while seeking to formulate the actual epistemological problem of historical knowledge, to establish the complex interconnection between history and the historian, has failed to penetrate into the intrinsic objective dialectics of history itself.

B.Croce, having discovered the intrinsic contradictions of earlier theorists, seeks to specify their positions, believing that there are two main tendencies in the interpretation of history in constant opposition with each other. On the one hand, there is the "philosophy of history" and, on the other, the deterministic conception of history. By "philosophy of history" Croce means the theories which seek to present a transcendental interpretation of history, while the deterministic conception contains an immanent interpretation. Determinism, Croce believes, inevitably moves to transcendentalism. In this context, he gives a critical analysis of the idea which has been accepted as the guiding principle by the Taine school: "First collect your facts and then establish their causality." But, Croce declares, it is well known that when we connect one fact with another as cause and effect, we produce a sequence of causes and effects making up a "bad infinity". Croce feels that this is fatal for the deterministic conception because there arises the question of the final cause. Thus, the deterministic conception becomes transcendental. Nor does determinism "save it-

self" even when it shamefacedly suggests causes that are more proximate in time and space. But, Croce stresses, there are no constant or universal facts which give real explanations. This means that the deterministic conception, stemming from the naturalistic premise in history, does not reach the desired goal and is inevitably crowned with the philosophy of history, which rejects the category of cause and substitutes for it an external and transcendental purpose.

However, the "philosophy of history" is just as contradictory as the deterministic conception, from which it originates and against which it is ranged. The transcendental conception rather seeks the meaning of facts than their connection, conceiving them as aspects of the transcendental process. Because, says Croce, the facts are in themselves mute, there is need for an organ to comprehend and interpret them, and that is the role played by logical thought filled with practical purposefulness and emotion. That is why the "philosophy of history" clearly reveals itself to be poetic. Images and words like progress, freedom, the economy, technology and science are myths, says Croce, because they are regarded as external agents with respect to the facts. They are myths as much as God and the devil, Mars and Venus or any other grosser forms of divinity.

What is the way out? Some suggest that ideas should perhaps be left to the philosophers and the crude facts to the historians. But Croce finds this unacceptable, because he is very well aware of the great importance of the problem of interpreting history, of the practical importance of this sphere of spiritual activity.

Criticising abstract notions of determinism in history, Croce in effect discards objective determinism in general. The historically comprehended fact, he says, has neither cause nor purpose outside itself. Only in thought do reality and quality, existence and substance coincide; it is impossible to assert a fact as being real without the knowledge of what it is, in other words, without its qualification.

Indeed, that is why historical comprehension is both enriched and complexified, without, however, going to the "root cause" of civilisation, without penetrating to a knowledge of God or the gods who control human destiny. Thought which studies history undergoes change and is in constant movement. There is a great distinction between the philosophy of history of Homer's world and the world of Herodotus, between the ideas of Herodotus and subsequent conceptions. New interpretations keep emerging, up until the appearance of the present-day mythology of progress and civilisation and the tendency to seek release from preconceptions through the growing power of science. In the course of this process, says Croce, mechanical causes are being idealised, and transcendental divinity humanised.

By rejecting the causal explanation, Croce seems to bring the whole of history to a single point, namely, the contemporary moment. When people speak of "modern history" they usually have in mind a relatively proximate period which, however, belongs to the past. In the strict sense of the word, Croce stresses, the term "modern" can be applied only to a historical phenomenon which is occurring at the present time. "Unmodern", "past" history, on the other hand, reveals itself in already formed history and for that reason appears in reality as a critique of that history, regardless of whether it is a thousand years old or an hour old. But a closer look shows that "unmodern" history does not differ at all from modern history, because it exists on the condition that it exerts an influence on the historian's soul, makes that soul vibrate. Croce feels that only some interest in the life of the present can make a man study a past fact. That is the only reason why history is a teacher of life. This does away with the paradoxical aspect of the proposition that "all true history is modern history". Modernity is not a characteristic of a definite class of histories, but the intrinsic characteristic of all history.

Croce stresses the need to have documents and their critical comprehension if history is to exist. History with-

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out documents is unverifiable and therefore unreal. At the same time, without a comprehension of documents it turns out to be deprived of meaning and truth and, consequently, also to be nonexistent as history. Is it possible to write a history of painting, Croce asks, if the historian has not seen any canvasses? Is it possible to write a history of philosophy if the researcher has no knowledge of philosophical works or extracts from them, at the very least? Names which are separated from works are empty words. Empty words are preserved not by an act of thought, but by an act of will, which believes their preservation to be useful for definite purposes. In the light of this, Croce criticises the established criteria for drawing a distinction between history and chronicle. He says that history is in principle an act of thought while chronicle is an act of will. Thus, the history of philosophy becomes a chronicle when it is written by those who have no understanding of philosophy.

It is obviously hard to present an adequate reproduction of the history of philosophy without a knowledge of philosophy, but it does not follow that real history is an act of thought. Consequently, it is not right either to substitute for the problem of the relationship between real history and its reproduction the problem of the relationship between chronicle and history, as Croce does.

Documents and their critique are regarded by Croce as being the true sources of history, as being two elements of the historical synthesis. He criticises empiricism and pedantry in history, as he does the other extreme, the groundless speculation. He says that one thing begets another, but cannot beget thought, which is why history that is derived from things cannot be real history. From this Croce draws the conclusion that it is impossible to understand the process of historical thinking unless one adopts from the very outset the principle that spirit is itself history, the demiurges of history at every moment of its existence. Spirit has its own history independently of external things to which documents refer, but it does turn these external

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things into "things for oneself" to be used as instruments. Thus, according to Croce, history appears to be concentrated in the spirit which is alive at the present moment, and from this it derives both thought and factual basis. Where there is no spirit, there is no history.

This idealistic thesis may be refuted by a reference to the fact that history existed before modern historians undertook their research. Indeed, history would continue to exist even if no such research were carried on at all. After all, historical research itself is a product of history, emerging at a definite stage of history. Historians must sympathise with the critique of the obvious extremes of empiricism and arbitrary speculation in historical research and with the requirement that facts and thoughts in history should be organically blended. But this requirement is carried by Croce to a postulate that spirit is primary, to an identification of the whole of history with spirit. At the same time, Croce engages in a kind of "actualisation" of history so that history is subordinated to the historian's interest of the given moment. The objectivity of history as such disappears and is transferred into the historian's mind. Croce presents the production of a version of history as the creation of history itself. That is the basis of Crocean idealism. There is also another aspect of this question: once accepted, such a theoretical approach tends to pave the way for an arbitrary interpretation of history.

A common feature of the new idealistic interpretation of history is the loss of the optimistic attitude to it, and lack of faith in progress. Even in the 19th century, philosophers like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche already expressed a fear of history owing to the formation of the so-called mass society. The diverse theories of the mass society produced by bourgeois thought in the 20th century are historically rooted in the 19th century. Indeed, it is safe to say that the rethinking of the whole of history is based on an understanding of the fact that the historical movement

tends to go beyond a framework that is "rational" from the bourgeois standpoint.

The objective process leading to the origination of new forms of social life which break up the established bourgeois order tends to convert history into something abounding in latent dangers for the dominant social forces, for the social élite taking shape after the bourgeois revolutions. The ideologists of bourgeois society are inclined to see the collapse of the ideals of that society as a cosmic catastrophe which has been prepared by the operation of elusive irrational and inexorable forces. The fundamental reappraisal of historical judgement has also been determined by the situation of tragic danger. The attempts to seek instructive examples in history in order to establish good in the present are seen as being a useless luxury because the whole point now is "survival".

A characteristic stand in this contex was taken by Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), who opposed "moral judgements" in history because these tended to produce "optical illusions".

He said that the attempts to find "happy" moments, periods and epochs in history arose from superficial analogies with man's youth, spring, the sunrise, etc. Thus, for instance, the age of Pericles is called a happy one because then the life of the state, society and the art of the ancient world reached a peak. But a study of the actual historical conditions brings out profound contradictions in social life in various historical periods.

Burckhardt criticises historical judgements assessing the glory and morality of peoples or the way of life of past epochs according to the spread of education, general culture and comfort in the modern sense of the word. He claims that the notion of moral progress is applicable to individuals but not to epochs, and opposes historical judgements based on personal preferences (for instance, the notion that the main value in life is emotion, imagination, reason, etc.)

and political sympathies (for instance, that a republic or a monarchy was a happy government). Judgements about history, says Burckhardt, frequently contain the so-called criterion of security, according to which the primary condition for happiness is the subordination of private purposes to the law, protection of profit and commerce, the home and the family. From that standpoint any peaceable and worthy citizen of our day, says Burckhardt, would have been profoundly unhappy in the age of Pericles, even if he had been a free citizen of Athens. Among the most popular judgements, according to Burckhardt, was that which took the view of the greatness of states or individuals based on the sufferings of others, which were regarded as "temporary failures". Judgements from the standpoint of egoism were also a source of error.

In criticising various historical judgements, Burckhardt reached the conclusion that the life of mankind was an integral whole and was guided by a "higher necessity". Just as natural history abounds in the struggle for life, so the historical life of nations is shot through with the same struggle. Hence the conclusion that the conception of happiness as applied to history is false at root. Life exists only in movement and in change with all its pains, and this amounts to history.

Consequently Burckhardt does not raise the question of correcting any particular errors in the judgements of the philosophy of history but of a fundamental change in the whole attitude as the initial and a priori premise for the tenor of its conclusions. Criticising bourgeois-liberal illusions that have an effect on the philosophy of history, Burckhardt seeks to comprehend their crisis in general abstract forms which set up the frame of mind of extreme reaction as a principle. Burckhardt asserts that evil is an integral part of world history, that the use of force by the strong against the weak is an expression of the struggle for life, and that this struggle permeates the whole of nature,

the animal and the vegetable kingdom and continues through human history. Burckhardt's arguments allow an element just justifying conquest under the pretext of "spreading culture", and evil in history on the plea of the possibility of a greater evil but for the given historical evil. Burckhardt believes that a mysterious "law of compensation" operates in history according to which there is a growth of population after epidemics and wars. Mankind's total life converts losses into gains. Compensation does not operate in the sense of substitution for suffering but as a continuation of the life of wounded mankind, whose center of gravity has shifted. Compensation is also in evidence whenever the onset of a desired event is delayed. It occurs ultimately but in more perfect form.

Burckhardt urges that the past should not be regarded from the standpoint of good and evil, but from the standpoint of the survival of the human spirit, which appears as the life of a single human being; he urges a study of how this life comes to be realised in history through history; he proposes a consideration of knowledge as purpose, comprehending history as we comprehend the laws of nature, rising over and above human passions, desires and interests.

The discovery that bourgeois society has a limited history tends to undermine the illusory optimism of the bourgeois consciousness. Earlier on, the philosophy of history was geared to the idea of "purifying" real history, of "introducing" into it the logic of progress, but now the philosophy of history turns out to be a theoretical movement intended to "purge" history of its moral meaning and to reappraise its objective and progressive tendencies. There is also evidence of greater criticism of rationalism and the emergence of an irrationalistic tendency in philosophy (Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Bergson, James). In the bourgeois consciousness, the ideals of enlightenment and liberalism have turned out to be blended with faith in the power of reason. The rupture of one link has led to the break-up of the whole chain of earlier bourgeois ideology.

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The general feature of the bourgeois philosophy of history is that the concrete historical antagonism of the bourgeois system is theoretically written off as some sort of general historical phenomenon. The social antagonisms of bourgeois society are declared to be a product of human nature as such. There appears an imaginary image of man in general which in effect turns out to be nothing but a generalised copy of bourgeois social relations abstracted from concrete historical conditions. This imaginary image is in a sense constantly sanctioned by the reality surrounding the philosopher, which is why he accepts his abstraction as genuine reality.

In the 19th century, historical science began to study not only the facts appearing on the surface but also the deep foundations of social development. It showed the internal mechanism of social development, making it possible to produce a deterministic explanation for broad social movements generated by the historically rooted material interests of various groups and classes. Thorough and allround study of the primitive system, and of the ancient and feudal world led step by step to the production of a coherent theoretical picture. However, the movement of theoretical thought in historical research kept "stumbling" on the bourgeois form of property. That was the starting point for the departure by bourgeois thought from the established scientific theory of history towards the idealistic philosophy of history. Because it needed to establish the constancy of the values of the bourgeois world, bourgeois thought became increasingly idealistic and irrational.

Philosophical thought expressive of the bourgeois consciousness responded to the spread of socialist ideas and the growth of the working-class movement by producing global speculative constructions irrelevant to an analysis of the changes in the mode of production and designed to establish the immutability of the exploitative society.

For a long time, human society developed in forms which predetermined the social inequality of men. The revolutionary working-class movement, socialism, by eliminating private property in the instruments and means of production, destroyed the foundation on which the political and spiritual forms of social life rested for centuries, ultimately taking shape as a system of laws and prejudices, moral rules and principles. In bourgeois philosophy, this "destruction" produced the problem of man's existence in general and logically led to a search for the grounds on which a "stable" society, a "stable" bourgeois civilisation could be based. Because bourgeois reality did not contain within itself any such stability, philosophical thought moved into the sphere of speculative metaphysics.

The problem of being, the definition of its substance, or, in other words, the problem of metaphysics, was considered from a new angle which fundamentally broke with the traditional approach. This is characteristically expressed in Martin Heidegger's views. Earlier on, philosophy had taken being to mean the real and primary basis on which nature and man both rested, whereas Heidegger took a different view of being which, he claimed, revealed its substance in the existence of man. Heidegger took being to be something more than the empirical being of an individual. In a sense it is a generic being which revealed itself through individuals. But the truth of being was not revealed to everyone ready-made. The urge to it is a condition of its comprehension. Heidegger believes that being revealed itself at the beginning of history in the thinking of the Greeks, who saw being as the presence of the present. Heidegger insists on this interpretation of the Greek view of being because he himself defines time as a characteristic of being. He takes a critical view of the old ontology, which sought to discourse on the being in general of all the particular types of being or to establish their relationship between themselves and the supreme being--God--which turned it into theology. He agrees with Nietzsche, who believed that the high metaphysical con-

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ceptions were nothing but the last little cloud of a disappearing reality.

This approach of Heidegger's is in a way determined by the growing crisis of Christianity, which claims the possibility of producing an absolute interpretation of being. The development of science and the scientific outlook undermined the very basis of the religious outlook; there was also a situation of crisis in the system of the moral rules ("practical consciousness"), which were regarded as being universal. The idealist philosophers interpreted this process as a "crisis of the spirit". They believed that their main task was to overcome the "spiritual paralysis" by working out a new structure that would make whole the disintegrating social entity. But in their aspirations they did not go beyond the framework of the relations inherent in the moribund social formation.

Characteristically, Heidegger connects the problem of metaphysics with the question of the destiny of the West. He asks: Does not the emptiness of the definitions of being indicate that the West has dropped out of being? And should not we perhaps say that the error did not arise together with our own emergence or the emergence of our distant or proximate ancestors but is contained in something that permeates Western history from the start? What if man, nations in their greatest movements and traditions have actually dropped out of being without being aware of this, so that this has become the main cause of their decline? That is why Heidegger attaches fundamental importance to this question: Is being a mere word, meaning "evaporation", or does it comprise the spiritual destiny of the Western world?

Characterising the German nation as the most metaphysical of all the nations, and as the center of Europe, Heidegger considers that this nation must above all determine its destiny within itself and then as a historical nation to advance itself and the whole history of the West into the very realm of the forces of being. The question of "how

things stand with being ", according to Heidegger, means nothing more than the reproduction and reiteration of the beginning of historically spiritual existence. These new beginnings, he believes, should be reproduced in all their novelty and obscurity, with all their dangers characterising any true beginning.

Because Heidegger takes a negative view of objective historical tendencies, assuming that they lead to spiritual decline, he naturally sees the source of spiritual revival as lying in a new discovery of metaphysics, which has the task of overcoming the earth-bound empirical consciousness. Heidegger believes that "being" amounts to more than a word designating all and any phenomena. The concept of "being" is closely connected with the new interpretation of ontology, being seen as an urge to make being display itself. The word "ontology", which originated in the 17th century, says Heidegger, merely designated a part of a philosophical system. This narrow interpretation, he says, needs to be overcome, because today the task is a different one: it is to re-establish man's historical being, to include future being in the whole totality of history.

Thus, the initial metaphysical question turns out to be a fundamental aspect of the basic historical problem. Do not metaphysics and philosophy become historical sciences in consequence of this Heidegger's answer is a negative one. Historical science, he stresses, studies what is temporal, and philosophy, what is extra-temporal. Philosophy is historical to the extent to which it realises itself in time. But metaphysics and philosophy, even when considering historical questions, are not at all historical sciences. Heidegger says that historical science does not determine the fundamental attitude to history, and may distort it or reduce it to a mere knowledge of antiquities. Moreover, all the attitudes to history cannot be scientifically objectivised and scientifically expressed.

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Consequently, Heidegger seeks to provide an answer to the fundamental problems of modern history outside the context of science and actual historical tendencies, to find some sort of absolute starting point for the whole of history so as to change the contemporary historical situation. But he turns out to be incapable of going beyond a speculative approach to the problem because any real definition of this absolute starting point turns out to be meaningless at root. This Heidegger does not consider to be evidence of a theoretical crisis of his philosophical stand but of a tragical lack of spirit in modern history. However, this theoretical illusion is backed up by the real socio-political crisis of the ruling class, which is incapable of formulating a positive historical alternative. What is characteristic of the present, Heidegger says, is an "obscuring of the world". The substance of it amounts to disintegration, a depression and a distortion of the spirit.

Heidegger's analysis of the weakening of the spirit and its disappearance is highly symptomatic. He believes that this disappearance is covered up by its re-interpretation by means of which the spirit is taken as intellectuality, the capacity to analyse and calculate already given things, to change and combine these, which allegedly makes it possible to create new things. But this kind of intellectuality is not the true spirit but is a semblance of the spirit camouflaging its absence. Spirit distorted in intellectuality is reduced to the level of an instrument in the service of others, an instrument of manipulation which can be mastered.

What Heidegger has produced is essentially a description of the situation in which man's spiritual life is reduced to "rationalisation", when talent and intellectuality do not appear as purpose but as means and nothing more. But this kind of situation is not at all universal, to say nothing of its being true of the whole of world history. It is typical for a social structure under which the purposes of a given system do not accord with the fundamental

interests of the bulk of the people within it. This situation is repeated on a massive scale in time of crisis in social formations. But every social crisis in a system produces new historical forces, whose movement accords with the objective requirements of mankind's progress. These are the forces that Heidegger loses sight of as the positive starting point for mankind's spiritual revival.

In many respects Heidegger's interpretation of the problem of humanism, which follows logically from his whole philosophy, is also characteristic. He says that humanism arose during the Roman Republic, when homo humanus was contrasted to homo barbarus. But the roots of this antithesis will be found among the Greeks, who distinguished themselves from the barbarians. The Renaissance is seen by Heidegger as a revival of the Roman principle. Mediaeval scholasticism was the barbarism of the period. Humanism seen in the historical prospect, Heidegger says, always amounts to a revival of the Greek world. But when humanism is taken to mean man's urge to be free and to acquire dignity, the interpretation of humanism--and the modes of its realisation, accordingly--become different. Marxist humanism, says Heidegger, does not require a return to antiquity. Christian humanism is concerned with the salvation of man's soul, which is why it sees the history of mankind as the history of its salvation. Man's substance, says Heidegger, is his special existence, which could be regarded as a way along which man moves to find himself outside himself and within the truth of being. The highest humanistic definitions of the substance of man, says Heidegger, do not make it possible to comprehend man's authentic dignity. He believes that his philosophical attitude is antithetical to humanism, and that it raises human dignity over and above any humanistic definitions. Man should seek that which corresponds to his substance and his destiny, he should defend the truth of being. Man is the guardian of being. Being is what is most proximate to man. It is not God, not an angel, not a machine, not a work of art, not an animal, and not a rock.

Being as such remains mysterious, a mere proximity of the necessary rule. In existing, man finds himself in the destiny of being.

The question of the future of man and mankind is, in effect, connected by Heidegger with the problem of the search for new gods, or to be more precise, for new idols for man to adore. Heidigger claims that man's substance contains within itself more than his being as a thinking animal. Man is not the master of his being, but a shepherd of Being with a capital B. That is where he attains to the truth. Indeed, in its discovery lies the way to overcoming alienation and abandonment. The old metaphysics has lost being. The task is to rediscover it in a free quest. But this "free quest" is not, in essence, a denial of God, because from the truth of being is comprehended the substance of sanctity, and from the substance of the latter, the substance of divinity.

In order to comprehend the truth of being there is need to set aside development of the philosophical and scientific thought which, Heidegger says, first abandoned the direct quest of the truth in Plato's time, erecting between thought and being a whole barrier of rationalistic and value constructions, and to return to the thinking of the pre-Socratics. This kind of "primitive thinking", which Heidegger approximates with the poetical, is neither theoretical nor practical. It is no more than a perception of being. This brings to full circle the history of human thought, which is invited to execute some kind of backward movement.

Heidegger clearly defines the fundamental problem of the world which is on the way out from the historical arena, and its mounting spiritual crisis. He realises that in bourgeois society the development of nations and culture, the development of philosophy promote a spiritual swing to forms of thinking rejecting progressive intellectual traditions. Heidegger started from the idealistic conception that

the acquisition of the new spiritual being could help to change the destiny of the West and with it the course of history. The roots of this abstract approach to the problem lie in the loss by the exploitative society of its positive historical task.

That is why the characteristic of the spiritual situation given by Heidegger is mainly negative. He fails to see the profoundly positive spiritual changes going forward in the world, reflecting and expressing a deep-going social, scientific and technical revolution. He regards the changes as evidence of a looming catastrophe. Regardless of his subjective intentions, Heidegger, who thinks in the categories of nation and the European region, reflects the attitudes of the forces which sense the loss of their hegemonistic positions, but these are, of course, not the forces of the whole German nation or the European region, but of its élitist, imperialist section, which seeks to maintain its privileged position by mobilising a broad human section. The abstract and social breadth of the ideas which are intended "for one and all", and the urge to "regain being" turn out, when projected onto the political reality, to be a call for reversing the whole tide of history.

However, present-day historical reality is the new internal life of the nations which step by step is infused with a totally different spirit as it assimilates the totally new truths of the time. Life itself has made Western philosophers recognise that any attempt to rise over and above the real humanism of the forces of progress turns out to be a dark romantic dream produced by fear and ill feeling.

In the 19th century, there was a broadly accepted view (one that was theoretically substantiated in Hegel's philosophy) that history itself advances this or that people, this or that country into a forward position, an idea which in the bourgeois consciousness was closely interwoven with the nationalistic ideology. In the real policy of imperial-

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ism it was expressed in colonial conquest and the urge to secure political and spiritual hegemony in the world.

The emergence of a qualitatively new social structure--the socialist system of property--worked a radical change in the relations between nations and peoples. The socialist system and the social forces personifying it began to exert a growing and ultimately definitive influence on the spiritual shaping of mankind. The idealistic philosophy of history was faced with the question of a spiritual reorientation, ruling out any acceptance of the socialist system from the standpoint of its prospect in world history. There began a quest of spiritual principles in history itself that in the past united the social forces not only of individual nations but of whole regions.

Arnold Toynbee starts from the history of Britain, remarks on the interaction of international national factors and external influences, and reaches the conclusion that the history of Britain is only a part of some broader society. He stresses that the forces operating there are not national, but have their origins in broader beginnings which influence each component part. Society in this broad sense of the word, according to Toynbee, faces a succession of problems in the course of its development which each of its members has to tackle with the most acceptable means. To illustrate this idea, Toynbee considers, among others, Ancient Greece from the the VIII to IV centuries B.C. reaches the conclusion that a correct understanding of the history of individual states requires a preliminary comprehension of the "whole" of which they are a part. But what is this whole? What are its boundaries in space and time?

Considering Britain's example, Toynbee says that if one is to explain the origins of its industrial system, one needs to extend the geographical boundaries of the view, and to take account of economic conditions not only in Western Europe but also in Tropical Africa, America, Russia, India and the Far East. But to explain its parliamentary system

and political relations the horizon may be narrowed down to the countries of Western Europe and the overseas communities set up by the West European settlers. Adoption by the British of Western Christianity ultimately predetermined Britain's inclusion into one society and ruled out the possibility of its membership of other societies.

Toynbee says that the three approaches--economic, political and cultural--are the instruments for anatomising history. From the economic and political standpoint, Britain deals with virtually the whole world, but from the cultural standpoint it is connected mainly with the Catholic and Protestant countries of Western Europe, America and the South Seas. From this Toynbee draws the conclusion that the spatial boundaries of the society to which Britain belongs coincide with the area of Western Christianity. Accordingly, he divides the rest of the world into four "living" societies: the society of Christian orthodoxy in South-Eastern Europe and Russia; Islamic society; Hindu society; and the Far East society. At the same time, Toynbee's criterion for identifying societies logically made him introduce numerous "additional" societies in accordance with other existing religious communities. Altogether Toynbee identifies 21 societies.

He holds that the map of the world has remained almost unchanged since the emergence of Western society, that is, since 775 A.D. In the struggle for existence, the West has maintained its soul (meaning the specifics of its religious trends).

Thus, in analysing the "spatial" characteristics of world history, Toynbee concentrates on an analysis of supranational entities, bringing to the fore the criterion of spiritual unity which in a sense he sets over and above the reality of individual peoples and nations. In his interpretation of the substance of history, Toynbee establishes a spiritual pluralism of regions and believes that it is this spiritual pluralism that generates historical convulsions.

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From this follows the logical conclusion that there is need for a preliminary spiritual revolution in order to pave the way for a conflict-free development of mankind as a single whole. There is need to create a "universal religion". There naturally arises the question of the spiritual initiative, of who is to undertake the functions of spiritual leadership. Toynbee suggests that this should be done by Western society. According to him, the continuity of the Western world is a continuity of generations which are related to Hellenic society as the child is related to its parents.

Of course, in virtue of definite historical circumstances, European culture has produced high standards of scientific thinking and philosophy. It has exerted and continues to exert a great influence on mankind's spiritual formation. This influence is progressive when it involves the advance of progressive ideas. But is would be wrong to cultivate on that basis a hegemonistic view with all the ensuring social consequences. Capitalist Europe, in particular, produced both the First and the Second World War, while imperialism was the social source of the colonial enslavement of the peoples. In general, it is risky, to say the least, to ascribe to the Western region the functions of mankind's spiritual leader. Life has now brought forward international progressive forces--the forces of socialism, national liberation and peace--which have been giving mankind a lead in actually solving the social problems posed by history today.

The changing balance of strength in the world arena in favour of socialism and the sharpening contradictions of imperialism add up to a real historical process which has served as a prerequisite for transforming Marxism-Leninism into the leading spiritual force of our day. Bourgeois philosophy seeks to contrast to it various "ideal projections" in politics, insisting on a transition from the old political principles to "super-politics". Of special interest in this context are the views of Karl Jaspers. The "super-politics" idea contains within itself the recognition

that nuclear weapons do not help to fight communism, and it is this positive aspect of the idea which has evoked a negative response from the ultra-Right-wing elements. On the other hand, "super-politics" ignores the real forces and ways of struggle for lasting peace and suggests a kind of "leap" from real history with its contradictions to a transcendental world of general principles.

The real social manifestations of imperialism, the historical dead end into which its global policies have run, tend to produce a peculiar philosophical view of history. The philosophy of history which regards the material basis of bourgeois society as being "natural" also seeks to establish transcendental forces as an effective factor of history in its quest for a way out of its contradictions. Because it raises the question of salvation for the whole of mankind, it requires a review of the Christian version of history as being essentially one-sided. The philosophy of history based on Christianity, says Jaspers, may be of value only for practising Christians but not for the whole of mankind. There is need, therefore, to determine the new axis of world history, to find it empirically, so that it could be accepted, as a fact, by one and all, including Christians, so as to serve as a basis for the general framework of the historical self-awareness of all men.

He believes that the axis of world history is to be found in the spiritual process which took place between the VIII and II centuries B.C. (round about V century B.C.),and which produced man as we know him today. Jaspers calls this spiritual process the "axial period". His comparative analysis of social and spiritual processes at the time in China, India and the West leads him to the conclusion that they were the same. That is the period in which unusual events occurred. In China there appeared Confucius and Lao-tse and various philosophical schools; in India the Upanishads and Buddha, and also a great number of philosophical trends, including scepticism, materialism, sophistry and nihilism; in Iran, Zarathustra advanced the idea of the

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world as a struggle between good and evil; the prophets appeared in Palestine; in Greece there were Homer and philosophers like Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, the tragics and also Thucydides and Archimedes. What was new and most essential for the period, according to Jaspers, was that man came to realise being as a whole, and also himself and his limitations. Having realised his limitations, he turned to the loftier purposes. He discovered the absolute within himself and in the clarification of the substance of the transcendental. In his thinking he rose to being, which was now being comprehended without dualism, the division into subject and object disappeared and the contradictions became identical. This identity of man and being was expressed in reflection, in the awareness of the unity of oneself and the world, in the experience of Nirvana, in the accord with Tao and in the subordination to the will of God. While individual accomplishments in this aspiration to being were different and while the gap between the summit achievement of individuals and the crowd was great, the whole of mankind nevertheless made a leap forward.

Jaspers says that the new spiritual world was paralleled by the sociological situation in all the regions: a great many small states and cities, the bellum omnium contra omnes and constant spiritual movement. Earlier on, spiritual conditions had been relatively stable and everything tended to repeat itself, but in that period there was growing tension, which caused a tempestuous movement. With a sense of impending catastrophe men sought to find succour in enlightenment, learning and reform. Philosophers travelled from state to state, acting as advisers and teachers. That was an age of simultaneous destruction and construction. That which started out as a free movement ended in anarchy. The loss of the creative spirit led to dogmatism, disorder generated new connections for a re-establishment of the stability of the conditions of life. As a result of conquest, mighty empires arose almost simultaneously in China, India and the West. The empires arising at the end of the "axial period", says

Jaspers, appeared to have been established for ever. But that was an illusion. All of them ultimately broke apart.

Analysing the structure of world history since the "axial period", Jaspers reaches the following conclusions:

1. The old, ancient civilisations which had existed for millenia everywhere gave way to the civilisation of the "axial period".

2. To this very day mankind lives by what happened in the "axial period".

3. Although the "axial period" does have its spatial boundaries, historically it has become all-embracing.

4. A profound mutual understanding turned out to be possible in the three regions as soon as they met: at their very first encounter they recognised that they were engaged with the same problems.

Stressing the mysteriousness of the "axial period" Jaspers notes that he does not see his main aim in explaining its origins but in denying the "convenient and empty" conception that history is a comprehensible and necessary movement of mankind. The "latent meaning" of the period described above, he says, cannot be discovered empirically. This "meaning" consists in what is the basis of the universal conception of history which is common to all mankind, regardless of distinctions of faith, being evidence that God reveals Himself historically in several modes and opens up different ways to Himself.

Jaspers puts forward the idea of the unity of the mankind's history and urges communications and tolerance for faiths which differ from Christianity. This unity, he says, arose on a definite spiritual basis, namely, on the basis of the recognition of the being of God, which is achieved by various religions and philosophical doctrines. The transition beyond the framework of the Christianity, as the initial premise for the interpretation of history, thus turns out to be more radical in form than in content. In his

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construction of the philosophy of history, Jaspers remains within the bounds of limited idealistic conceptions. He believes that the hallmark of the "axial period" is the change of the form of man's spiritual assimilation of reality: the transition from mythology to philosophy. But this is not a definitive mark for characterising history in general. The idea of the unity of history as presented by Jaspers establishes the fact that peoples in various geographical regions can be in spiritual communication. But when dealing with the unity of history, Jaspers interprets economic and socio-political factors as being of secondary importance. That is why he loses sight not only of the real dialectics of the historical movement but also of the dialectics of mankind's spiritual development. Jaspers seeks, in effect, to determine some everlasting spiritual forms which allegedly predetermine mankind's constancy and its unity, regardless of different geographical regions, and economic and socio-political conditions in which the peoples live. Japsers's approach is at root nothing but a refined Christian view of history. He tends to canonise a distorted view of reality, and historically obsolete forms of thinking and consciousness. For the religious view actual life is something that is inessential and that is subordinate to the higher abstraction. No wonder, therefore, that real history has developed in a very different way to that which religious prophets have suggested.

In a sense, the attitude of philosophers like Heidegger, Toynbee and Jaspers is a reflection of reality but is not an adequate reflection of social being. It is a reflection of the situation of the social forces which have been losing the principles of the old outlook and have been seeking new principles. But idealist philosophers have not put forward new principles but have sought to make up something new from the old ones; that is why these attempts have not led to any positive results.

An analysis of the main aspects of the formation and development of the idealist philosophy of history reveals paradoxes which may appear "odd" at first sight. The philosophy of history contains within itself a problem, although at every historical stage it has promised to solve the fundamental problems of the age. It has reflected on the ceaselessly changing scene, while seeking to establish something that is lasting. But as soon as this "lasting" element is deemed to be established, the process of its disintegration begins. The movement of "everlasting" truths in the philosophy of history turns out to be a pseudomovement, because its initial principles constitute a closed circle. Once the philosophy of history discovers its circular motion it provides the soil on which cosmic pessimism and a denial of progress tend to flourish.

The preparation and implementation of revolutionary changes within the system of social relations takes up a long historical period, because it is closely bound up with a qualitative change in the productive forces that makes the master-and-slave relationship absurd and historically unjustified. The revolution in social relations inevitably blends organically with the spiritual revolution. The breakup of the spiritual basis of the old world does not result in an atomisation of social consciousness if social consciousness has a positive alternative before it. Mankind's historical experience and the development of philosophical, scientific cognition have shown up the fundamental contradiction between the idealistic religious world outlook, its concrete forms and actual reality. Religion has now lost its aura of divine revelation handed down to man from on high. Its human character has been disclosed so that it has shed the veil of mystery; man has started to regard religious texts as the handiwork of man. This sober and realistic approach has made it possible to discern in religious doctrines all the aberrations of the human mind which produced them. At the same time, the relative, historical nature of the rules and principles of behaviour proclaimed by religion and idealistic philosophy as being sacrosanct and everlasting was also understood.

Man is now advancing to an understanding of the surrounding world not from abstract being, as coined by the prophets, but from actual reality, from concrete, natural and historical being. The scientific outlook is becoming massive and is taking the place of the religious outlook. This helps to eliminate the historical contradiction and the intrinsic antagonism of social consciousness; social consciousness acquires a unity of principle and a possibility of being consistent in practising these.

THE TREATMENT OF HISTORICAL FACTS BY PRESENT-DAY BOURGEOIS HISTORIOGRAPHY

Vladimir Salov, D.Sc.(Hist.)

Historicism is one of the key principles of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of history. The essence of the historical approach, according to Lenin, "is not to forget the underlying historical connection, to examine every question from the standpoint of how the given phenomenon arose in history and what were the principal stages in its development, and, from the standpoint of its development, to examine what it has become today."[1]

In the recent period there has been a growing interest in historicism on the part of bourgeois historians, sociologists and philosophers. This is evidence of the growing importance of the interpretation of theoretico-cognitive and methodological problems in historical science in the present-day ideological contest between socialism and capitalism. The antithetical nature of the Marxist-Leninist and the bourgeois methodology of history is most visually expressed in the treatment of historical facts, without which historical research is itself inconceivable.

In this article, which is based on the writings of Soviet researchers who have criticised the bourgeois interpretation of historical facts, I have tried to review the latest historico-methodological views of our ideological

[1] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow, Vol.29, p.473.

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opponents to show that their interpretation of historical facts is untenable.

The primary and inescapable condition for understanding the historical process and its uniformities is to bring out the general and the specific in historical situations and to study these in their development and interconnection. Lenin wrote: "The whole spirit of Marxism, its whole system, demands that each proposition should be considered (α) only historically, (β) only in connection with others, (γ) only in connection with the concrete experience of history."[2] The founders of Marxism-Leninism also emphasised the importance of giving facts the correct interpretation. In every science, Engels wrote, "the correct assessment of the facts is the only guiding principle".[3] Lenin pointed out that "Marxism does not base itself on anything else except the facts of Russian history and reality."[4]

Let us stress right away that historical writings use the term "historical fact" in two ways: first, to mean a real event, that is, as a fact of historical reality, and second, to mean the reflection of this reality in the historian's mind, that is, as a fact of knowledge of historical reality. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, it is not right to identify the historical fact and its reflection in the mind of the researcher, the knowledge of the fact.

Lenin's theory of reflection is the foundation for the solution of all theoretico-cognitive problems in historical terms, including the study of its original material, the fact of history. Lenin said that "The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it images"[5] Elaborating on this idea, Lenin wrote: "Mate-

[2] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.35, p.250.
[3] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.II, p.437 (in Russian).
[4] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.1, p.394.
[5] Ibid., Vol.14, p.235.

rialism in general recognises objectively real being (matter) as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity. Historical materialism recognises social being as independent of the social consciousness of humanity. In both cases consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it."[6] Only when one is guided by this precept of Lenin's is it possible to understand historical facts both as objective reality and as their reflection in the researcher's mind in the form of a cognitive image of the real, in the form of knowledge of the real fact.

In this context, it is important to note that the founders of Marxism-Leninism, characterising the epistemological aspect of historical facts, brought to the fore the problem of the objective reality of the phenomenon. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels wrote that "Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process."[7] Elaborating on this idea, Lenin asked this question: "By what criteria are we to judge the real 'thoughts and feelings' of real individuals?" His answer was: "Naturally, there can be only one such criterion--the actions of these individuals. And since we are dealing only with social 'thoughts and feelings' one should add: the social actions of individuals, i.e., social facts."[8]

The roots of historical facts lie in a phenomenon that has actually taken place; this is a "piece of reality", a fragment of objective being, a part of the living tide of historical reality which is subject to analysis. That is why knowledge of historical facts is objective in content, because it reflects what actually existed in the past or exists in present-day reality, regardless of its reconstruction and reproduction in historical narrative. Let us note

[6] Ibid., Vol.14, p.326.
[7] K.Marx and F.Engels, The German Ideology, Moscow, 1968, p.37.
[8] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.1, p.405.

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in this connection that the founders of Marxism-Leninism wrote about the "specific logic", the "inexorable logic", the "objective logic" of historical events and situations. They urged an effort to "perceive the specific logic of the specific subject".[9]

Knowledge of the facts reflects real being and contains objective truth in varying degree. In a letter to N.F.Danielson in 1892, Engels cites some facts characterising the situation in Russia and says: "Whether you like this or not, the facts will still be there. The more we remain aloof from our sympathies or antipathies, the better shall we be able to judge of the facts themselves and of their consequences."[10]

The historical source, of which the scientific critical analysis is a necessary condition of the historiographical process, is the vehicle of information about historical facts. This is an independent branch of historical science, and the question of historical sources is an important element in the cognition of historical reality and deserves to be considered separately.

While Marxist-Leninist historiography proceeds from the assumption that historical facts exist objectively, many bourgeois historiographers today tend to identify historical fact and the understanding of the fact, insisting that this understanding loses its communicative connection with reality because it is not adequate to "the actual state of things". Their conclusion is that historical facts exist only in the minds of historians. Some bourgeois theorists consider facts as being phenomena of collective or individual consciousness, while others regard them as being concentrated complexes of volitional acts and psychic events. Many theorists of bourgeois historical science today take facts

[9] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.1, p.325 (in Russian).
[10] Ibid., Vol.38, p.312 (in Russian).

to be no more than the product of the mind, an individual reproduction of past events, a product of the constructive activity of the researcher, a mere abstraction, and so on.

This approach has been best expressed by C.L.Becker, who says: "The historian is interested in some event.... Yet he cannot deal directly with this event itself, since the event itself has disappeared. What he can deal with directly is a statement about the event. He deals, in short, not with the event, but with a statement which affirms the fact that the event occurred." That being so, Becker reasons, "the historical fact is not the past event, but a symbol which enables us to recreate imaginatively."[11]

But what is a symbol: is it reality or a tentative concept, a reflection of phenomena that have actually taken place or intuitive modelling, a kind of identification of the desired and the real? Becker's answer leaves no doubt that the "symbol of the historical fact" is a purely intuitive creation of the historian's in which his individual perception of the fact is "programmed" in advance.

According to Becker, the reality of the fact tends to be dissolved in the historian's mind and in his subjective emotions. It will be easily seen that Becker's attempts to substitute for the historical fact its reflection in the historian's mind are connected with the neo-Kantian traditions and the traditions of empiriocriticism, empiriomonism and other varieties of subjective idealist philosophical doctrines which had been criticised by Lenin for denying the possibility of obtaining an objective knowledge of the world.

This methodological approach, which is characteristic of many bourgeois historiographers, has also been expressed at international congresses of historical sciences. The Italian Professor E.Sestan told the 13th Congress of Historical Sciences in Moscow that "facts", "events" are not

[11] Carl L.Becker, "What Are Historical Facts?", Ideas of History. Ed. by Ronald H.Nash, Vol.II, New York, 1969, p.181.

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realities in themselves, but are the products of our mind. Facts are facts, he said, only insofar as man remembers them and has comprehended them. Historical fact of which, according to Sestan, we have no idea, is not something that has taken place, but something that is at most a hypothetical fact.[12]

These statements by bourgeois historians show that the principal thesis in the modern bourgeois philosophy of history is the following: historical facts are symbols, hieroglyphs, which are illusory and exist in someone's mind or nowhere. Facts become facts only when the researcher finds them and draws them from their source. Up until then these facts are "dead facts", which are not expressed in any way and do not, in general, exist.

Marxism-Leninism, as I have said, starts from the opposite postulate. The facts themselves exist regardless of the mind and correspond to objects as part of the real historical process. But notions of the facts are secondary and subjective in form. Facts are things and objects of research. Their cognition includes activity on the part of the resercher (subject), and the reproduction of the fact is not entirely free from elements of subjectivism. What is more, this may either be true or false. But the incorrect or distorted interpretation of the facts cannot make any difference to its objectivity. Engels pointed out that "in every science, incorrect notions are, in the last resort, apart from errors of observation, incorrect notions of correct facts. The latter remain even when the former are shown to be false."[13]

Bourgeois philosophers insist that historical facts cannot exist objectively because in contrast to the facts at

[12] E.Sestan, "Storia degli avvenimentie storia delle struture", Papers of the 13th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Vol.I, Part I, Moscow, 1973, p.255.

[13] F.Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Moscow, 1954, p.215.

the disposal of the natural sciences, these do not, allegedly, bear strict verification and cannot be reproduced experimentally. It is true that some works have now appeared which declare historical science to be an exact science because it now and again involves the use of electronic computers. But this view is rejected by most bourgeois authors. While the facts with which the natural and historical sciences operate are not categories of the same order and do not have the same degree of "precision", they are still equal in the sense that they exist before the researcher has turned to them and has reconstructed them. The whole point is the mode of their cognition.

In order to bring out the specifics of present-day bourgeois historiography in treating historical facts, one should bear in mind that now and again it tends to obliterate the distinction between the concepts of "facts" and "view of historical facts". In many bourgeois writings we find different versions of H.Rickert's idea: historical facts are in themselves useless and meaningless, and only the historian is capable of deciphering them, of giving them meaning, thereby calling them forth from non-being, and creating them.

Some authors deliberately take a vague and half-way approach in tackling methodological problems. Professor Ch. Samaran of the Sorbonne, characterising the problem of historical facts, writes: "Historical facts, in the pure sense of the word, are valuable atoms of historical reality, which then need to be explained and synthesised not without risk and danger." However, he then goes on to make the reality of facts contingent on the historian's assessment of the facts: "Everything that in an effort at recuperation could help to gain an understanding of mankind's past experience does not yet deserve to be considered as a historical fact. For it to be promoted to that rank, this element of cognition also needs to be judged by the historian to be worthy of memory."[14]

[14] Histoire et ses methodes, Paris, 1961, p.1494.

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It is the historian, bourgeois theorists claim, who is the sole arbiter and judge in interpreting and deciding on the question of whether a fact is real or unreal, of whether its substance is typical or not. According to Sestan, facts become historical insofar as the historian considers these as an important element in the context of the historical subject which he is due to study and interpret within the limits of a predetermined spatial and chronological framework.[15] The same view is expressed by Professor M.Postan of Oxford University.

If the facts are deprived of objective content, they cannot help to recreate a picture of the objective truth and merely go to produce a subjective truth in all its diversity, including "existentialist truth". The West European Professor G.Ritter said that there is no possibility of verifying the objective truth of a historical picture by comparing it with the original in order to decide whether it is identical or not.[16] In his opinion no such original exists anywhere. By depriving historiography of the possibility of getting at the truth, bourgeois theorists deprive history itself of objective content.

Actually, historical truth consists in the correspondence of our view of the facts with the reality of their being, in the authenticity of the reproduction of typical facts and in the precision of the light being shed upon them. Engels wrote that positive science deduces "world schematism not from our minds, but only through our minds from the real world."[17] Elsewhere Engels says that "in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts"; and that "the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts but are to be discovered

[15] See E.Sestan, op. cit.

[16] See G.Ritter, "Leistungen. Probleme und Aufgaben der internationalen Geschichtschreibung sur neueren Geschichte", Relatione del X Congresso Internationale di scienze storiche, Vol.VI, Firenze, 1955.

[17] F.Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1969, p.49.

in them."[18] Lenin stressed that the criterion of our assessment consists "not in abstract schemes and suchlike nonsense at all, but in its fidelity and conformity to reality".[19] Cognisance of historical facts consists in the researcher's specific and syncretic concept of the past; it is a special view and an imaginative recreation of an actual fact in the process of its genesis and further development, in interconnection with other facts; it consists in the researcher's ability to establish unity in the diversity of the facts and to find its equivalent in his concepts, something that enables historians to understand the process of socio-historical development and its regularities.

Many bourgeois authors believe that the main task of the historian is to discover the meaning of historical facts. They say that historical facts in themselves have no meaning and can tell one nothing about what has happened, so that it is only the historian's intuition that can help him to grasp at the content of the facts, thereby giving them historical importance. Becker says that the aim the historian sets himself determines the meaning which he extracts from events. Events, the facts themselves say nothing and suggest no conclusion. It is the historian who invests the facts with meaning.[20] Thus, in the bourgeois methodology of history the reproduction of the facts is made directly dependent on the researcher's concepts of the facts, an approach that results in the subject being substituted for the object of research.

However, in studying historical facts the researcher's mind has power over the reflection of the facts only within certain limits, no more than as a subjective reflection of the objective. The Marxist-Leninist approach to the assessment and comprehension of the facts makes it possible to

[18] F.Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Moscow, 1954, pp.64-65.
[19] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.I, p.194.
[20] See C.Becker, op. cit.

give a precise assessment of the place of the facts within the general historical process. In Marxist-Leninist methodology a study of the facts also implies a study of the general socio-historical regularities. It is the historian's task to identify in the great mass of facts those which are the most important and the most typical, taking care not to impoverish their content and to systematise the facts in such a way as to reproduce an objective picture of the historical process.

In bourgeois historiography, historical facts are frequently treated as independent absolutes, as an autonomous and self-sufficient force. In that case, the main task of historical science consists in discovering the truly historical individuality and in describing it. This kind of approach is typical for the neo-Kantians, whose method was based on absolutising factographic data and denying the generalising character of historical science. The urge to reduce the task of historical science to a statement and a mere coordination of various facts and a description of specific and individual phenomena is also characteristic for the present-day followers of W.Windelband and Rickert. So-called existential historicism starts from a reverential approach to the individual and shuns any kind of determination. Describing the role of the principle of individuality, the West German historian Th.Mommsen says that historicism regards the totally definitive principle of historical cognition in the uniqueness, specific nature and individuality of all historical phenomena. The British historian A.Bullock also supports the idea of the lasting independence of historical facts. The Swiss historian H.Lüthy says that historical science has the function of historical hygiene, with the ability of seeking out the concrete specific fact which is covered up by the refuse of history. To be able to fulfil this task, the historian must be creatively enlightened, possessing the gifts of prophecy and an ability to give shape to shapeless matter. He regards history as a chaotic

and structureless process and says that it is pointless to try to produce a generalising historical picture.

Many Western historians reject the idea that historical facts are primary and independent in an effort to overcome the one-sided character of the ideographic method by applying Weber's doctrine of ideal-typical concepts in the social sciences, O.Anderle's "theoretical history", J.Habermas's "dialectical sociology", and so on. The futility of such attempts is expressed, in particular, in the so-called phenomenological method. Its most typical advocate is the West German Professor E.Nolte, who has tried in his writings on the history of fascism to make use of the facts in an effort to combine the individualising and the generalising concepts with the aid of the "phenomenological method". Even his colleagues have described this method as being unhistorical, for it makes the historian's starting point the so-called self-understanding of the characters in history; this approach is, in effect, a repetition of G.Dilthey's thesis about the need "to sense oneself" into the historical facts, which is allegedly the process of their cognition. Actually, the result is that Nolte, operating with a great many facts, takes for his basis not the fascists' acts themselves but the fascists' ideas about these bloody acts which they sought to have the world accept. Marx, characterising the principles of the British Whigs, observed that "We can find out better what they are on the basis of the historical facts, on the strength of what they have been doing, and not of what they have once believed or what they would like others to think about their role."[21]

Some bourgeois authors admit that the most important function of historical facts is their etiological (Gk. aitia--cause) function. Postan is right when he says that history is definitely something more than a collection of facts, and that for the historian facts are of no great value if they are not the causes, the part of causes or the

[21] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.8, p.356 (in Russian).

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causes of causes of the phenomenon he is studying. Elaborating on this idea, Postan, however, makes the reality of facts dependent on the researcher's interest. He writes: "An historical fact is nothing more than one of the event's observed aspects. What makes it observable is its affinity to an interest uppermost in the observer's mind. This affinity impels the historian to focus his vision upon it; but to be able to focus the historian must also be prepared to neglect."[22] Thus, the author's idealistic outlook ultimately gains the upper hand over his rational approach, which is that comprehension of the facts is above all their study as a real concrete-specific object.

Considering the problem of seeking out, bringing out and using historical facts, bourgeois historians use various methods to assess, explain and reconsider it. Among these methods are the motivational explanation of historical facts, that is, their explanation from the standpoint of the purposes and motives of various individuals. This method yields some results in explaining local and "peripheral" historical events, but can do nothing to bring out the general historical tendency or the regularities of socio-economic development.

The motivational interpretation of events is frequently identified with their psychological explanation, a tendency which took shape in the late 19th century and which was initially also promoted by the neo-Kantians. A.Lappo-Danilevsky, a Rickertian, held historical facts to be the impact of the consciousness of a given individuality on the environment, especially social environment.[23]

Today, this tendency is represented in bourgeois science by psychoanalysis, which has penetrated deep into

[22] M.P.Postan, Fact and Relevance. Essays on Historical Method, Cambridge, 1971, p.51.

[23] See A.Lappo-Danilevsky, The Methodology of History, Part II, St.Petersburg, 1913 (in Russian).

the sphere of the bourgeois historical perception of the world. The desire on the part of those who advocate psychoanalytical historicism to present as the real that which, in their opinion, is inaccessible to the human understanding but which has nevertheless existed in the past in the form of something purely individual and extra-social, the urge to include this as a fact of history results in a denial of history as a science.

Some bourgeois historians regard historical facts as being some kind of supernatural and mysterious force, investing them with a mystical aspect and refusing to interpret them. Apart from everything else, this kind of approach is unproductive. It is through the prism of the author's interpretation and assessment that the facts are given an outlet into the general scientific arena of history; so here the researcher's skill in determining the social meaning and substance, and the scale and horizons of historical events is highly important.

In the light of this one should consider the views expressed by E.Carr about the interconnection of facts and their interpretation as a positive phenomenon in the development of contemporary bourgeois historiology, although these views, set out in his lectures at Cambridge University, bear the mark of bourgeois objectivism. He says that history and historical facts are necessary to each other. The historian without the facts has no footing and is impotent; the facts without the historian are dead and meaningless. That is why the answer to the question of "what is history?" is that history is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an endless dialogue between the present and the past. In the course of this dialogue, the historian seeks to comprehend the period, the epoch and men's deeds, circumstances, situations and the destinies of men in their inter-relations with the facts. By linking up the past and the present, he makes use of the method of ordering his material, seeking to comprehend the depth of the general historical changes expressed in the wealth of

concrete historical facts and to establish the "latent order" behind the phenomena. Historical facts, says Carr, are not any event which took place in the past, but only that which, in the researcher's view, is historically significant: while drawing on the greatest possible number of facts, the historian has the task to select from these the numerous significant facts and to convert them into historical facts, discarding the insignificant as unhistoric. Carr says that the historical significance of a fact keeps changing because it is determined by the historian's historical conception and his view of the historical process. Carr says that history is interpretation, which is the arterial bloodstream of history. However, the scale and limits of the historian's interpretative activity are not boundless. While the historian does interpret the actual data he is not a tyrannical ruler of the facts. The relationship between the historian and the facts is a relationship of equality. The historian is ceaselessly engaged in a process of adapting the facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to the facts. It is impossible to give priority to either of these processes.[24]

However, neither Carr nor other bourgeois objectivists wish to admit that the historian's class attitude is always a part of the interpretation of the historical fact and the historical process. This class attitude may weaken or strengthen the historian's cognitive potential, depending on the interests of which class--a progressive or a reactionary one--he reflects.

Marxist historians are guided by Lenin's methodological approach implying the principle of partyism, which means "the direct and open adoption of the standpoint of a definite social group in any assessment of events."[25] Elaborat-

[24] See E.H.Carr, What Is History? The G.M.Trevelyan Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge, January-March 1961, London, 1962, pp.24, 9, 18, 23.

[25] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.1, p.401.

ing on this idea, Lenin said that "It is impossible 'to study the real state of affairs' without qualifying it, without appraising it from the Marxist, or the liberal, or the reactionary, etc., point of view."[26] The value judgement of historical facts, being invested with party-and-class significance, may be free of subjectivism and have objective content. The most profound evaluation of the past is possible if the historian takes the view of the progressive class expressing the requirements of social regularities. In our epoch, this is the working class, which carries on a struggle to realise the objective regularities of social progress. It is the ideology of the working class and its political vanguard, that is, the Marxist-Leninist approach, that ensures to the greatest extent the true picture of the facts and the value orientation in the historical past.

Lenin's proposition about the need to take a class approach to the assessment of social phenomena becomes especially meaningful today, when historical knowledge in the capitalist countries is frequently used by the bourgeoisie for anti-communist purposes. This is most pronounced in the writings of bourgeois reactionary Sovietologists, who are guided by the ideology and policy of the "cold war". They deliberately shed unobjective and distorted light on the facts of Soviet history. They ignore important events and build up insignificant facts into sensational events, thereby producing unobjective works, to put it mildly. Even their fellow-anti-Sovieteers have to admit that an anti-communist interpretation is being given to authentic events.

The progressive French historian J.Elleinstein says in the first volume of his five-volume History of the USSR: "Anti-Sovietism is not a basis for writing a scientifically grounded history of the Soviet Union but consists in seeing

[26] Ibid., Vol.19, p.123.

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only the negative aspects and drawing from them anti-Soviet and anti-Communist conclusions."[27]

Foreign Affairs admits, for instance, that the reader of Sovietological writings finds it hard to separate facts from fiction. The Times Literary Supplement carried a review of a book about Lenin and Nadezhda Krupskaya, which said that the author of the book tried to justify his hostile attitude to Lenin by resorting to unauthentic information.[28] Assessing the work of the US Professor Adam Ulam, entitled Lenin and the Bolsheviks, one reviewer had to admit: "What seems a pity is that Mr. Ulam has mistakenly tried to enliven a sober narrative with showy epigrams and bright modern analogies.... Such a judgement dispenses Mr. Ulam from any analysis of the aims and significance of the revolution; and he offers none.... All in all, one feels that he has expended considerable abilities and much hard work on the wrong subject."[29] Let us note that this was said about an author who, criticising his fellow-Sovietologists, had said that their anti-communist ritual demanded a solemn abdication from historicism. But the opponent of this ritual soon found himself in the same boat.

In order to reproduce an authentic historical picture, Marxist historians seek to take account of the whole aggregation of facts constituting the basis for real knowledge of the past and the present. Engels said that objective reproduction of reality was possible only when use was made of "vast historical material, critically verified and totally assimilated."[30] Elsewhere Engels noted the need to establish "a connection between individual facts, which need to be described, and the general conditions so as thereby to bring

[27] J.Elleinstein, Histoire de l'URSS, Tome I. La conquete du pouvoir (1917-1921), Paris, 1972, p.9.

[28] See The Times Literary Supplement, February 9, 1973.

[29] The Times Literary Supplement, January 12, 1967, p.30.

[30] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.13, p.492 (in Russian).

out in these facts everything that they contain of the striking and significant."[31] The Marxist historian always remembers these words of Lenin's: "If it is to be a real foundation, we must take not individual facts, but the sum-total of the facts, without a single exception, relating to the question under discussion."[32]

While adopting these principles, no Soviet historian ever lays claim to his standpoint being the ultimate expression of the Marxist-Leninist view of this or that question. Soviet historians have mustered and introduced fresh facts into the historical narrative, thereby enriching and continuing creatively to enrich not only Soviet but also world historical science.

Western historians have recognised as much. One American journal says that Soviet historians use Marxism-Leninism as a criterion for selecting and interpreting the facts, and adds that guided by this credo, Druzhinin and other Soviet historians have achieved solid (sometimes very important) results. The journal admits that serious historical work is being done on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.[33]

The British journal, Soviet Studies, says that in Volume IV of the Essays on the Historical Science of the USSR and in the collection of articles edited by Academician M.Nechkina, History and Historians, the factological basis has been further extended.[34] Recognition of the scientific importance of what Soviet historians have written is also contained in the comment on other concrete historical studies by Soviet historians. A.McConnel has given this assessment of the book by E.Druzhinina, Souther Ukraine in 1800-1825: "This is an impressive work of scholarship, based on enormous research, presenting important new ques-

[31] K.Marx and F.Engels, Works, Vol.4, p.218 (in Russian).
[32] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.23, p.272.
[33] See Kritika, 1968, No. 2.
[34] See Soviet Studies, January 1969, No. 3.

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tions and elucidating a complex, dynamic quarter-century of history with scrupulous care".[35]

Summing up the approach by a number of bourgeois authors to the study of history, the Hamburg historian H.Hedinger has had to admit that in their works subjectivism has decidedly pushed the objective assessment of the facts into the background. He says: "The prevailing view today is that subjectiveness is ultimately insuperable, which is why the objective approach and recognition of the universal significance of historical knowledge are impossible."[36] This is just short of claiming that history is not a science, that it is, as the French historian P.Veyne says, no more than a special mode of cognition, a work of art, crippled knowledge, sheer description without scientific method."[37]

Modern bourgeois historiographic writings clearly suggest the idea that the content of the historical process is irrational, that supernatural forces have some kind of fatal role to play, exerting an influence on history and transforming it into a religious and mystical lifestream. Anderle says that "One should unconditionally recognise that history has an irrational content."[38]

To sum up. Acute interest in the problem of historical facts has never waned; this problem is still on the order of the day, and continues to be the epicentre of the underground tremors in the methodology and epistemology of history. Because the two world outlooks--the materialist and the idealist--are antithetical, they take a fundamentally different approach to the epistemology of the theory of the his-

[35] Slavic Review, December 1972, p.890.
[36] H.W.Hedinger, Subjektifität und Geschichtswissenschaft. Grundzug einer Historik, Berlin, 1969, p.7.
[37] P.Veyne, Comment on écrit l'histoire? Essai d'épistemologie, Paris, 1971.
[38] O.Anderle, Das universalhistorische System A.J.Toynbee, Wien, 1955, p.37.

torical process and to the assessment of the role of historical facts in the cognition of this process. Bourgeois historiographers treat historical facts subjectively and frequently sacrifice them on the altar of anti-communism. Meanwhile, Marxist-Leninist historical studies are based on the existing facts of the past, whose materialist interpretation makes it possible to recreate a truthful and objective picture of historical events from a progressive social standpoint.

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ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY OF CULTURE AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS IDEALISTIC CONCEPTIONS

Lev Kertman, D.Sc.(Hist.)

Although the study of the history of culture in West European and American societies from the 17th to the 20th century may have been advanced in the past few years, there is hardly any need to show that this branch of historical knowledge still lags considerably behind the study of economic, social and political history.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism always took account of the dialectical interconnection between material being and spiritual life when characterising complex historical phenomena and situations. In the real practice of the class struggle, the stand of the various classes, social groups and individuals is largely determined by the nature of their ideological principles, the type of value orientations, and their ethical, social and aesthetic ideals which, naturally, have their roots deep in the basis, but are relatively independent. No political movement has ever been able to exist, let alone triumph, without campaigning for the hearts and minds of men, a struggle that is waged not only in the sphere of political or social conceptions, but that permeates every aspect of spiritual life in society. The ideological form of class struggle has been growing in importance in modern history, and it is the task of Marxist-Leninist historical science to analyse it as deeply and as fundamentally as it has analysed the other basic forms--political and economic. The history of culture has itself

become an arena of the most acute ideological struggle, and I do not mean theoretical culturology so much as the history of culture, specifically the culture of the countries in the contemporary West. However, there is no great distinction between the two, because bourgeois historians of culture rely on different variants of the idealistic theory of culture, while the theorists of culturology operate with historical material and generalisations contained in the writings of historians.

Soviet philosophers, sociologists and ethnographers have done much to show the flimsiness of bourgeois culturological conceptions.

Most bourgeois theorists and historians of culture reject the class character of phenomena in spiritual life, and that is the light in which they analyse culture from the 17th to the 20th century. Whatever the concrete tasks the author of a study may set himself, one of the strands, overt or covert, that runs through it is a polemic with Marxism, with the Leninist doctrine which says that the culture of capitalist society is made up of two different cultures, the bourgeois and the democratic. This applies above all to works analysing present-day Western culture, in which the pessimistic view of its present and future predominates.

Professor F.Polak of the Netherlands School of Economic Sciences considers spiritual life in the West from the standpoint of the "image of the future", the key element of his conception. Indeed, that is how he has entitled his book, in which he claims to have discovered "a new historical law of cultural dynamics". His law is formulated with sufficient clarity: "Every culture which has positive images of the future must inevitably demonstrate a period of flowering and every culture whose images of the future are weak and disintegrating is irrevocably doomed to decline". The absence of any positive image of the future tends, according to Polak, to erode all the other elements of culture like strong acid, and "our time is the first in the memory of man which has

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produced no images of the future, or only negative ones". From this standpoint, Polak analyses bourgeois philosophical trends, the social sciences, the state of the universities, art and literature, and reaches the conclusion that they are in decline because of the absence of any positive image of the future. His characteristic of the crisis of bourgeois culture is given at full length and is convincing. But he insists that it is not a crisis of bourgeois culture, but of Western culture in general, and ignores such rapidly developing and expanding elements of socialist culture in the Western countries as Marxist philosophy and historiography and the literature and art of socialist realism, to say nothing of the general democratic tendencies in the humanities and the art of critical realism. It is true that at one point, completely at variance with his own conception, the author admits that communism offers a healthy and splendid image of the future, one which attracts millions of people,[1] but this is not linked up in any way with his analysis of spiritual culture.

The patchy mosaic of spiritual phenomena in present-day capitalist society is so striking that bourgeois culturologists of various orientations prefer not to deny the existence of two cultures in the culture of the West, but to draw the dividing line between them on any imaginable principle, except the class principle.

Charles Snow, the British scientist, writer and public figure, delivered a lecture in 1959 on "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution". Snow contrasted classical, humanitarian culture and natural-science culture, and claimed this to be the main principle on which phenomena in modern culture could be classified by type. He also said that the division on this principle is more essential than according to the class principle. His lecture sparked off a sharp polemic among bourgeois culturologists in Britain and else-

[1] F.Polak, The Image of the Future, Vol.II, New York, 1961, pp.126, 89, 326.

where. The "physicists" and the "lyricists" debated which of the two cultures was higher, but all assumed this principle to be fundamental in classifying cultural phenomena. The US scientist D.Regin[2] admits the dichotomy of the intellectual entity of the Western world into two hostile camps and links this up with the two-cultures problem in the same way as Snow does.

The same purpose--denial of the class approach to historico-cultural phenomena--is served by another principle which is popular in present-day bourgeois culturology, namely, a division of culture into "élite" and "mass" culture. Like the former approach, the advocates of this conception have indeed brought out essential distinctions but by bringing them to the fore and taking them out of the general historical context, have ignored or distorted the actual contradictions in the sphere of culture. Regin says, for instance, that the only and decisive struggle in culture in our day, which lies at the basis of everything, is the irreconcilable battle between the principles of the individual and the collective, between the authentic and the conformist, between the unique and the public view. "High" culture, the culture of the élite, of the individual, of the uniquely creative, says Regin, has been defeated in the struggle against "mass", conformist and averaged-out culture. That is why this age of ours can ensure no more than material progress and technological development, but there should be no illusions about our ability to create a great culture by applying talents of that kind to art. We find a similar classification of cultural phenomena and an equally pessimistic forecast in C.Greenberg's Art and Culture, which claims that "higher" culture is avantgardist culture, the rest being commercial, "mass" culture (Kitsch, rubbish, as the Germans call it). But avantgardist culture, he says, tends to become ever more complexified, thereby losing support even from the "élite", and considering that avantgardism

[2] See D.Regin, Culture and the Crowd. A Cultural History of the Proletarian Era, Philadelphia, 1968.

is now the only living culture, the preservation of culture in general in the period just ahead tends to be jeopardised.

The same principle of classification is adopted by the Canadian cultorologist D.Macdonald, with the only difference that he stresses the reciprocal influence of the two cultures. "Mass culture takes on the colour of both varieties of the old High culture, Academic and Avantgarde, while these latter are increasingly watered down with Mass elements". But he, too, believes that the "High Culture of our times is pretty much identical with Avantgardism."[3]

Consequently, the main contradiction in the culture of the capitalist world is seen by bourgeois culturologists as lying in the struggle between "humanitarian" and "scientific" culture, between "high" and "low" culture, between "élite" and "mass" culture, between "avantgardist" and "traditional" culture, in short, a struggle between any two opposites, with the exception of the struggle between bourgeois culture in all its forms against democratic and socialist culture. These and many other writers insist that the present state of Western culture was inaugurated in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, without any qualitative changes taking place since then. This idea has been most explicitely expressed by Regin, who says that at about that time, intellectuals and artists began to rebel against the forms and formulas of the classical world, so that the year 1800 is a watershed in the history of culture. This neatly eliminates the question of the crisis of bourgeois culture as an integral part of the general crisis of world capitalism.

I have listed only a few of the historico-cultural conceptions current in the West, but even this short review shows how necessary Marxist-Leninist historico-cultural studies in modern history are for the ideological struggle against bourgeois historiography.

[3] D.Macdonald, "A Theory of Mass Culture", Mass Culture, Ed. by B.Rosenberg and D.White, Glencoe, 1958, p.63.

Among the numerous causes for the lag in this branch of historical science, I think, considerable importance attaches to the fact that various theoretical and methodological problems have yet to be solved. Accordingly, I have set myself the task here to formulate for discussion some of the problems which one inevitably faces in any concrete historico-cultural study and to suggest some ways of tackling these.

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The Marxist-Leninist history of culture has been developing into a relatively independent branch of historical science like economic history, the history of the working-class movement, the history of international relations, etc. Like these historical disciplines, it is based on the general methodology of dialectical and historical materialism. Like them, it has its own specifics, which are determined above all by the specific nature of its subject-matter and also by the origins and history of development of this branch of historical knowledge. It is natural, therefore, to start consideration of the theoretical problems of the history of culture with an analysis of its subject-matter.

This problem entails considerable difficulties chiefly because the very concept of "culture" is much more complex than, for instance, the concept of "international relations". Ever since the American "cultural anthropologists" A.Kroeber and C.Kluckhohn collected 164 formal definitions of culture and something like a hundred odd attempts to explain the concept descriptively (1952), a great many other versions have appeared, but all of these were merely combinations of the old formulas. One cannot expect bourgeois culturology to make a fundamental advance, because it is based on idealistic conceptions about the origins of spiritual phenomena.

The special meaning of the term "culture" (grain culture, the culture of speech, labour, behaviour, etc.) apart, there remain three basic scientific approaches to the concept

which could be tentatively designated as anthropological, sociological and philosophical. Unless this fundamental distinction in approach is considered, we shall hardly be able to go to the substance of the problem beneath the layer of its countless definitions. Nor does the problem boil down to coining yet another definition. The point is to try to decide the ambit of the history of culture, to decide how its subject-matter differs from that of anthropology, the sociology of culture, the history of ideas, art, education and science.

"The anthropological attitude," say Kroeber and Kluckhohn, "is relativistic, in that in place of beginning with an inherited hierarchy of values, it assumes that every society through its culture seeks and in some measure finds values, and that the business of anthropology includes the determination of the range, variety, constancy, and interrelation of these innumerable values."[4] The anthropological approach marks a break with the division of peoples into historical and nonhistorical, cultural and noncultural, and starts from the assumption that culture is inherent in any human society. At the same time, this approach (in bourgeois anthropology) is, indeed, relativistic and objectivist, because it eliminates the question of the level in the development of culture, the criterion for its evaluation, and, finally, the progress of human culture. This is obviously an unacceptable approach for any historical analysis of culture, implying an analysis not only of the state but, above all, the process of ascent from the lower to the higher.

The anthropological concept of culture includes a general view of culture (culture as contrasted to a culture), which is characterised by an extremely broad interpretation. The anthropologist Kroeber and the sociologist T.Parsons stress in their assessments of the anthropological approach that in anthropology even the social system is regarded as no more than a part of culture.

[4] A.Kroeber, C.Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, Cambridge, 1952, p.32.

Definitions of culture which spring from the anthropological approach (let us add that these have also been produced by researchers in other lines) are sufficiently diverse, but they all include, in essence, the whole life of society.

Definitions of this type are clearly aimed against various biological (including racist) interpretations of the origins of culture, all stressing the supraorganic, human, that is, social nature of culture. But to accept this as a definition of culture would be to substitute for a whole concept only one, preliminary sign of it. Indeed, the whole life of the human race, even if it is bound up with the biology of homo sapiens, is determined above all by nonbiological, supraorganic, social processes.

That is why the emphasis on the nonbiological nature of culture is clearly not enough to bring out the specifics of this phenomena. What is more, at the present stage in the development of Marxist-Leninist social science there is no need at all, I think, to include this obvious aspect in the definition of the concept, just as it is not included in the definition of other social phenomena, being always there by implication.

It may be assumed that the anthropological type of definition of culture is genetically connected with the traditional subject-matter of concrete anthropological (and ethnographical) research: up until recently, these dealt with the less developed peoples mainly at the tribal stage.

However, one should not extrapolate to the whole of history the unarticulated state of social being and consciousness at the earliest stage of human history, however long it may be.

However, writers on the history and theory of culture frequently take too broad a view of this concept, of this type of wide-spread formulation: the aggregation of all the achievements in the development of society's material and spiritual life. This type of definition has been criticised

mainly on the ground that it does not allow any reduction of the cultural objects being analysed to their intrinsic unity. It has also been pointed out that the concept of "aggregation of all the achievements" excludes the process of development itself. But the main defect of this type of definition is that it covers virtually the whole of mankind's history.

As the various aspects of social life became more complex and differentiated, the individual branches of historical science took shape, with their subject-matter being the history of this or that aspect of the coherent process of mankind's development: economic history, the history of state and law, the working-class movement, literature, etc. Which aspect of the historical process does the history of culture study in that case? The anthropological approach obviously does not help to find an answer to this question.

The sociological approach proves to be more fruitful from this standpoint, because with it culture is treated as a definite aspect, part or element of social life. This approach must have arisen in connection with the fact that the immediate object of concrete social research is highly organised society with its very complicated social relationships, division of labour, notably, between mental and manual labour, and a clearcut differentiation between the forms of social consciousness (science, art and morality).

The sociological type of definition is for the most part descriptive; such definitions indicate the aspects of social life which, in the opinion of their authors, make up culture in their aggregate or in a definite system. In this sense, even the well-known definition produced by Tylor, the founder of modern anthropology, belongs to the sociological type. He says that "Culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of

society."[5] This definition includes only superstructural phenomena.

The authors of "sociological definitions", belonging to different schools of bourgeois sociology, take an approach that is a long way from the scientific, dialectico-materialist approach to social phenomena. Indeed, what they have produced is not definitions but merely a list of elements, of component parts of some whole. As Kroeber and Kluckhohn have remarked, they forget to say what culture is, after all. In the context of this problem of the subject-matter of the history of culture what is of fundamental importance is not the component elements the various schools refer to culture, but the approach itself: the concept of "culture" does not cover the whole life of society but only some part of it.

In Soviet historical writings, the sociological approach is expressed in two main versions. The most widespread tendency is to draw a distinction between the concept of "culture" in the broad and the narrow sense of the word. The broad sense includes, for instance, definitions with an anthropological aspect, while the narrow sense implies spiritual culture taken as an aggregation of spiritual values and, in some definitions, as modes of their creation.

Now and again some aspect is set apart from the coherent process of social development, with material production and social relations, the class struggle, etc., being included in the sphere of research into culture.

Finally, with the philosophical approach culture does not appear as a synonym of society or as a definite part or aspect of social development, but as a phenomenon abstracted and considered apart from the process in purely analytical terms. Thus, Evans-Pritchard believes that when culture is analysed some entity is mentally broken down, with the distionction being drawn not between two types of objects, because society and culture do not, allegedly, exist in

[5] E.Tylor, Primitive Culture, Vol.I, London, 1871, p.1.

reality, but between different types of abstraction. Kroeber and Parsons say the same thing, although they do not hold society and culture to be abstractions, but an actually existing phenomenon from which either the former or the latter is analytically brought out.

Some authors define culture as a specific function of the collective life of men. I do not think this approach is a fruitful one, at any rate for historical research into the sphere of culture. Of course, society and culture arose simultaneously. But together with the emergence of society there also emerged the relations of production and production itself, and also a definite type of social organisation. Does this mean that all these components of social life are not a part of society, as a part of the whole? Is it true also that only the instruments of logical analysis can help us to separate one component from the other, and each from the whole? After all, economic, family (tribal) and all other types of relations (including cultural relations) exist in objective reality as parts of the whole (society). Indeed, it is as such that they lend themselves to concrete historical analysis, and it is this approach that is most fruitful.

Marxist researchers always bear in mind that the various aspects of the historical process make up an organic whole, but this has never prevented them from studying the development of this or that aspect of the whole in the historical plane. There is here, of course, a definite element of abstraction, but this is not greater than in any other scientific quest. The organic bond between, say, economics and politics is no bar to the separate analysis of economic and political history.

Neither the broad anthropological view of culture which deprives the concept of its specific content, nor the philosophical approach has, I believe, produced a solution of the problem. That is not to say, however, that nothing useful can be derived from each in dealing with the subject-matter of the history of culture. The anthropological approach con-

tains at least one fundamentally important element, and it is the urge to regard culture not as a sum-total of diverse phenomena and aspects of reality, but as an integrated whole. What is especially essential for the history of culture in the anthropological approach is its orientation up on the study of phenomena among the masses, including value orientations, standards of behaviour, ideals, preferences, etc. As Soviet writers have observed, anthropology and ethnography provide not only the cultural-sociological, but also the cultural-historical analysis with well formulated methods of the complex approach to culture.

The philosophical approach to the concept of "culture" also turns out to be fruitful in some instances, like the purely analytical identification of phenomena, which we designate as being "cultural", in the process of production or social relations.

The sociological approach of Marxist researchers of culture seems to be best suited to the purposes of historico-cultural research because it cannot be devoted to the whole historical process or only to some analytically identified aspects of the process. Relying on the general principles of materialist dialectics and making use of the concrete statements by Marx, Engels and Lenin, Soviet scientists have made a substantial contribution to elaborating the concept of "culture". Thanks to their efforts, we are now in a position to assert that: a) this concept embraces not only the results of definite activity, but that activity itself; b) culture is not a mere sum-total of some aspects of social life, but is some entity, a definite system, whose main features are determined by material being, the mode of production, and social relations; and c) culture is not the whole life of society, but some aspect of it.

It now remains to formulate a consensus on which particular aspect of reality is expressed in this concept. This is necessary in order to agree on the terminology, and also to produce a clearcut definition of the subject-matter of

historico-cultural research. It is hardly advisable here to carry on with the concept in the broad and narrow senses, because the conceptual apparatus in science must be coherent.

The various approaches to the consideration of culture and, consequently, the various definitions of culture can, I think, all be covered with the concept of "spiritual life of society", which is not adequate to social consciousness although, of course, it has much that is in common with that category. The "spiritual life of society" concept is much broader than the "social consciousness" concept. Nor does "spiritual life of society" coincide with "spiritual production" which is now and again suggested as the basic category in the history of culture. Leaving aside the question of the applicability of this concept, which has been borrowed from political economy, to the theory of culture, let us merely note that it relates exclusively to the professional activity of workers by brain.

Of course, spiritual life exists in any human society, regardless of whether the division between mental and manual labour there has taken place. But even at that stage, when the division of labour has acquired extreme forms of antithesis between mental and manual labour, spiritual life goes on in all classes, including those which are not engaged in spiritual production.

These classes, like all persons in general not immediately involved occupationally in spiritual production, are in no sense isolated from the production of spiritual values. In contrast to material values, the latter are shaped not only in the course of purposeful labour activity. A man building a house has a fair idea of what he wants to produce by his efforts. But a man developing an opinion, an evaluation of some events or phenomena, does not set himself any production tasks, he merely lives and works in the world of his fellow-men, and in this real being he adds something--however microscopic—to mankind's spiritual wealth.

Consequently, spiritual life, while not coinciding with social consciousness or with spiritual production, fully or partially includes these concepts, and is a definite aspect of social life. It is a phenomenon which has a solid basis and which is ultimately determined by the conditions of material being and is expressed in diverse and changing manifestations in the process of historical development.

Culture, I think, is the spiritual life of society whose basic characteristics are determined by the conditions of material life and social relations, and that exerts a reciprocal effect on them. This formulation lays no claim to being a formal definition. However, together with what I have said above, it helps to show the substance of the approach I have suggested to the subject-matter of the history of culture. This approach contains an anthropological element, because culture is considered as some entity, with the centre of gravity being switched to the spiritual life of the whole of society; it contains a sociological element, because the concept includes a definite aspect of social life, and a philosophical element because some components of spiritual life (like the spiritual element within the framework of material production) may be brought out only by means of logical analysis.

That, I think, is what Lenin meant by culture. Although he did use the word "culture" in his writings with different shades of meaning, depending on the nature of his work (article, speech), on the audience to whom it was addressed and on the context, he never used it in too broad (anthropological) a sense. In his formulations, for instance, "the tremendous destruction of culture and the means of production", "socialism is impossible unless it makes use of the achievements of the engineering and culture created by large-scale capitalism", "making use of everything created by capitalist culture and capitalist production"[6]--the productive forces, technology and production are not taken as a part of culture, but are independent concepts of the same order. Similarly, Lenin does not include the "culture" concept in the relations of production. Thus, he says, "we must take the entire culture that capitalism left behind and build socialism with it."[7]

[6] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow, Vol.27, pp.128-129; Vol.1, p.350, Vol.28, p.421.

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Is it not obvious that the point here is not to take the capitalist relations of production? What is usually designated as material culture, that is, the instruments of labour, dwellings, household objects, are not included by Lenin in the concept of culture. The well-known propositions about "the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie," "the elements of democratic and socialist culture"[8], do not of course imply machinery, because machines cannot be either capitalist or socialist, but ideas, views, value orientations, etc., that is, the spiritual life of different classes or sections of society.

Man's material environment—the instruments of labour which he uses, the nature of his nutrition, type of dwelling, and clothing--do, of course, exert (together with the relations of production) a decisive influence on every aspect of spiritual life, but it does not follow that the material values themselves should be regarded as being a part of culture. The machines, buildings, and all things made in general are an embodiment not only of manual labour, but also of mental labour, an embodiment of culture. That which in the process of the production of material goods has the character of spiritual activity (scientific discoveries, technical inventions and improvements, whatever the level on which these are made, exchange of experience, conscious interaction, the organisation of production, discipline, attitude to work) constitutes an element of spiritual life, of culture. That is what we usually have in mind when we speak of the "culture of production".

[7] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.29, p.70.
[8] Ibid., Vol.20, p.24.

These elements of spiritual life have an important part to play ir the whole complex of what Lenin has said about the need to make use of the achievements of culture under capitalism. "Cooperative movement is a huge cultural legacy that we must treasure and make use of,"[9] said Lenin, thereby including certain organisational skills in the concept of "culture". He said that capitalism "has raised culture in general, and the culture of the masses in particular, to a much higher level", and a few paragraphs later spoke of the embodiment of this mass phenomenon: "The principle of discipline, organisation, harmonious cooperation on the basis of modern machine industry, and strict accounting and control."[10]

Thus, Lenin does not include the products of material production and production itself in the concept of "culture", and fully includes the spiritual element of the production process in that concept. That is the point at which the researcher is faced with the task of analytically bringing out this element so as subsequently to include it in the whole complex of the spiritual life of the given class at the given historical stage.

The fact that the proposed view of culture as society's spiritual life excludes the concept of "material production" and its results does not at all mean any underestimation of men's material activity and material being in general, just as the existence of the concept of "superstructure" does not in any sense lead to an underestimation of the basis. E.Baller is quite right when, analysing one of the basic flaws of bourgeois culturology, he says: "The idealistic separation of spiritual culture from its material basis is the methodological basis for the conclusion about the absolute independence of spiritual culture and the consequent theories of the self-development of ideas."[11] But the only

[9] Ibid., Vol.28, p.197.

[10] Ibid., Vol.27, p.163.

[11] E.Baller, Continuity in the Development of Culture, Moscow, 1969, p.51 (in Russian).

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conclusion to be drawn from this is that culture should not be separated from the basis, and not that both these phenomena should be covered by the same concept. On the contrary, the concept of "culture" in the broad sense of the word tends to obliterate the distinction between basal and superstructural phenomena.

By clearly defining culture as a superstructural phenomenon, we state it to be secondary, to be dependent on the basis. There is no need at all to dissolve the mode of production in the concept of "culture". The monuments of material culture are an important type of source for the study of mankind's history--economic, social and cultural. The concept of "material culture", as a special concept in some sciences (like archaeology), has, of course, every right to exist, like the concept of the "grain culture" type. But that is an independent and special concept.

Accepting the proposed concept of "culture", I think that we can take the subject-matter of the history of culture to be the development of mankind's spiritual life and its instruments of expression from its origination in the process of the formation of the species homo sapiens to our own day. But this most general definition is, however, clearly insufficient to clarify the framework, the problems and the specifics of historico-cultural research.

Spiritual life does not exist in general, but is always the spiritual life of a historically defined community of men taking shape on the basis of the material being and social structure of the given society. Of crucial importance for a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the spiritual life of different societies and communities is the doctrine of socio-economic formations. The chief feature of spiritual life in antagonistic formations is its class character, the existence of two or more cultures in the given society, something, however, that does not make it impossible for the spiritual life of the given society to have general features. The basic body of men with a characteristically qualitative and

clearly defined spiritual life is class, the vehicle of its value orientations, ideals, standards of community living, preferences, attitudes to nature, man and society.

Of course, there are distinctions in the spiritual life of various age groups, sexes, occupational communities and even psychological types, and these may now and again be considerable. But classification on the strength of these features fails to show the true essence of cultural historical phenomena, and this explains why it tends to be accepted by bourgeois culturology. There is no youth and adult, male and female, sanguinic and melancholic culture, but there is the culture of the peasants and the culture of the feudal lords, there is democratic culture and the culture of the exploiting classes. That is why the classification of cultural types by the class principle is the only scientific one, and the class approach to historico-cultural research is the only one that helps to go to the very substance of spiritual phenomena. In application to the history of the capitalist formation this means that the subject-matter of the history of culture is the origination and evolution of the spiritual life of all the classes of capitalist society, that is, bourgeois culture, democratic and socialist culture, whose intricate interaction, in effect, constitutes the culture of the new period.

Marxist researchers, starting from the Marxist-Leninist tenet concerning the decisive role of the masses in the historical process, have shown the various élite theories, which are widely accepted in bourgeois culturology, to be scientifically untenable and apologetic. At the same time, it has been justly stressed that capitalism tends to deprive the masses of working people of any access to the spiritual values accumulated over the ages, to restrict the people's opportunities for education to a minimum which is required for the development of production, thereby slowing down the satisfaction of the spiritual requirements of those who produce the goods and, let us add, the development of these

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requirements themselves. The socialist revolution alone is capable of sweeping away every obstacle in the way of the individual's allround development and complete realisation of the people's spiritual potential.

All that being so, what is the role of the working people in spiritual life under capitalism? Replying to this question, the Soviet scientist M.Kim stresses that the working people are always the actual creators of culture. This is backed up by two important arguments: man has changed spiritually while producing material goods; the most profound, striking and aesthetically full-fledged types of hero have been produced by folklore. Indeed, the change in the spiritual make-up of the producer himself is an extremely essential and immediate contribution by the people to culture. Nor is there any doubt about the spiritual value of the people's artistic creativity. To this should be added the fact that among the greatest cultural values are the standards of morality and justice produced by the working people themselves. It is the hammering out of these values and the corresponding value orientations and ideals that shows the decisive role of the working masses in the development of culture.

The every-day consciousness of the working people in capitalist society is developed immediately in the process of material production and in the class struggle. Lenin pointed out that "the existence of exploitation will always engender ideals opposite to this system both among the exploited themselves and among certain members of the 'intelligentsia'."[12] In view of the limited access to education, the every-day consciousness of the masses under capitalism consists chiefly in the nature of value judgements, expressing their interests and requirements. But every-day consciousness is not separated by an insuperable barrier from scientific and aesthetic cognition. On the contrary, it pro-

[12] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.I, p.416.

vides the soil which feeds theories, doctrines and artistic images produced by ideologists.

Naturally, the value orientations and ideals of the masses do not amount to scientific theories. In his work, What Is To Be Done?, Lenin gave a thorough analysis of the causes for which scientific socialism needs to be brought into the minds of the masses "from outside".

Every-day consciousness may be said merely to pose the question to which scientific and aesthetic cognition provides the answers, thereby giving the ideologists the most general direction in their quest. This also applies to art. It is not the masses of the working people themselves who produced Hamlet or War and Peace, the canvasses of Courbet and Serov, the symphonies of Beethoven and Tchaikovsky, and the theatre of Kean and Shchepkin. But behind all these great works produced by aesthetic genius thorough analysis will reveal the value orientations and ideals, the notions of the real and the desired, that have taken shape among this or that section of the people, among the various classes. The series of articles written by Lenin about Leo Tolstoy provides a brilliant model in analysing the connection between the creative effort of a great writer and the socio-psychological make-up of the mass of peasants, whose contradictions were so precisely reflected in Tolstoy's writings.

Nothing of what has been said should serve to deny the great role of the ideologist who, of course, acts not only as a mouthpiece of the ideas, aesthetic concepts, and ideals which have taken shape outside his own thinking, but above all as a creative individual enriching society's spiritual life with the fruits of his own scientific or imaginative thinking. His conscious or unconscious stand in the class struggle, the contradictions of his creative work, his unique perception of the world, and his personality itself are of the same interest to the historian of culture as the personality of the historical leader to the student of civic

history. In general, the relationship between the masses and outstanding leaders of culture does not, in principle, differ from the relationship between the people and leaders in history.

The masses as a whole are, of course, the main motive and crucial force in history, including the history of culture. Marx says that "upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, mode of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations."[13] The "whole class" and not only its ideologists--there we find the primary methodological importance of this idea of Marx's for the history of culture.

A scientific view of the decisive role of the masses in society's spiritual life provides, I think, the possibility to establish a clearcut criterion on the basis of which, in the course of concrete analysis, one needs to determine the class nature of phenomena in spiritual life.

The phenomena of spiritual life which originate on the level of every-day consciousness, and the fruits of the efforts of ideologists to express the value orientations and ideals of the masses in the light of these ideals and moral principles, should, I think, be regarded as phenomena of democratic culture. Of course, the great thinker or artist frequently discerns merely the embryonic elements of the popular ideal and of the constantly changing system of value orientations which have yet to become quantitatively prevalent in the mass itself, but these are, nevertheless, popular ideals.

At a definite stage in the history of a given country, the general democratic system of value orientations and

[13] K.Marx and F.Engels, Selected Works, Vol.I, Moscow, 1969, p.421.

ideals rises in the midst of the working class or its forward-looking section to the level of the socialist ideal, which together with scientific and aesthetic values, expressing and elaborating on it, constitutes a phenomenon of socialist culture.

The phenomena of bourgeois culture originate in the midst of the bourgeoisie itself in the form of its value orientations, views, notions and preconceptions, and are on that basis elaborated by bourgeois ideologists. "The Young-Hegelian philosophy", wrote Marx and Engels, "merely imitates in a philosophic form the conceptions of the German middle class."[14] Quoting the view expressed by the liberal Narodniks, who held that "literature educates the kulaks", Lenin resolutely objected and said: "On the contrary, respected Mr. Narodnik: the 'kulaks' educate literature--they give it ideas..., they give it resources."[15] In a footnote to the word "kulaks" Lenin made this point: "This is too narrow a term. The more precise and definite term 'bourgeoisie' should have been used".

The criterion here proposed, I think, makes it possible in the process of historico-cultural research to determine whether a phenomenon of spiritual life in capitalist society belongs to bourgeois, democratic, or socialist culture. But a criterion is not a skeleton key which will help to open any lock: after all, behind such phenomena may frequently be found highly complicated and stratified spiritual phenomena.

The history of culture is such an extensive sphere that its interconnection with the basis and also with the class struggle as a whole can be more immediately traced than, for instance, the interconnection between the basis and the struggle of ideas in the sphere of philosophy or the struggle of aesthetic trends in art. Just as the study of one branch of industry or even the parallel study of all the

[14] K.Marx and F.Engels, The German Ideology, Moscow, 1968, p.23.

[15] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.1, p.389.

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branches cannot be a substitute for economic history as a whole, the study of the various spheres of spiritual life cannot be a substitute for the history of culture. This or that course in the development of culture, ultimately determined by the basis, can acquire great importance for the shaping of concrete historical situations.

That is why one of the tasks of historical science specifically is to study the history of culture. The historian can and must make use of the results of research by specialists in literature, art, etc.; he lays no claim to substituting for them, but complex historico-cultural research itself is the business of the historian.

ON THE HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF TIMUR

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The history of the world in antiquity and the Middle Ages is saturated with the names of various great and minor conquerors who created sometimes short-lived, but now and then more or less stable state formations or even "world" empires. One such conqueror was Timur, known to the peoples of Europe as Tamerlane, who in the 70s of the 14th century founded a huge state, the history of which recalls, in many ways, the history of Genghis Khan's state. Being an admirer of the founder of the Mongol Empire, Timur set himself a task which not even his predecessor had been able to accomplish--the creation of a "world empire". But if Genghis Khan, as a representative of a nomadic milieu, measured the limits of the future empire by the territory reached by the hooves of the Mongol horses, Timur formulated his plans much definitely, asserting that the entire space of the inhabited part of the world was unworthy of having more than one ruler.

Much has been written about Timur. The greater part of the sources for this epoch and Timur have long been known, published and studied. The only thing with which we can reproach historians in this regard is, perhaps, their inadequate utilisation of Transcaucasian (Armenian and Georgian) and some Arab sources. These materials contain interesting data not only on Timur's campaigns in Transcaucasia and the Arab countries but also curious characteri-

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sations and details concerning the international relations of that time, as well as the activities of the conqueror himself.

It is the custom in Soviet historiography to divide the sources on this subject, as it were, into two large groups. In the first are the sources emanating from the court of the conqueror or his heirs. The best-known of these are the chronicles of Nizam ud-din Shami and Sharaf ud-din Jazdi, which are imbued with deep respect for the "Iron Cripple" ("temyur", "temir"--in Turkic languages, "iron". Hence, obviously, the name that is sometimes used, "Iron Cripple"). Making use of the court historiography of the eastern countries, the authors of these chronicles described the majestic figure as a cruel but wise and just statesman who synthesised the qualities that were inherent, in the past, in Nizam al-Mulk and Genghis Khan. It would, however, be wrong to claim that Shami and Jazdi passed over Timur's "exploits" in the conquered countries in silence, for they did not set themselves such a task. Cruelty (and not only in wartime) was an essential feature of the entire epoch of the Middle Ages. Considering himself a worthy successor to Genghis Khan, Timur took pride in his "exploits" and did not try to conceal them from posterity.

The second group of sources are documents which did not emanate from the circles of Timur and his successors. These materials are heterogeneous. Among them are the evidence of such a neutral (but for political reasons favourably disposed towards Timur) author as the Ambassador of the Castillian King Ruy González Clavijo, and numerous documents emanating from the peoples who experienced the results of Timur s campaigns and his policy. Of all these sources, historians have made adequate use of only the works of the Arab writer Ibn Arabshah, a native of Damascus.

Ibn Arabshah was a highly-educated, well-travelled man. He survived the destruction of his native city by Timur's hordes, was taken along with other captives to faraway

Samarkand, and had reason to hate Timur. Other Arab authors and contemporary Armenian writers were well informed about the events of this era; they themselves lived through a great deal, and they also learned of Timur's campaigns from the words of eyewitnesses and from reliable documents.

How has Timur's activity been evaluated in historical literature? In mediaeval historiography, two very differing evaluations of this conqueror are encountered. The majority of the Moslem historians of Iran, Central Asia and some other countries basically continued the tradition established in the works of the court chroniclers of Timur and his successors. Over many centuries a respectful attitude towards Timur was preserved in the works of these historians. Even when describing the destruction of their own countries and the calamities of their own peoples, these chroniclers continued to feel a reverential fear of Timur. The other group of mediaeval authors, primarily Christians (Armenians, Georgians, Russians), characterised the time of Timur as a period of supreme disasters which fell to the lot of many peoples, and the conqueror himself they considered the next "scourge of God". Such an evaluation is given in the Chronicle of Nikon.

If the reasons for the completely nihilistic evaluation of Timur by the historians of the second group require no special commentary, the position of the Moslem historians demands some clarification. The majority of them did not conceal the painful consequences of Timur's epoch for their countries, yet at the same time they respected him. How can this be? The answer to this question should be sought in various aspects of Timur's activity and in the different attitudes towards him of the representatives of various social strata. Since the chroniclers of succeeding times (whatever their social class origins) invariably expressed the interests of the ruling class or of separate parts of it (such, very frequently, was the nomadic aristocracy), they tried to portray the events of the past in their works in accordance with the interests and expectations of their

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patrons. In this manner, the question is one of the class ideology of the feudal lords, more precisely, of definite groups of this class.

Timur drove tens of thousands of people--artisans, skilled workers--out of the conquered countries. With their sweat and blood, Samarkand and some other cities of Central Asia were built. The lion's share of the plundered riches fell, of course, into the hands of the Central Asian nobility, which was both participant in and inspiration for the plundering campaigns. Timur understood that his state, created by the sword, would exist only so long as he was capable of accomplishing his victorious booty-bringing campaigns in the interests of this aristocracy. But for this "internal order", which only a strong state power could secure, was necessary. Therefore Timur ordered not only the immuring of thousands of living people and the piling up of a pyramid of tens of thousands of heads of "rebels" of various countries. In case of necessity he punished an excessively thievish ruler or a dignitary who had come under suspicion. As a result of this, in the eyes of the ruling class of that and later times, the name of Timur personified the concept of a strong power capable of defending this class, taken as a whole, from popular insurrections and other internal disorders, and also capable--this was the main thing--of leading victorious, booty-bringing campaigns from the new objects of pillage. Precisely such an image of Timur--as a powerful ruler who could serve as a model for other sovereigns--was attractive both for the ruling class of later times and for the chroniclers who served this class.

The works of W.Barthold, who used new sources and who, naturally, reviewed previous evaluations, constituted an entire epoch in the study of the past of the Central Asian peoples. (To be sure, not all his conclusions have retained their significance in our time: for example, there is in his works a certain idealisation of the Mongol Empire.) Studying Timur's era, Barthold sought, as objectively as possible, to take into account the entire chain of events that permitted

the appearance of this conqueror on the historical stage and created the conditions for the founding of his state. In characterising Timur's state, Barthold attempted not only to reveal the negative consequences of Timur's activity, but also to find some positive features in it. Since the 15th century was a time of the flowering of mediaeval culture among the peoples of Central Asia, Barthold singled out the given period and tried to find some corresponding explanations for this, not taking sufficiently into account, however, the material foundations of the temporary flourishing of Maverannahr in the 15th century.

But that which can, in Barthold's works, be characterised as isolated inaccuracies explicable in terms of the general level of the science of the time, takes on, in some contemporary works, the form of a patent idealisation of Timur's personality. Thus, some historians, while not turning a blind eye to the plundering character of his campaigns, began to speak of Timur as the unifier of Central Asia. This unification, they say, can only be regarded as the result of the work of Timur himself. It was achieved owing to the complicated political relations that arose as a result of the collapse of Jagatai's ulus, the Hulagu state and the Golden Horde. This thesis does not arouse any objections, but the interpretation of these historians of many historical facts of the last third of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th century, and their general evaluation, nevertheless seems incorrect.

In a series of works there was an obvious idealisation of Timur. They sometimes presented him as a strong personality, a farsighted politician who was, allegedly, historically necessary to Central Asia in that era. They noted the "international merits" of Timur expressed in his aid to Byzantium, Rus and other European countries and in the saving, at the beginning of the 15th century, of the peoples of North Africa, first of all Egypt, from Turkish enslavement, thanks to the rout of Bajazet I.

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The majority of Soviet historians evaluate the activity of Timur negatively. In Volume 3 of World History, it is pointed out that "Timur's rule played a negative role also for the peoples of Central Asia themselves, for all his ephemeral successes were achieved at the cost of strengthening the regime of lawlessness in Maverannahr and of the destitution of the conquered countries".[1] Similar evaluations are contained in Essays on the History of the USSR, in the multi-volume History of the USSR from Ancient Times to Our Days[2] and in many other works of Soviet historians. Historians of those foreign countries which were in the past subjected to the invasions of Timur's hordes hold him in no higher regard. Thus, Indian writers, speaking of the destructive consequences of Timur's campaign, consider that this campaign was a terrible calamity in which the defeated lost everything and the conqueror achieved nothing.[3]

The idealisation of Timur, of which we spoke earlier, demands that we return to the problem of evaluating his role in history.

What caused the appearance of Timur on the historical stage? Had conditions ripened in that era for the firm unification of the territory of Central Asia, and, in general, was such unification then possible? No one disputes that Timur was a talented general and not a bad diplomat, that he not only knew how to organise and direct pillaging campaigns of enormous size but also to use the material resources of the ruined countries and districts for the welfare of his "native ulus". However, not every historical personality who possesses extraordinary capabilities is truly great. As is well known, the role of separate individuals in history must be judged according to their contribution to general world

[1] World History, Vol.3, Moscow, 1957, p.574 (in Russian).

[2] See Essays on the History of the USSR. 14th-15th Centuries, Moscow, 1953; History of the USSR from Ancient Times to Our Days, Vol.2, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

[3] See V.D.Mahajan, Muslim Rule in India, Delhi, 1965, p.198.

progress. Two questions arise in connection with this: did Timur's activity really have progressive consequences for Central Asia (more precisely, for Maverannahr); is it possible to claim that his campaigns brought some kind of benefit to other countries and peoples?

In order to answer the first question it is necessary to recall what Central Asia was in the 14th century and the historical situation in which Timur appeared, a situation that enabled him, an ordinary robber chieftain (of which there were then more than a few), to become the ruler of a great part of Maverannahr and then the perpetuator of the "cause" of Genghis Khan on the Eurasian continent.

In our times, by "Central Asia" we usually understand the territory of the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadjik, Kirghiz and part of the Kazakh SSRs. In his works, Barthold often and by preference employed the term "Turkestan", the geographical volume of which was significantly wider than that which is now understood by the term Central Asia. Obviously, in every concrete instance it is necessary to stipulate the content of this concept. It is more correct, in connection with the events of that time, to speak of Maverannahr as a definite historico-geographical region which took shape long before the 14th century and which, irrespective of the motley ethnic composition of the local population, represented a certain economic and cultural community also in the period of Timur's activity. Maverannahr (literally, Transoxiana) included the provinces on the right bank of the Amu-Darya. This name arose after the Arab conquests but on the basis of an older historico-geographical demarcation. Maverannahr usually was understood to include Khorezm, which was situated along the lower reaches of the Amu-Darya. A characterisation of Timur's state must keep this circumstance in view, for Timur's "good deeds" did not extend to Khorezm. But even Maverannahr relatively rarely, in antiquity as in the Middle Ages, represented a united political whole, and when it did, separate parts of contemporary Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan and other areas joined it.

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After the collapse of Genghis Khan's empire, a large part of Maverannahr formed part of the Jagataian ulus. And the basic part of the territory of Khorezm became part of another fragment of the Mongol Empire, Djuchi's ulus--which we know as the Golden Horde.

The 14th-15th centuries ethnic history of the territory of the present-day Soviet Central Asian republics has been little studied. The only thing we know for certain is that at that time there continued, very intensively, the process of the Turkicisation of the local (Iranian-speaking) population which had begun many centuries earlier. (This Turkicised population of Maverannahr and the more southerly regions, together with other groups of the Turkic-speaking population, was gradually formed into the Uzbek nationality.) Sources of the 14th-15th centuries clearly distinguish in Maverannahr not only the Iranian-speaking population (the Tajiks) and the settled Turkic population, but also the so-called Jagataians (Djagataians)--nomadic and semi-nomadic descendants of the tribes which came here with Genghis Khan and his heirs. At the end of the 14th and beginning of the 15th century, four Jagataian tribes, among them the Barlas, were distinguishable. And from the Barlas came Timur. Obviously, already towards the middle of the 14th century, the Barlas had lost the Mongol language and had become Turkicised.

Already in the 14th century the Jagataians of Maverannahr, having fallen under the influence of the local, settled population (which stood at a higher stage of development), gradually drew close to this population. Consequently they differed all the more, in terms of their economy, from the nomads of the eastern part of the Jagataian ulus, the so-called Mogolistan, who were ethnically close to them.

When the Jagataian ulus separated into two parts (one of which comprised a large part of Maverannahr, the other--Mogolistan) in the middle of the 14th century, a struggle began between the two parts. The Jagataian aristocracy of Maverannahr, drawing closer to the local Iranian and Turkic

aristocracy on economic grounds, stood in opposition to the Mogolistan aristocracy and even at times become intimate with the so-called Serbedars. (The Serbedar movement of the 14th century was complicated in terms of the composition of the participants and the aims of the movement. There was a powerful anti-feudal current in it. Simultaneously it was a protest of the settled population against the oppression of the nomadic aristocracy. The demands of the Left wing of the Serbedar movement were also unacceptable to the leadership of the settled population.)

In the 1360s and 1370s, when Timur came forward in the arena of political struggle, there was taking place, in the countries of the East and Central Asia, that long-standing struggle between nomads and the settled population, a struggle which was expressed in the epos of the Iranian peoples preserved for us by Firdousi. This was neither racial nor ethnic hostility but rather a struggle between two forms of economy, a struggle of settled peoples against the encroachments of nomads who threatened to destroy the results achieved over the centuries by the pertinacious labour of those who tilled the soil.

In such circumstances, a temporary concord between the Serbedars of Maverannahr and the Jagataians became possible. Such a temporary alliance was useful to both sides, since only through the unification of all forces was it possible to organise a rebuff to the Mogolistan nomads. (The military advantage was at first on the side of the latter, for the nomadic detachments, which united a large part of the male population, were a more powerful organised force than a militia composed of peasants-agriculturalists or town dwellers.) Such an alliance could not, however, exist for long. And right here Timur revealed himself as a crafty, two-faced politician, gradually getting rid of the support rendered him by allies who were already not only not needed but even dangerous. After the Serbedars smashed the Mogols of Iljas-Khadja (from whom Timur and his temporary ally Hussein had recently fled), Timur treacherously made short

work of the Serbedar leaders, whom he had lured to his headquarters. The Serbedar movement was drowned in blood. In the 1380s, accounts were settled in even crueler fashion with the Serbedars of Khorasan.

Traitorously dealing with the Samarkand Serbedars, on the crest of whose movement he had risen to prominence, Timur rather quickly united a large part of Maverannahr, excluding Khorezm, under his authority. After the death of the Golden Horde Khan Berdibek (1359), Khorezm became an independent state and persistently opposed Timur. The latter undertook several campaigns there. In 1388 Timur levelled the main city of Khorezm, Urgench, to the ground and ordered the sowing of barley on the spot. So far as the remainder of Maverannahr is concerned, after the massacre of the Serbedars its position became different externally. Timur regarded this territory as his own native ulus. A strong government with a peculiar military trend was organised in the country: all of Maverannahr was divided into military-administrative units, each of which had to supply ten thousand soldiers. (In the given case it is unimportant whether this system existed under the Jagataian khans and came from them to Timur, or whether Timur himself introduced it. Even if the first supposition is true, it merely proves the organic tie between Timur's state and the empire of Genghis Khan and the uluses of his heirs.) And although the settled population was attracted to service, the most privileged part of Timur's armies remained the nomads-Jagataians. They composed the skeleton of his army, which was organised (as was his entire state) on the model of the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan and his successors. This organic tie between Timur's state and Genghis Khan's empire is traceable literally in everything.

As we know, Timur did not take the title of khan. He constantly kept figure-head khans from Genghis Khan's line around him, but real power lay in his own hands. So far as the nominal heads of state are concerned, their selection from among the descendants of the founder of the Mongol

Empire symbolised, as it were, Timur's devotion to the legacy of his idol. From Genghis Khan Timur inherited the notorious idea of a world empire and, like his predecessor, sometimes with even greater cruelty and often only to terrorise peoples, he destroyed cities and slaughtered their inhabitants.

Relying chiefly upon the nomadic aristocracy, at the same time Timur did not neglect to bestow his favours upon that part of the settled nobility that entered his service. This involved first of all the Maverannahr nobility. The suppression of the Serbedar movement, in which there had been much that was not to the liking of the orthodox Moslem clergy, the prosperous townsmen and the settled farmers, attracted the sympathy of these strata of the population to Timur's side. His further policy, which was designed to secure a special position for the principal part of Maverannahr in the state he created, and also his successful policy of conquest, strengthened Timur's authority among the Maverannahr nobility. Historians who idealise Timur emphasise especially his concern for the central regions of his state, forgetting at what price and at the cost of what the flourishing of Maverannahr was achieved under Timur. Incidentally, here too an analogy with Genghis Khan is suggested: the latter (like his most immediate heirs) strived with riches plundered in other countries, and with the labour of craftsmen driven out of almost every country in the world, to "make comfortable" his own "native yurt", Mongolia. Of course, the analogy here cannot be complete, for the centre of Timur's state was Maverannahr, a region of an ancient agricultural culture that had cities which came into being on a natural basis. But the relatively short-lived flowering of this region at the end of the 14th and into the 15th century fed, to a significant extent, upon sources analogous to those just mentioned in connection with Genghis Khan's empire.

We have spoken above about the destruction of Khorezm, a province of Maverannahr which did not enter Timur's

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"domains". Beginning with 1381, Timur undertook a series of campaigns in the south, in Khorasan, and then in the west, all the way to Palestine and the Aegean Sea. These campaigns were accompanied by unparalleled destruction and butchery, by the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of captives and peaceful people. The apogee of Timur's cruelty was the Indian campaign of 1398-1399. On the eve of the decisive battle with the local ruler, Timur ordered the slaughter of 100 thousand unarmed Indian captives on the specious grounds that they might strike from the rear.

On the return from the campaigns, behind the victorious army files of many thousands of captives stretched to distant Maverannahr. Thousands of artisans from Damascus, Tabriz, the cities of Transcaucasia, Iran, Asia Minor, India and elsewhere laboured on the construction of palaces, mosques and other buildings in Samarkand. It was precisely the extensive use of the forced labour of representatives of many peoples, together with the merciless exploitation of the local population, that permitted the construction of the magnificent buildings in Samarkand and other cities of Maverannahr which to this day astonish one with the perfection of their forms and the richness of their decorations. Stolen treasure and a cost-free labour force also made it possible to build some irrigation works and even at times to lighten the tax burden of the privileged cities a little.

Some people consider that Timur was a great patron of the Central Asian cities and the local merchantry. The opinion even exists that he undertook some of his aggressive campaigns with the goal of undermining the caravan trade through the Golden Horde, thereby weakening the latter (in particular, those who hold this view link Timur's campaigns against the Golden Horde with his destruction of a number of East European cities which lay across the trade route from the Black Sea to Central Asia). We think there is a certain exaggeration in all this. During his campaigns Timur plundered cities which stood on the trade routes and those which did not (for example, he burned the little city of Yelets,

which had no connection whatsoever with these routes). Obviously Timur took the interests of the Maverannahr merchantry into account to a certain extent, but his main task was to satisfy the interests of his main support, the Jagataian nomadic aristocracy.

Some people think that Timur, who was illiterate but who thirsted for knowledge, gave his protection to poets and scholars, thus promoting the raising of the cultural level of Central Asia. In truth, Timur was notably curious, especially in matters of military history; he kept special readers for this purpose. But a knowledge of history, above all military history, was necessary to him in his capacity as military commander who wished to perfect the Mongol-Turkic military system. So far as literature in the Turkic language is concerned, contrary to the opinion of some historians, it appeared in Maverannahr before Timur and quite apart from him.[4]

It is necessary clearly to delimit the activity of the conqueror himself and the rise in the cultural level in Maverannahr, in modern Afghanistan, Eastern Iran and other countries, a rise which took place after Timur in the 15th century. This period left a deep imprint upon the history of world civilisation; its cultural legacy is the property of the peoples of Central Asia and the East in general. One can pay homage not only to the great scholar Ulug-Beg but also to another of Timur's grandsons, Prince Baisunkar, under whose direction the work of editing of the Shah-name was carried out. The peoples of Central Asia carefully preserve the names of Dzhami, Navoi, Khudzhandi, Kushdzhi and other scholars. But what do Ulug-Beg and Timur have in common beyond their kinship? Soon after Ulug-Beg tragically perished in a struggle with the conservative opposition, which expressed the interests of just those social strata bred by Timur's policies, the group of scholars and people from the world of art led by Ulug-Beg collapsed. Many of them left

[4] See W.Barthold, Works, Moscow, 1968, Vol.5, pp.178, 606-607 (in Russian).

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Maverannahr and fled to other countries, where they contributed to the emergence and development of new scientific and cultural centres.

After a few decades, a new wave of nomads from Djuchi's ulus ripped into Maverannahr. The gradual inundation of Central Asia by nomads with their backward, stagnant economic and social forms, but powerful military organisation; the establishment of the nomadic aristocracy's state and the gradual but steady primitivisation, as a result of all this, of the economy and social norms in the settled regions of Maverannahr--all this, in the final analysis, dictated that these regions would enter upon a period of prolonged economic and cultural stagnation and decay. Timur's rule was an essential feature of this entire centuries-long chain of events. The temporary rise in the economy and culture of Maverannahr, noticeable both in Timur's day and after him (in the 15th century), cannot be understood or explained without taking account of his plundering expeditions.

Of course, it is not the peoples of Central Asia who bear the historical responsibility for the calamities which befell many peoples of other lands because of Timur and the Jagataian aristocracy. Definite historical circumstances spawned favourable conditions for the appearance of such "forceful personalities" as Genghis Khan, Timur and others, and in the final analysis not only the peoples who were the victims of their aggression but also the societies in which these personalities appeared suffered because of them. The enormous material wealth and human resources of the many countries Timur conquered were used to enrich the Maverannahr aristocracy. Timur's real role in the history of Central Asia consisted of zealous service in its class interests.

We turn now to the international activity of Timur. As has been noted above, there exists an opinion that his campaigns had a favourable impact upon the development of Rus and other European states and also upon the countries of North Africa. The view has been expressed, for example, that Timur's state and Djuchi's ulus differed radically from one

another, that the Golden Horde was one of Timur's principal opponents, and that consequently he was vitally interested, if not in its destruction, then in its weakening. Timur's wars with Toktamish, the defeat of the latter in 1395 and the subsequent destruction of the Golden Horde's cities dealt it a fatal blow, and thereby Timur objectively did something useful not only for Central Asia but also for Rus. Was this the way it was?

First of all, it is hardly possible to speak of the radical opposition of the Golden Horde to Timur's state. The proponents of this view proceed from the fact that the principal pillar of Timur's support was Maverannahr, where there were developed cities and where the majority of the population was sedentary. The Golden Horde embraced, primarily, steppe regions inhabited by nomads. It was mentioned earlier that Timur's basic social support was also a nomad aristocracy, but one from another ulus (more accurately, from a part of it)--the Jagataian, which arose, like the Golden Horde, on the ruins of Genghis Khan's empire. Under the authority of the Golden Horde khans and Jagataians from the line of Genghis Khan and their successor, Timur, there were regions with a settled population whose relations with the nomadic aristocracy changed according to concrete conditions.

In the 60s and 80s of the 14th century, conditions in the Djuchi and Jagataian uluses were extremely similar. At that time, the former Jagataian ulus split into two rival parts, Mogolistan and Maverannahr. The Golden Horde was also broken up into two parts which were in fact independent, Ak-Horde (east of the Volga) and the Golden Horde proper (west of the Volga). These parts were at war with each other, as were the Jagataians of Maverannahr and the khans of Mogolistan. Timur emerged victorious from the struggle between the latter in the 70s of the 14th century. In the internecine struggle inside the Golden Horde, Mamai was victorious; he ruled only in the west, but he did not give up the idea of uniting all of Djuchi's ulus. Both Timur and

Mamai relied upon the nomads of their areas, but the one and the other sought wider social support. Here too the advantage was with Timur, for he ruled wealthy Maverannahr. Unfortunately, there is almost no information about the relations of Mamai and in general the Golden Horde khans of that time with the cities along the Volga, in the Crimea and so forth. But obviously there were definite circles in these cities (such as the city leaders of Maverannahr) who favoured a strong authority of the khans to protect the relatively favourable conditions of their development.

Mamai fought persistently for the unification of the Golden Horde. In order successfully to accomplish this task, he had to strengthen his authority in the west, first of all in the Russian lands. The situation there, however, was not what it had been a century earlier. The principality of Moscow, which had become the centre of the unification of the Russian land, had grown stronger. In the west, part of the Russian land had entered the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Taking advantage of troubles in the Golden Horde, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Olgerd defeated a group of Golden Horde Tatars at Siniye Vody in 1363. As a result, the territories of Kiev, Pereyaslavl and Podolia were liberated from the authority of the Horde. It is possible that it was just this circumstance which impelled the aristocracy of the western part of the Golden Horde to unite around Mamai.

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The events of the 70s of the 14th century showed that North-Eastern Rus had become the chief opponent of Golden Horde sovereignty. Therefore Mamai, before entering upon a decisive struggle with the Trans-Volga begs (behind whom stood Timur), decided to mount a campaign against Rus first. In 1380 it seemed that the situation favoured him: the Lithuanian Grand Duke, at war with Moscow, became his ally, and among the Great Russian princes there were to be found separatists who worried only about their own appanages (for example, the prince of Ryazan). Having gathered all the forces of the western part of Djuchi's ulus, Mamai advanced

on Rus, but at Kulikovo Polye he suffered a defeat which in many ways decided the future fate of the Golden Horde and its relations with the Russian lands.

But if Mamai's fate was decided by this battle, the mighty protector of the Golden Horde as a state proved to be Timur. Timur wished neither the death nor the disintegration of the Golden Horde. He had no claims upon any of the lands that composed it (with the exception of Khorezm and some other border territories). It suited him that Djuchi's ulus was a united state headed by a khan who was either friendly or in some way obligated to him. Such a figure, Toktamish, was selected.

In the 70s of the 14th century, when Mamai was functioning successfully in the western part of the Golden Horde, Timur set himself the goal of consolidating the authority of his creature in the Trans-Volga part of the Horde. The history of Timur's support of Toktamish in the latter's struggle with Urus-khan and his sons is well known from the sources. Timur used everything, including military force, to ensure that Toktamish would overcome his rivals. In 1377-1378 Toktamish became the head of Ak-Horde, and in two years he unified all Djuchi's ulus (after Mamai was crushed by the Russians). This took place, one may presume, with Timur's approval and with his support.

As soon as authority in the European possessions of the Horde passed into his hands, Toktamish decided to accomplish that which Mamai had been unable to do. In truth, on the strength of circumstances that had arisen, chiefly the lessons of the Kulikovo Polye battle, a campaign against the Russian lands now had a different character. Instead of a great war planned in advance, a quick raid, which made it possible to take advantage of the nomadic cavalry, was undertaken. The Russian lands seem to have been unable to repel this, for otherwise it would be difficult to imagine how the recently defeated Tatars could have dared to undertake a new campaign. Precisely thanks to Timur's support, the Golden

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Horde was able to prepare itself quickly for the raid. In 1382 Toktamish, unexpectedly invading the Russian lands, seized Moscow and established the Golden Horde's sovereignty over North-Eastern Rus. As a result of Toktamish's unification of the Golden Horde, which was accomplished with Timur's support, the Tatar yoke in Rus was reimposed for almost a century.

Sanctioning Toktamish's rule in the Golden Horde, Timur calculated that the khan, who was indebted to him for everything, would limit his authority to Djuchi's ulus (minus Khorezm). But it turned out differently. In 1385 Toktamish appeared in Transcaucasia and thereupon laid waste to Southern Azerbaijan and Tabriz. Strictly speaking, in this period Toktamish had still not infringed upon any of Timur's "rights": Timur had then not yet subjugated Azerbaijan, although he intended to subdue it. Here, for the first time, the interests of the two plunderers crossed. And there it was revealed that Timur, who laid claim to Transcaucasia, was at the same time ready to forgive Toktamish for ravaging "his" territory.

But the Golden Horde begs, just as Timur's Jagataians, dreamed of plundering the rich settled areas and their cities. Toktamish knew Timur's strength, and, although he was rather afraid of his protector, he could not fail to take into account his own troops, for whom military booty was one of their means of existence. Just because of this, Toktamish, in 1387, taking advantage of Timur's absence from Maverannahr, invaded that region and ravaged it all the way to Bukhara. The ruler of Khorezm was Toktamish's ally. Timur determined to punish his treacherous creature in exemplary fashion. Timur's forces followed Toktamish to the Volga, then turned back. But Toktamish quickly recovered and, taking advantage of Timur's preoccupation with a campaign against the Egyptian possessions in Asia, again invaded Transcaucasia. There was nothing for Timur to do but to deal Toktamish a new, powerful blow. On April 14, 1395, he com-

pletely destroyed Toktamish's hordes on the river Terek, then went on with fire and sword into his possessions, destroying the towns along the Volga.

Plundering to his heart's content in the possessions of the Golden Horde proper, the conqueror did not limit himself to this and invaded the Russian lands, burned Yelets, devastated the surrounding districts, and, in the words of the Russian chroniclers, remained there for 15 days. The Grand Prince Vasily Dmitriyevich gathered his forces and advanced to meet the enemy on the river Oka. Apparently Timur did not intend to limit himself to Yelets, and for this reason he stayed within the limits of Ryazan for two weeks. Some of the Russian separatist princes inclined towards his side. Nevertheless, having laid waste the southeastern districts of Rus, Timur unexpectedly left; to this day it is not entirely clear why he did so. Most probably, during his halt in the Ryazan lands, Timur ascertained the fighting capacity of his new opponent. Since Moscow was getting ready to repulse him, his advisers from the Golden Horde murzas, remembering Kulikovo Polye, dissuaded him from continuing his campaign.

Timur soon left the territory of the Golden Horde. He did not destroy it as a state and indeed did not intend to do so. The destruction of cities and many localities, of course, caused great damage to the Golden Horde leadership, but this should not be exaggerated. These cities were the focus of the settled population that was subject to the Horde, and the nomadic uluses, the pillar of the Horde's masters, did not suffer greatly. So far as the further disintegration of the Golden Horde is concerned, this was a process which conformed to historical laws and which began before Timur's appearance on the historical scene. For his part, he did everything he could to arrest this process. Timur's further actions are evidence of this. It would seem that Toktamish, whom Timur had beaten and whose many betrayals ought to have won him Timur's hatred, in fact did not lose the conqueror's favour. Timur's policy vis-à-vis

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the Golden Horde was to strengthen it under his own aegis. Many years later, at the start of the China campaign, there appeared at Timur's headquarters an ambassador from Toktamish, who was wandering around somewhere in the steppes. Timur showered kindness upon the emissary, promising to subdue Djuchi's ulus and turn it over to Toktamish. The Russian chronicles inform us that Timur intended to undertake another campaign against the Horde and against Rus.

Thus, Timur's "aid" to the Russian lands, as a matter of fact, comes down to some very concrete results: the establishment of Golden Horde unity and the pillaging of the outlying Russian lands. With its own forces, Rus freed itself from Tatar oppression 75 years after Timur's death.

Now let us have a look at Timur as a "saviour" in relation to other European countries. There exists an opinion that Timur's defeat of the Ottoman Sultan Bajazet I near Ankara in 1402 postponed the fall of Constantinople for several decades. The appearance of Timur's forces in Asia Minor was a next stage of his pillaging compaigns. Having devastated Iran, Transcaucasia and several Arab countries, Timur entered into conflict with the two greatest states of the Near East, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the latter had subjugated almost the entire Balkan Peninsula and had in fact liquidated the Byzantine Empire: all that there was left for the Turks to do was to seize Constantinople. In 1400, Bajazet I had just besieged this city when his conflict with Timur came to a head.

Not only a great military commander, Timur was also not a bad diplomat. Preparing for his clash with Bajazet I, he attracted part of the Turkish tribes of eastern Asia Minor and Armenia to his side. The ruler of another force of Turkmen was expelled from his possessions by Timur; he found refuge with the Turkish sultan. Both conquerors made ready for the decisive engagement, which took place in 1402 near the site of the modern Turkish capital. Timur's army was much larger, but the Ottomans were superior in arms. The

outcome of the clash, however, was not determined by force of arms. Bajazet's force consisted of Moslems and Christians. Also part of it were nomadic Turkic tribes, principally those that had come into Asia Minor with the Mongols. In the course of the 14th century, the Ottoman sultans had subjugated them to their rule, but these nomads merely waited for the right moment to liberate themselves. On the eve of the battle, Timur turned to them with an appeal that strongly recalls that of Genghis Khan's commanders to the Polovtsy in the period of their first campaign in Eastern Europe (1222-1223). And the nomads of Asia Minor, betraying Bajazet, went over to Timur, thereby ensuring the defeat of the Ottoman army.

What were the results of the Ankara battle? It is hardly possible to boil them down to one single outcome. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was dealt a heavy blow; following that there were several years of internecine strife between Bajazet's sons, and all this was aggravated by a peasant war within the confines of the Empire. But it is not right to exaggerate Timur's "services" here. Already in 1413 Mohammed I, having defeated his rivals in the struggle for supreme power, began a successful struggle with Venice, and in 1422 his successor, Murad II, undertook the next siege of Constantinople. In this manner the European expansion of the Ottoman Empire recommenced a few decades after Bajazet's defeat, and within 20 years the Turkish sultan again besieged the capital of Byzantium. The respite which it had received proved not to be very long. And the pogrom which Timur's forces undertook in Asia Minor had a terrible effect upon the situation of the Greek, Turkish, Armenian and other peoples.

Finally, let us see what Timur's real role was in the history of North Africa, or more precisely, of Egypt (it is impossible to say anything about any relations he might have had with other countries of this region). If it is still possible to assert, by stretching things greatly, that

Timur's victory over Bajazet postponed the fall of Constantinople for a short time, the claim that Timur played the role of "savior" in relation to the countries of North Africa is absolutely unsubstantiated. In the 13th-15th centuries, Egypt, ruled by the Mameluke dynasties of Kipchak and Circassian origin, was one of the most powerful states. Palestine and Syria were under its authority.

Timur first invaded Syria, which was subjugated to Egypt, in 1395-1396, but two years before that his forces, after devastating Mesopotamia, captured the district of Mardin, which was under the control of the Egyptian sultan, Barkuk. Timur had already entered into conflict with Egypt. Appearing in Syria in 1396, he suddenly turned east, to the Indian campaign. After the death of Barkuk in 1399, Timur, having once again devasted Azerbaijan, Georgia and other countries, invaded the Egyptian possessions anew. His actions in Syria, as everywhere, were accompanied by the ravaging of cities, the taking of populations into captivity and so forth. The Egyptian sultan Farag tried to organise a stand against Timur, but after the latter's successes in Syria and especially after the defeat of Farag's ally, Bajazet, Farag acknowledged himself Timur's vassal. Only after he learned of the terrible conqueror's death did Farag begin to equip his forces to retake the lost territories.

The events enumerated above show that it was not the Turkish sultan but Timur who threatened Egypt. Although relations between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were not friendly, it is hardly possible to claim that, at the moment of Timur's invasion of the Near East countries, the Ottoman Empire seriously threatened Egypt's independence. It was still not strong enough for that. Egypt and its Syrian possessions were seized by Selim I only in 1516-1517. But before they could accomplish this act, the Turks had to strengthen themselves significantly in the Balkans, liquidate the independence and semi-independence of the emirs of eastern Asia Minor, and defeat the Safawid state decisively. Thus, there

is no foundation whatsoever for describing Timur as the "savior" of Egypt. Egyptian historians of the 15th century do not conceal their hostility towards Timur. And this was not personal animosity but hatred for an enemy who had humbled their country.

And thus, what does an analysis of the basic problems connected with an evaluation of Timur and his role in the history of Maverannahr, Rus and other European countries, and also Egypt, say? From a sufficiently impartial critique of the factual material there emerges before us the figure of a second Genghis Khan, a great military commander and diplomat who made certain efforts to secure the prosperity of his own "native ulus", but who at the same time shamelessly plundered and devastated many countries. The temporary rise of Maverannahr, which was observed in the 15th century, was to a significant degree caused by the results of the wars of pillage, by the pumping out of material wealth and human forces from the countries Timur subjugated, and for this reason the rise was unstable. Timur's role in the history of Central Asia and of peoples of other countries which came into contact with his hordes was reactionary, exactly as was the role of his predecessor, Genghis Khan.

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PSEUDO-HISTORY IN THE SERVICE OF PEKING'S GREAT-POWER DESIGNS

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With a series of articles on world history signed by a certain Shih Tsun[1] the CPC Central Committee's theoretical journal Hungchi broke the long silence imposed on the social sciences by the "cultural revolution", during which Marxist historians, economists and philosophers were removed from work, sent to be "re-educated" or were exterminated. While laying claim to the discovery of general laws governing world history, these articles in effect lay down political guidelines. Their purpose is to reinforce Peking's Great-Power strategy ideologically and mirror the latest changes in the tactics of implementing this strategy in China and on the international scene.

This attempt to give their chauvinistic policy an ideological "foundation" has been undertaken by the CPC leaders in order to justify it in the eyes of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communists and the international Communist movement, to elevate it to the rank of new theoretical "achievements" and reinforce it with quotations from the works of Lenin taken out of context or misrepresented altogether.

[1] "On the Study of World History" (Hungchi, 1972, No. 4); "Once More on the Study of World History" (Hungchi, 1972, No. 5); "Study the History of Imperialism" (Hungchi, 1972, No. 6); "Understand the History of the National Liberation Movement" (Hungchi, 1972, No. 11).

Inasmuch as the objective course of history clearly clashes with the reactionary, anti-Soviet guideline of the Chinese leaders, Peking propaganda has been given the assignment of falsifying the history of world development and fitting the historical process into a pattern conforming to their chauvinistic ambition to attain world supremacy and to their anti-Soviet attitude. To achieve this purpose they decided to have recourse to a means such as the study of world history on, needless to say, a pseudo-scientific foundation. This aim is served also by the articles penned by Shih Tsun, who offers phoney historical arguments to justify the Great-Power aspirations of the Peking leaders. The journal Hungchi recommends the writing and circulation of popular books on history, in which world history and the development of individual countries would be recounted in the Maoist spirit.

In the articles in question no attempt is made to assert that the "thought of Mao" is the highest phase in the development of social thinking and that it rectifies allegedly mistaken Marxist-Leninist propositions. More, these articles state that the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism have to be studied, but recommend not more than four or five titles. Shih Tsun interprets the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist teaching arbitrarily, as required by the Chinese leaders.

The only point in studying world history, he maintains, is that it helps to give a better understanding and implement the proletarian revolutionary guideline of Chairman Mao, who, it is alleged, has made a large contribution to civilisation. The works of Mao Tse-tung, particularly the work headed On New Democracy, are proclaimed, along with the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, as the theoretical compass in the study of modern and latest history and also of the experience of the international Communist movement, which Mao Tse-tung is alleged to have generalised. Therefore, to understand his "theory" it is imperative to study the history of that movement (naturally, as interpreted by the Maoists).

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Evidently on account of the international revolutionary movement's unfavourable reaction to the attempts to impose the "Chinese experience" on various contingents of that movement, nothing is said in Shih Tsun's articles of "Asian" or "Chinese" Marxism, of the special significance of the "Chinese revolutionary experience". Instead of bluntly expounding the "Chinese way of revolution", these articles make a roundabout, disguised effort to force Mao Tse-tung's ideological leadership on the international Communist movement.

A utilitarian approach to history as a means of justifying any arbitrary political act is to be seen in the attempts to substantiate the innumerable zigzags in Peking's policy and to veil its collapse with the argument that the path of revolution is tortuous, that progress in a complicated struggle is a dialectical law of history and that no revolution proceeded smoothly after it had achieved victory. In support of this contention Shih Tsun offers a spurious pattern showing the duration of bourgeois revolutions, which allegedly lasted 50 years in Britain, 80 years in France and over 100 years in the USA. This is contrary to the facts.

Today Mao Tse-tung and his "thought" are lauded under the screen of an analysis of arbitrarily constructed laws of history. For instance, Shih Tsun offers a singularly primitive exposition of Lenin's teaching on imperialism and categorically asserts that Mao Tse-tung had upheld and enlarged on that teaching. As an argument, he cites Mao Tse-tung's propaganda thesis to the effect that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers. This, properly speaking, is the sum total of Shih Tsun's proof that Mao Tse-tung had contributed to Lenin's theory of imperialism.

On the other hand, in his articles there is no shortage of distortions and falsifications of Lenin's theory. He continues the line of interpreting imperialism narrowly, solely as a policy of aggression and plunder. Plunder is the substance of imperialism, Shih Tsun writes, entirely ignoring

his own assertions that colonial plunder was observed long before the epoch of imperialism. He confines his analysis of the history of imperialism to accentuating the contradictions and struggle between the imperialists, the flimsiness of the agreements on the division of the world into spheres of influence, and imperialist wars as the means of resolving contradictions. In the long run it turns out that the Peking falsifiers needed Lenin's theory of imperialism to "substantiate" the counter-revolutionary aims of the Maoist attacks on the Soviet Union. For this they distort Lenin's teaching on the sources and substance of opportunism. In their efforts to slander the Soviet Union and undermine the alliance between the three major forces of the world revolutionary process—the socialist community, the world Communist movement and the national liberation movement—Peking propaganda slanderously applies Lenin's characteristic of the opportunists of the Second International as social-imperialists to the Soviet Union.

In Peking's pattern of modern and latest world history the class approach to an analysis of developments is replaced with a nationalistic, Great-Power approach. In the newbaked "concept" of world history given in Hungchi nothing is said of the epoch-making mission of the working class and of the role of proletarian socialist revolutions today. Shih Tsun ignores the impact of the main contradiction of the present epoch, the contradiction between socialism and capitalism, and rejects the great progressive mission of the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries in world history. Essentially, in his articles the basic content of modern and latest history is reduced to the national liberation movement: he contends that the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples of the colonies is the sole motive force of human progress. Significant as is the national liberation struggle against colonialism, this formulation leads away from the basic contradiction of our epoch. In order to camouflage the Maoists' departure from Marxism-Leninism, these one-sided propositions are alternated with

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individual Marxist theses on the substance of colonialism, the role played by the masses, the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and so on. But these theses are ultimately supplanted by the assertion that the masses can play the leading role provided they are guided by the "thought of Mao", in accordance with Peking's thesis on the role played by the Third World peoples and countries in the struggle against the "two super-powers", the Soviet Union in particular. As interpreted by Peking, world history and the world revolutionary movement have very little to offer in the way of experience. They are doctored and falsified to serve the political aims of the Maoist rulers.

In fact, Shih Tsun ignores the fundamental distinction between modern and contemporary history, which was ushered in by the appearance of the socialist system on the historical stage. While noting that the Great October Socialist Revolution started a new era in world history, he regards this era not as the latest period of world history but only as the third period of modern history, thereby bracketing the emergence, development and downfall of capitalism with the birth, development and triumph of socialism. This approach of the Peking propagandists to the periodisation of world history is not accidental. It covers their striving not only to belittle the role played by the USSR but also to ignore the progressive significance of the USSR and the entire socialist community in history. Their pattern disregards socialism as a powerful force exercising the decisive influence on society's development, including China. Moreover, the Soviet Union is quite falsely portrayed as the successor of tsarist imperialism, as allegedly continuing tsarist Russia's aggressive, colonial policy in the specific form of "social-imperialism". They strike out the epochal significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution in order directly to connect tsarist imperialism and the Maoist-invented Soviet "social-imperialism" as an unbroken policy directed at the colonial oppression and enslavement of peoples, including the peoples of the USSR. In effect,

Shih Tsun's assertions about the Soviet Union coalesce with the scribblings of the most reactionary imperialist "Sovietologists" in the West. The new pattern of world history concocted in Peking is nothing less than another counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet, anti-socialist undertaking aimed at undermining the faith of the peoples in socialism and in socialist internationalism and villifying the great friendship among the peoples of the USSR and the progressive role played by the Soviet Union in the world.

The Peking "theorists" are endeavouring to push from the stage of history the entire socialist community together with the Soviet Union. The countries of that community are regarded as having been allegedly enslaved by Soviet "social-imperialism". It is contended that they will inevitably rise against it. In this, too, the Peking propagandists are at one with the most rabid enemies of socialism in the imperialist countries, whose reactionary ravings the Peking "theorists" propagate under the guise of a "new pattern" of world history. There is no doubt whatever that this "pattern" and the specious pronouncements of the Peking propagandists about Soviet "social-imperialism" pursue the aim of camouflaging the aggressive substance and hollowness of Maoist anti-Sovietism.

On the basis of the unsupported thesis that tsarist Russia was out to achieve world supremacy, Shuh Tsun maintains, in contravention of historical truth, that tsarist Russia had seized a large territory belonging to China. While quoting Lenin, who exposed the actions of tsarism in China, he flagrantly distorts Lenin's pronouncements on this subject.[2] Doctoring a quotation from The War in China, a work written by Lenin in 1900, he writes that tsarist Russia "was the first to place her rapacious paws" upon China (the words in the quotation marks are given out by Shih Tsun as an accurate quotation from Lenin's work). However, referring to the

[2] See Hungchi, 1972, No. 11.

Opium Wars, Lenin noted that in the colonial plunder of China the initiative was taken namely by the Western capitalist powers. In The War in China Lenin wrote: "The bourgeois governments of Europe have long been conducting this policy of plunder with respect to China, and now they have been joined by the autocratic Russian Government."[3] In this manner the Peking propagandists distort what Lenin wrote about Russia's policy towards China. While characterising tsarist Russia's imperialist policy, Shih Tsun completely disregards the plans of the other imperialist powers, particularly Britain, Germany, Japan and the USA to lock Russia up in her land boundaries and deny her a free outlet to the sea, and depicts as expansionism Russia's efforts to safeguard the security of her seaways.

On the whole, in world history until 1917 Russia is wrongly depicted as the principal and almost only aggressive country, while the predatory colonial policy of the Western imperialist states is played down and moved into the background despite the fact that the size of the territory and population subjugated by the Western imperialist powers was several times larger than the conquests of tsarist Russia. Even in this case the Peking pseudo-historians sing in unison with the anti-Soviet propagandists and falsifiers of Russian history in the West.

In dwelling on Russia's plans of aggression, Shih Tsun pursues a definite political purpose, namely, that of accusing the Soviet Union that it likewise has colonial ambitions. The political aim of this falsification is to discredit a great socialist country and the internationalist principles underlying the friendship and cooperation among its peoples, and paralyse the immense influence exercised on the relations between nationalities by the half-century existence and successful development of the world's first socialist union of nations.

[3] V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.4, p.373.

The speciousness of Shih Tsun's articles is also seen in the fact that in them the main class contradiction of the contemporary epoch, namely, the contradiction between socialism and imperialism, is replaced with an artificially constructed pattern of contradictions between imperialism and "social-imperialism" (or between the "two super-powers") and between the "super-powers" and the rest of the world, countries with different social systems, from socialist to capitalist, including countries with the most reactionary regimes.

The Peking mud-slingers make no distinction between the peaceloving socialist foreign policy of the USSR and the policy pursued by US imperialism, depict the Soviet Union as one of the "two imperialist super-powers" fighting for world supremacy, spread the fabrication that a conspiracy exists between the USSR and the USA with the aim of dominating the world, and endeavour to set the peoples of small and medium countries against the Soviet Union's policy peace.

Shih Tsun's analysis of facts from modern and latest history pursues the objective of creating an artificial nationalistic pattern of contradictions in the world today and demonstrating that these contradictions can and inevitably will be resolved in a manner politically suitable to the Peking leaders, i.e., through the defeat of the "super-powers" and the victory of the rest of the world in the struggle against imperialism and "social-imperialism". The objective of theories of this kind is to "prove" that in their drive for world supremacy the Peking leaders are justified in using not only broad segments of the working people but also the intermediate strata and even the monopoly bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and racist and other reactionary regimes. Peking propaganda propounds the view that in the struggle against imperialism the principle role is played not by the world socialist community but by the Third World countries and peoples, who, it alleges, bear the main burden of that struggle.

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Nobody intends to question the fact that the national liberation movement has played and continues to play a great role in the struggle against imperialism. The Communists have always regarded that movement as one of the major reserves of the socialist revolution and as an ally of the working class in the liberation struggle. However, Marxist-Leninist teaching has never regarded the national liberation movement as a self-sufficing force, much less as the only revolutionary force capable of overwhelming the capitalist world.

Having identified the national liberation movement with the world proletarian revolution, Shih Tsun goes further, calling it the mainstay of the world anti-imperialist revolution. Completely ignoring the significance of the Soviet people's victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism and turning a blind eye to the Soviet Union's massive assistance for the Chinese people's liberation struggle against imperialism and internal reaction, Shih Tsun writes that it was due exclusively to Chairman Mao Tse-tung's leadership that the Chinese people accomplished a victorious new democratic revolution and embarked upon the building of socialism, that realising the truth of the maxim that "power comes from the barrel of a gun" an ever larger number of countries and regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America are taking the revolutionary path of armed struggle.[4] He thus misinterprets the historical content of the national liberation movement, falsely depicting it as the implementation of Peking's guidelines by the oppressed peoples. In spite of the facts, the Soviet Union is proclaimed the enemy of the national liberation movement. He propounds the absurd idea that the national liberation movement will be unable to achieve final victory without fighting "Soviet neocolonialism".

In their efforts to gain undivided control of the national liberation movement the Peking leaders are going to all

[4] See Hungchi, 1972, No. 11.

lengths to disparage the Soviet Union's economic and military assistance to the developing countries and portray this policy of the Soviet Union as differing in no way from the actions of US imperialism. For this purpose they have "perfected" the "intermediate-zone theory" that they had trumped up in order to deceive the peoples of the world. According to the latest interpretation there are "two intermediate zones": the first consisting of Asian, African and Latin American countries, and the second consisting of some of the leading capitalist countries of the West and East. According to the Maoist propagandists, in these zones the "two predominant powers"--the USA and the USSR--are fighting for world supremacy. On this basis the Chinese leaders are attempting to rally round themselves different, even antipodal, forces for which they are urging the creation of the "broadest united front" spearheaded, in fact, against the USSR. The Peking propagandists are endeavouring to put over the idea that the countries of the first "intermediate zone", i.e., of Asia, Africa and Latin America, should not only support one another but that they could unite with the "second intermediate zone", i.e., with the capitalist countries, with the exception of the USA. All this is recommended with the ultimate objective of fighting the Soviet Union. The ververbiage about the "two super-powers" is only a screen hiding the anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leaders.

The Peking pseudo-historians do not confine themselves to anti-socialist, anti-Soviet slander. In their articles, which contain not even a hint of a class approach to world history, they crudely accentuate nationalistic Sinocentrism and seek to set the Eastern peoples against the peoples of the West on racial grounds. According to their pattern of world development during the period of "modern history", the Western countries have made no contribution whatever to world citivilisation and development and have always been exponents of aggression and oppression, while the Eastern countries had a high level of culture and development for many thousands of years until their enslavement by the West.

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Nothing at all is said of the role played in the history of these countries by the forces of internal reaction and aggression.

While having no intention of denying the immense contribution that the countries of the East have made to world civilisation, we cannot but note that the rejection of the progressive role played by the Western peoples can only be assessed as a striving by the Peking propagandists to kindle contradictions between the peoples of the East and West on a racist, chauvinistic foundation, to incite hostility between nations in order to use it for chauvinist, hegemonistic aims. The belittlement of the role played by the Western nations in world history implies the belittlement of the role played by the proletariat of the Western countries in the world revolutionary struggle in the past and today. While conceding that there was some progressive significance in the struggle of the Western proletariat in the 19th century, the Peking pseudo-historians assert that the peoples of the Asian, African and Latin American countries have remained the only revolutionary force in the 20th century, that since the 15th century they have given rise to one revolutionary storm after another.

This theory completely ignores the greatest movement of modern times, the struggle of the peoples for the transition to socialism and the building of a socialist society and its highest phase, communist society. Shih Tsun totally disregards the historic achievements of the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

It evidently goes against the grain of the inspirers of the articles in Hungchi that the policy pursued by the Soviet Union is moving from one success to another in the struggle to ease international tension, avert the threat of a thermonuclear war and strengthen security in the world as a whole and in individual regions, particularly in Europe. They are infuriated by the fact that the Soviet Union's great achievements over the past 50 years are recognised by

the other socialist countries, the national-democratic parties, the liberation movements and democratic organisations. However, the pseudo-scientific pattern of world development cannot deceive the peoples. The Hungchi articles with their manifestly untenable discourses about world history only give the whole world a clearer insight into the Great-Power, chauvinistic attitudes of the Peking leaders. None of their subjective twists in policy can change history's objective course. The basic interests of the Soviet Union and Chinese peoples make peace and friendship between them imperative. Soviet people want to see China a flourishing socialist power and an ally in the struggle for peace, against imperialism. When this happens depends on China's leaders. Needless to say, nothing can compel the Soviet Union to depart from its principled Marxist-Leninist policy, from its firm defence of the Soviet people's state interests and the inviolability of Soviet territory and from its resolute struggle against the divisive activities of the Chinese leaders in the socialist world and the liberation movement.

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Hong Kong	Apollo Book Co., P.O. Box 5710, KOWLOON; Great Eastern Book Co., 38-46 Hennessy Road, 2/F., P.O. Box 20005.
Iceland	Istorg H.F., Posthолf 444, REYKJAVIK.
India	People's Publishing House, Rani Jhansi Rd., NEW DELHI, 55; P.P.H. Bookstall, 190-B Khetwadi Main Road, BOMBAY-4; N.C.B.H. (Private) Ltd., 6 Nallathambi Chetty Str., MADRAS-2; Manisha Granthalaya, Bankim Chatterjee Str., CALCUTTA-12; National Book Agency, 12 Bankim Chatterjee Str.,

	CALCUTTA-12; Prabhath Book House, Head Office, TRIVANDRUM-24; Himachal Book Centre, Skiplton Villa, SIMLA 1; Nabajuga Granthalaya, Bajrakabati Road, CUTTACK-1, Orissa; Visalaandhra Publishing House, Eluru Road, VIJAYAWADA-2, A.P.; People's Book House, Opp. B.N. College, Ashoka Raj Path, PATNA-4.
Iran	Bookstore Sako Hovsepian 48, Avenue Marshal Stalin, TEHERAN; "Gutemberg", Khiabane Manuchehri, TEHERAN.
Iraq	General Establishment for Press and P Printing, Sarrifia, BAGHDAD.
Italy	Libreria Italia-U.R.S.S., Via Edilio Raggio, 1-10, 16124 GENOVA; Associazione Italia-U.R.S.S., Sezione di Milano, Via Dogana, 4, 20123 MILANO; So Co. Lib. Ri., Piazza Margana, 33, 00186, ROMA.
Japan	Kaigai Publications Ltd., P.O. Box 5020, Tokyo International, TOKYO 100-31; Nauka Ltd., 30-19, Minami-Ikebukuro, 2-chome, Toshima-ku, TOKYO; Far Eastern Book-Sellers, Kanda, P.O.B. 72, TOKYO; Nisso-Tosho Ltd., 2-1-6, Nishi-Kanda, Chiyodu-ku TOKYO.
Jordan	Jordan Distribution Agency, P.O. Box 375, AMMAN.
Kenya	Equatorial Publishers Ltd., P.O. Box 7973, NAIROBI.
Kuwait	The Kuwait Bookshops, Company Ltd, P.O. Box 2942.
Lebanon	Maison d'Edition, Dar el Farabi, B.P. 3181, BEYROUTH; Librairie das Amis-Machdotz, Rue de Capucins-Imm. Sahnooui, 2 Etage, No. 11, BEYROUTH.
Luxembourg	Messageries Paul Kraus, Case postale 2022, Luxembourg-Gare, LUXEMBOURG.
Mali	Librarie Popularie, P.B. 28, BAMAKO.
Malta	Polcar, 7 Market St., FLORIANA.
Mexico	Ediciones de Cultura Popular S.A., San Juan de Letran No. 37-709, Apartado postal 2352, MEXICO 1, D.F.; Servicios Bibliograficos, Apartado postal 8336, MEXICO D.F.; Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso, Escobedo Sur 146, MONTERREY, N.L.; "El Dia" Alfonso Lopez Camacho, Rue Flores Magon (6a) 1908, Apartado postal No. 175, TIJUANA, B. Cfa.

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Morocco	Societe Cherifienne de Distribution et de Presse, 1, Place de Bandoeng, CASABLANCA.
Netherlands	"Pegasus" Boekhandel, Leidsestraat 25, AMSTERDAM; Ster-boek, Visserstraat, 23, GRONINGEN.
Nepal	Baje Ko Pasal, Bank, Road, BIRATNAGAR.
New Zealand	Progressive Books, 14-16, Darby Strt., AUCKLAND C.I. Technical Books Ltd., 262 Lambton Quay, WELLINGTON. New Zealand Tribune, P.O. Box 19-144, AUCKLAND.
Nigeria	Home and Overseas Newspapers, 11 Martins Street, P.O. Box 2133, LAGOS.
Norway	A/S Narvesens Litteraturtjeneste, Bertrand Narvesens vei 2, Postbooks 6140, OSLO 6; A/S Norsg Forlah NY DAG, Books 3634 GB, OSLO.
Pakistan	People's Publishing House, Plomer Building, 26, The Mall, LAHORE; Paradise Subscription Agency, Fatima Jinnah Road, KARACHI-4. Classic. Shahrah-E-Quaid-E-Azam /The Mall/, Lahore-3.
Peru	Libreria y Distribuidora Siglo XX, Jiron Trujillo 228-Rimac LIMA.
Senegal	Librairie Centrale, B.P. III, DAKAR.
Somalia	Samater's, P.O. Box 936, MOGADISCIO.
Sri Lanka	People's Publishing House, 124, Kumarau Ratnam Road, COLOMBO-2.
Sudan	National Culture Library, P.O. Box 10, KHARTOUM.
Sweden	AB C.E. Fritzes Kungl., Hovbokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, STOCKHOLM, 16; AB Sandbergs Bokhandel, Box 5702, S-114, 87 STOCKHOLM; Forlags AB Arbetarkultur, Kungsgatan, 84, 112 27 STOCKHOLM.
Switzerland	Genossenschaft Literaturvertrieb, Cramerstrasse 2, Ecke, Zweierstrasse, 8004 ZÜRICH; Pinkus et Cie Büchersuchdienst, Limmatbuchhandlung Froschaugasse 7, 80001 ZÜRICH; Herbert Lang C-ie AG, 2, Münzgraben Amthausgasse, 3000 BERN 7; Société de la Librairie, S.A., Librarie Academia, 9 Av. Henri-Dunaut, 1211, GENEVE 4.
Syria	General Press Company Nizam Bros and Kayyali, 29 Ayyar Street, P.O. Box 2366, DAMAS; Dar Dimachq Editeurs-Distributeurs Adib Tounbakji, Share Port Said, DAMAS.

Tanzania	African Bookshop, P.O. Box 20837, DAR ES SALAAM.
Togo	Librairie Populaire, P.B. 935, 129, Bd. Circulaire, LOME.
Tunisia	Les Etablissements A. Ben Abdallah d'Edition et de diffusion, sis 8, rue de Tanneurs a Tunis, TUNIS.
Uganda	Popular Book Supply Ltd., 81, Kampala Road, P.O. Box 769, KAPALA.
United Kingdom	Central Books Ltd., 37 Grays Inn Road, LONDON W.C.1.; COLLET's Holdings, Ltd., Denington Estate, WELLINGBOROUGH Northants; Robert Maxwell and Co., Ltd., 4-5, Fitzroy Square, LONDON, W.1.
USA	Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 Fift Fifth Ave., NEW YORK 10010, N.Y.; Stechert-Hafner, Inc., 31 East 10th Street, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.; Universal Distributors Co., 52-54 West 13th Street, NE NEW YORK 11, N.Y., Eastern News Distributors, Inc., 155 West, 15 Street, NEW YORK, 10011, N.Y.; Moore-Cottrell Subscription Agencies, Inc., North Cohocton, N.Y.; Schoenhof's Slavic Books, Inc., 1280 Massachusetts Avenue, CAMBRIDGE 38, Mass.; Imported Publications, Inc., 1730 Arcade Place CHICAGO, Illinois 60612.
Uruguay	Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, S.A., Casilla Correo 589, MONTEVIDEO.
Venezuela	Distribuidora Transocianica, Apartado 40242, CARACAS; Distribuidora "Progreso", Apartado 14360, CARACAS.
West Berlin	Kawe Kommissionsbuchlandlung 1,BERLIN 12 (Charlottenburg) Hardenbergalatz 13; Das europpische Buch,1000 BERLIN 12, Knesebeck 3.

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